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LukeRushingSecondPaper 4 - 15 Apr 2018 - Main.LukeRushing
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< | | | | I. Introduction | |
<
< | Through contingency, the disempowered in England were able to transform unfreedom into freedom by unifying their might to usurp some power from the ruling classes. Power in England was wielded through rhetoric, resources, or unity. In England’s power ladder, the king was theoretically at the top, followed by the peerage and Parliament, and lastly, the commoners. But each rung depended in some way on a lower rung: the king depended on the peerage to raise funds and armies, and the peerage, in turn, relied on the commoners for taxes, labor, and military service. If a lower rung unified in opposition to a higher rung, they could deny that rung’s needs. In these moments, concessions could be forced upon the higher rungs, forcing them to give up some power and redistribute it more favorably to a lower-rung. Unfreedom in England gradually transformed into freedom through incremental concessions forced on the higher-rungs. | >
> | Through contingency, the disempowered in England were able to transform unfreedom into freedom by unifying their might to usurp some power from the ruling classes. In England’s power ladder, the king was theoretically at the top, followed by the peerage and Parliament, and lastly, the commoners. But each rung depended in some way on a lower rung: the king depended on the peerage to raise funds and armies, and the peerage, in turn, relied on the commoners for taxes, labor, and military service. If a lower rung unified in opposition to a higher rung, they could deny that rung’s needs. In these moments, concessions could be forced upon the higher rungs, forcing them to give up some power and redistribute it more favorably to a lower-rung. Unfreedom in England gradually transformed into freedom through incremental concessions forced on the higher-rungs. | | | II. The Distribution of Power on the Ladder | |
<
< | Despite the propagandist and ecclesiastical notion of the absolute monarch, the king could not directly and independently raise an army, impose taxes, or control local affairs. These powers were instead directly wielded by the peerage under the feudal expectation that their benefits would flow upward to the king. Thus, the peerage controlled England’s resources and if the king needed money or an army, he had to go to the barons or Parliament. | >
> | Power in England was wielded through rhetoric, resources, or unity. Resources were firmly the domain of the peerage, the king could not directly and independently raise an army, impose taxes, or control local affairs. These powers were instead directly wielded by the peerage under the feudal expectation that they were exercised on behalf of the king and their benefits would flow upward to him. Thus, if the king needed money or an army, he had to rely on the barons or Parliament. | | | Despite this reliance, the king exclusively wielded the rhetorical power to lend his subjects royal legitimacy. The peerage frequently squabbled among themselves for power, and the king’s rhetorical support for one faction or another could be enough to tip the balance in their direction. Once a faction had the explicit backing of the king, dissent became rebellion. Even though those opposed to the king’s chosen faction often had the resources to potentially prevail in a rebellion, victory still meant risking their position and their lives. Furthermore, the legitimacy bestowed by the king’s support helped rally undecided nobles to his chosen faction while at the same time giving dissenters a pretense for backing down. In the constant struggle for power among the nobility, the king’s support could help Davids beat Goliaths and help Goliaths crush Davids. Thus, even though the king alone could not raise funds or an army, those would could needed his support. | |
>
> | | | | But the king and the peers both relied on a lower-rung for power. The king’s economic and military power relied on a supply from the peerage and his ability to empower a faction with royal backing needed a faction to empower. If opposition to the king was united, he would have no independent means of raising funds or an army and no rhetorical power to use as a bargaining chip. Unified, the peers commanded enough resources to credibly threaten the king and make demands on him. But the peers relied on a lower-rung to muster those resources, they needed commoners to pay taxes, work their lands, and populate their armies. When the commoners united against the peers or the king, they too had enough leverage to make demands.
