Computers, Privacy & the Constitution

Mass Video Surveillance – A Threat to Democracy?

Growing surveillance by video cameras or closed-circuit television (CCTV) has become a widespread normality in the US and worldwide. Living in New York City, every step seems to be monitored by cameras once you leave your apartment. Cameras are installed in lobbies, elevators, parking lots, shops, public transports and stations, public spaces, at building entrances, … everywhere. According to a HIS Markit report, the US has nearly the same ratio of security cameras to citizens as China as of 2018 (US: 1 camera for every 4.6 people; China: 1 camera for every 4.1 people). And the number of cameras in the US is rising. Whereas in 2015 there was a total of 47 million cameras in the US, the number was already at 79 million in 2017 and is expected to reach 85 million by 2021. When it comes to concentration of cameras the US is almost on par with China – a state that is widely being condemned for its mass surveillance and suppression of its citizens. This unfavorable comparison leads to questions and concerns about the legitimacy of mass video surveillance and its repercussions on democracy. This essay will first analyze the rationale behind video surveillance and then talk about its risks.

Rationale behind video surveillance

Public video surveillance is justified as being necessary for national security, i.e. to prevent crime or acts of terrorism. Cameras are usually installed highly visible in order to act as a deterrent as people are expected to be on their best behavior when they are feeling watched.

However, it is questionable whether this rationale can actually be achieved by mass video surveillance. Firstly, there is no evidence that mass surveillance helps to prevent terrorism. In contrast, terrorist / suicide attackers may even be attracted to the television coverage cameras can ensure. Secondly, in reality video surveillance is rather used to reduce much pettier crimes or even over-enforcing those at the cost of minorities and other disadvantaged groups who are usually disproportionately affected. Moreover, a potential deterring effect of video surveillance would simply move crimes to not surveilled areas. In order to combat this effect total public surveillance would be necessary and even then, total security would be an impossible aim to achieve (e.g. due to people acting on impulse). Video surveillance cannot replace policemen and mostly serves as a tool for crime detection.

Risks of video surveillance

Despite some perceived benefits of public video surveillance, it also entails many risks.

The idea of people being on their best behavior when feeling watched illustrates a significant problem of mass surveillance: it threatens civil rights and liberties by potentially having a chilling effect on freedom of expression and association. Being watched by authorities results in people being more self-conscious and potentially altering or refraining from their usual behaviors, e.g. not going to rallies. Freedom of expression and association are at the core of a democracy; when they are restricted the democratic system of a state is challenged.

Another danger for democracy is that video surveillance is susceptible to abuse. Sophisticated systems and video analytics enable the police to track people across multiple cameras from a command-and-control center, desktop, or even smartphone and to analyze the mass of filming. The video footage is nowadays of such high quality that not only people’s sex, age and type of clothes but also their identity can unmistakably be identified. Even unusual behavior or disposition can be recognized and embarrassing footage sought out by video analytics. The rapid advances in artificial intelligence contain the possibility of total public surveillance. In such a surveillance state security forces could screen anyone, produce movement profiles and extort opposition members with compromising video footage. Although most cameras in the US are owned by private individuals and not the government, this does not mean that the government / police does not have access to the video footage. It encourages businesses to place privately owned cameras on their police network so that there is no need to build its own centralized government-run camera system.

The fear of abuse also stems from the lack of legal restraints and controls on video surveillance. In the US, there are no legally enforceable rules to protect privacy in public and against abuse of CCTV systems. The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution merely protects against video searches by the police and mainly encompasses the home.

Conclusion

Despite video surveillance serving a legitimate purpose its impairment of civil rights - such as the right to privacy, freedom of expression and association – and its risks to democracy are considerable. Therefore, it should be confined to specific high-risk places and be subject to specific legislative regulation. Rules governing the admissibility of video surveillance have to be established, clarifying issues such as where cameras can be installed, how long video recordings can be stored, who and for what purpose can access the recordings, whether a judicial warrant is needed to access them, whether or under which circumstances video analytics can be employed, etc. This would also be an important step to ensure more transparency leading to a clearer public understanding of video surveillance. Further, the US should consider introducing a right to privacy in public - for example by expanding the scope of the Fourth Amendment.

-- Christine Otto - 19 Mar 2020

 

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r1 - 19 Mar 2020 - 19:24:21 - ChristineOtto
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