III. Freedoms for the Peerage Won by Contingency |
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LukeRushingSecondPaper 3 - 14 Apr 2018 - Main.LukeRushing
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< | The concentration of power over individual liberties in one person is the antithesis of freedom; because the monarchs began with almost unfettered power over individual liberties, freedom resulted from continual concessions forced onto the kings by their barons and by Parliament. Because the kings did not maintain a standing army until the late-17th century and their authority over local affairs flowed through the feudal system, they were forced to rely on the barons and Parliament to raise troops and funds. This reliance resulted in a sovereign unable to challenge the combined might of the barons or Parliament, and was repeatedly forced to relinquish his power over their rights. Over time, these relinquished rights added up to the modern freedom enjoyed by citizens of the UK and the weakened figurehead status of the monarch. | | | | |
<
< | The king’s reliance upon the barons and Parliament meant that his greatest power neither economic nor military, but rather rhetorical; by either casting legitimacy on the factions of barons and Parliamentarians who squabbled over control of government, or refusing to do so. A minority of barons alone could not govern, the opposed majority would wield sufficient military and economic power to punish the minority for attempting to upset the status quo and claim power for themselves. But if that same minority of barons had the decisive backing of the king, the only form of dissent left to the opposing majority was rebellion. Consequently, the king’s power was that his decision to back one faction shifted the responsibility of starting a war to the opposing faction, if they refused to concede. Wars are expensive and risky, even when the opposition to the king was a majority of barons such that they could prevail in a rebellion, victory would still mean risking significant amounts of money and potentially their lives. Once the king picked a side, that faction could use the king’s backing to strengthen their might by rallying barons who otherwise had no stake in the conflict. Meanwhile, the opposing side could use the king’s authority to as a pretense for backing down and avoiding a bloody and costly rebellion. Thus, when the king backed one faction, it incentivized unity behind that faction at the same time that it disincentivized the dissenting faction from exercising their economic and military power, even when dissenting faction’s power was greater than that wielded by the king and the faction he chose. By making an ally of the kind, a faction with insufficient military and economic power to prevail on their own gained rhetorical power. | >
> | I. Introduction | | | | |
<
< | But this dynamic was a two-way street. The king, lacking his own army or independent means of collecting taxes, could not muster a meaningful military or economic power on his own. Furthermore, when acting against the combined might of the barons or Parliament, the king could hardly command legitimacy and so, as per Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube, his rhetorical power was at its lowest ebb. While the king’s rhetorical power was sufficient to empower a faction, it required a faction to empower; the king needed the backing of the barons to wield any rhetorical, economic, or military power. Standing against the king unanimously (or nearly so), the barons and Parliament could deny him his power and thus wielded their military and economic power unopposed at the same time that the king could not wield his usual rhetorical power. In this position the barons and Parliament could either credibly threaten the king or could refuse to assent to his demands. | >
> | Through contingency, the disempowered in England were able to transform unfreedom into freedom by unifying their might to usurp some power from the ruling classes. Power in England was wielded through rhetoric, resources, or unity. In England’s power ladder, the king was theoretically at the top, followed by the peerage and Parliament, and lastly, the commoners. But each rung depended in some way on a lower rung: the king depended on the peerage to raise funds and armies, and the peerage, in turn, relied on the commoners for taxes, labor, and military service. If a lower rung unified in opposition to a higher rung, they could deny that rung’s needs. In these moments, concessions could be forced upon the higher rungs, forcing them to give up some power and redistribute it more favorably to a lower-rung. Unfreedom in England gradually transformed into freedom through incremental concessions forced on the higher-rungs. | | | | |
<
< | These occasions were the moments when power was slowly stripped from the king. That power was either given to the peers, through whom it would sometimes flow to their subjects or, on rare occasions, directly to all English subjects. For instance, the Magna Carta, the first major declaration of the liberties of the English, was issued five separate times by three different kings. The first three times, it was issued to appease a group who mounted a credible threat to the king. The last two times, it was issued as a concession demanded by the barons in exchange for new taxes requested by the king. The Provisions of Oxford, establishing Parliament as a check on the monarchy, was only issued because Henry III tried to place his son on the throne of Sicily, but did not have the economic means to do so. He was forced to ask his barons for funding, who agreed only on the condition that he first had to accept the Provisions. | >
> | II. The Distribution of Power on the Ladder | | | | |
<
< | There was one set of circumstances where the barons and Parliament held even more power over the monarch: when the throne was empty. Several times throughout English history an insecure claimant to the throne would be forced by a powerful faction to promise certain grants of liberty in exchange for their backing in putting him on the throne. The Charter of Liberties, forerunner to the Magna Carta, was issued by Henry I as a condition of the support of the nobility who felt that his brother, William II, had over-taxed them. Henry’s acquiescence to being bound by the laws of the kingdom was the bargaining chip that placed him on the throne. Almost 600 an angry populace ejected the Catholic James VII from his throne. With no obvious claimant to a vacant throne, Parliament offered it to the Protestant William and Mary, on the condition that they first accept the Bill of Rights of 1689. With Parliament holding all the cards the future king and queen replied, “we thankfully accept what you have offered us.” | >
> | Despite the propagandist and ecclesiastical notion of the absolute monarch, the king could not directly and independently raise an army, impose taxes, or control local affairs. These powers were instead directly wielded by the peerage under the feudal expectation that their benefits would flow upward to the king. Thus, the peerage controlled England’s resources and if the king needed money or an army, he had to go to the barons or Parliament.
Despite this reliance, the king exclusively wielded the rhetorical power to lend his subjects royal legitimacy. The peerage frequently squabbled among themselves for power, and the king’s rhetorical support for one faction or another could be enough to tip the balance in their direction. Once a faction had the explicit backing of the king, dissent became rebellion. Even though those opposed to the king’s chosen faction often had the resources to potentially prevail in a rebellion, victory still meant risking their position and their lives. Furthermore, the legitimacy bestowed by the king’s support helped rally undecided nobles to his chosen faction while at the same time giving dissenters a pretense for backing down. In the constant struggle for power among the nobility, the king’s support could help Davids beat Goliaths and help Goliaths crush Davids. Thus, even though the king alone could not raise funds or an army, those would could needed his support.
But the king and the peers both relied on a lower-rung for power. The king’s economic and military power relied on a supply from the peerage and his ability to empower a faction with royal backing needed a faction to empower. If opposition to the king was united, he would have no independent means of raising funds or an army and no rhetorical power to use as a bargaining chip. Unified, the peers commanded enough resources to credibly threaten the king and make demands on him. But the peers relied on a lower-rung to muster those resources, they needed commoners to pay taxes, work their lands, and populate their armies. When the commoners united against the peers or the king, they too had enough leverage to make demands. | | | | |
<
< | The French foreign minister once noted that “the English buy peace rather than make it.” | >
> | III. Freedoms for the Peerage Won by Contingency | | | | |
<
< |
Source?
| >
> | When the peerage unified against the king, they could demand some of his power over them be relinquished. Over time, this transformed the peers’ unfreedom into freedom. For instance, the Magna Carta was issued five separate times by three different kings. The first three times, it was issued to appease a group strong enough to threaten the king. The last two times, it was issued as a concession demanded by the peerage in exchange for new taxes requested by the king. The Provisions of Oxford, establishing Parliament as a check on the monarchy, were only issued to appease the barons who were unified in refusing to raise taxes to help Henry III place his son on the Sicilian throne.
When the throne was empty the unified peerage had even greater leverage. Powerful factions forced insecure claimants to the throne to promise grants of liberty in exchange for their backing. When Henry I claimed the throne without the means to hold it, the barons only backed his claim in exchange for new rights and protections for themselves under the Charter of Liberties. Five hundred years later, the ejection of James VII left no obvious claimant to the throne, and so Parliament offered it to William and Mary, contingent on their acceptance of the Bill of Rights of 1689. With Parliament holding all the cards, the future king and queen replied, “we thankfully accept what you have offered us.” | | | | |
>
> | IV. Freedoms for Commoners Won by Contingency | | | | |
<
< | Throughout English history kings bought piece between themselves and their subjects. The price they paid was their power over government and individuals. Over time, the kings were forced to nickel-and-dime this power away for short-term gains, until they became the ceremonial figure-heads they are today and the citizens of the UK had the power they have today. | >
> | The commoners also used their leverage to transform their unfreedom into freedom. During the Second Baron’s War, “the barons had been dependent to a considerable extent upon the assistance of smaller landowners who also had to be satisfied by a measure of reform.” These landowning commoners leveraged their position for greater property rights, including regulation of the right of extra-judicial distress, which were later codified in exchange for peace by the Statute of Marlborough.
The least free people in England, serfs, also transformed their unfreedom into freedom by contingency in the century following the Black Death, when severe labor shortages mobilized laborers and enabled them to seek higher wages. Though Parliament clumsily attempted to end this practice with the Statute of Labourers, the leverage the serfs gained was a major blow to villeinage, which effectively ceased by the 16th century. | | | | |
>
> | V. Conclusion | | | | |
<
< | | >
> | Throughout English history, those in power chose to “buy peace rather than make it.” Thomas Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, & Shane J. Maddock, American Foreign Relations: A History, to 1920: Volume 1 20 (2009). The price they paid was control over people and property. Over time, this power was nickeled-and-dimed away for short-term gains, incrementally transforming unfreedom in freedom. | | | | |
<
< | The best routes to improvement here are twofold. First, there's an
unexamined premise that "the monarchs began with almost unfettered
power over individual liberties." That's not right enough for an
unexamined premise. The charters of Angevin and Plantagenet kings,
not just John's "Great" one, speak a different language. What
William achieved was not a conquest only, or primarily. He used the
lawfulness of his reign wherever he could. So unfreedom does not
begin at the top of the society, which allows us to get at the
second route of improvement: not starting at the top, but at the
bottom of the social structure, where unfreedom actually was. This
will also allow some effort to see unfree tenure as well as
persons, with the result that we are thinking not so much about
civil liberty as about lordship.
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LukeRushingSecondPaper 2 - 26 Mar 2018 - Main.EbenMoglen
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="SecondPaper" |
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The concentration of power over individual liberties in one person is the antithesis of freedom; because the monarchs began with almost unfettered power over individual liberties, freedom resulted from continual concessions forced onto the kings by their barons and by Parliament. Because the kings did not maintain a standing army until the late-17th century and their authority over local affairs flowed through the feudal system, they were forced to rely on the barons and Parliament to raise troops and funds. This reliance resulted in a sovereign unable to challenge the combined might of the barons or Parliament, and was repeatedly forced to relinquish his power over their rights. Over time, these relinquished rights added up to the modern freedom enjoyed by citizens of the UK and the weakened figurehead status of the monarch. | | | There was one set of circumstances where the barons and Parliament held even more power over the monarch: when the throne was empty. Several times throughout English history an insecure claimant to the throne would be forced by a powerful faction to promise certain grants of liberty in exchange for their backing in putting him on the throne. The Charter of Liberties, forerunner to the Magna Carta, was issued by Henry I as a condition of the support of the nobility who felt that his brother, William II, had over-taxed them. Henry’s acquiescence to being bound by the laws of the kingdom was the bargaining chip that placed him on the throne. Almost 600 an angry populace ejected the Catholic James VII from his throne. With no obvious claimant to a vacant throne, Parliament offered it to the Protestant William and Mary, on the condition that they first accept the Bill of Rights of 1689. With Parliament holding all the cards the future king and queen replied, “we thankfully accept what you have offered us.” | |
<
< | The French foreign minister once noted that “the English buy peace rather than make it.” Throughout English history kings bought piece between themselves and their subjects. The price they paid was their power over government and individuals. Over time, the kings were forced to nickel-and-dime this power away for short-term gains, until they became the ceremonial figure-heads they are today and the citizens of the UK had the power they have today. | >
> | The French foreign minister once noted that “the English buy peace rather than make it.” | | | | |
>
> |
Source?
Throughout English history kings bought piece between themselves and their subjects. The price they paid was their power over government and individuals. Over time, the kings were forced to nickel-and-dime this power away for short-term gains, until they became the ceremonial figure-heads they are today and the citizens of the UK had the power they have today.
The best routes to improvement here are twofold. First, there's an
unexamined premise that "the monarchs began with almost unfettered
power over individual liberties." That's not right enough for an
unexamined premise. The charters of Angevin and Plantagenet kings,
not just John's "Great" one, speak a different language. What
William achieved was not a conquest only, or primarily. He used the
lawfulness of his reign wherever he could. So unfreedom does not
begin at the top of the society, which allows us to get at the
second route of improvement: not starting at the top, but at the
bottom of the social structure, where unfreedom actually was. This
will also allow some effort to see unfree tenure as well as
persons, with the result that we are thinking not so much about
civil liberty as about lordship.
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LukeRushingSecondPaper 1 - 31 Dec 2017 - Main.LukeRushing
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>
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="SecondPaper" |
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The concentration of power over individual liberties in one person is the antithesis of freedom; because the monarchs began with almost unfettered power over individual liberties, freedom resulted from continual concessions forced onto the kings by their barons and by Parliament. Because the kings did not maintain a standing army until the late-17th century and their authority over local affairs flowed through the feudal system, they were forced to rely on the barons and Parliament to raise troops and funds. This reliance resulted in a sovereign unable to challenge the combined might of the barons or Parliament, and was repeatedly forced to relinquish his power over their rights. Over time, these relinquished rights added up to the modern freedom enjoyed by citizens of the UK and the weakened figurehead status of the monarch.
The king’s reliance upon the barons and Parliament meant that his greatest power neither economic nor military, but rather rhetorical; by either casting legitimacy on the factions of barons and Parliamentarians who squabbled over control of government, or refusing to do so. A minority of barons alone could not govern, the opposed majority would wield sufficient military and economic power to punish the minority for attempting to upset the status quo and claim power for themselves. But if that same minority of barons had the decisive backing of the king, the only form of dissent left to the opposing majority was rebellion. Consequently, the king’s power was that his decision to back one faction shifted the responsibility of starting a war to the opposing faction, if they refused to concede. Wars are expensive and risky, even when the opposition to the king was a majority of barons such that they could prevail in a rebellion, victory would still mean risking significant amounts of money and potentially their lives. Once the king picked a side, that faction could use the king’s backing to strengthen their might by rallying barons who otherwise had no stake in the conflict. Meanwhile, the opposing side could use the king’s authority to as a pretense for backing down and avoiding a bloody and costly rebellion. Thus, when the king backed one faction, it incentivized unity behind that faction at the same time that it disincentivized the dissenting faction from exercising their economic and military power, even when dissenting faction’s power was greater than that wielded by the king and the faction he chose. By making an ally of the kind, a faction with insufficient military and economic power to prevail on their own gained rhetorical power.
But this dynamic was a two-way street. The king, lacking his own army or independent means of collecting taxes, could not muster a meaningful military or economic power on his own. Furthermore, when acting against the combined might of the barons or Parliament, the king could hardly command legitimacy and so, as per Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube, his rhetorical power was at its lowest ebb. While the king’s rhetorical power was sufficient to empower a faction, it required a faction to empower; the king needed the backing of the barons to wield any rhetorical, economic, or military power. Standing against the king unanimously (or nearly so), the barons and Parliament could deny him his power and thus wielded their military and economic power unopposed at the same time that the king could not wield his usual rhetorical power. In this position the barons and Parliament could either credibly threaten the king or could refuse to assent to his demands.
These occasions were the moments when power was slowly stripped from the king. That power was either given to the peers, through whom it would sometimes flow to their subjects or, on rare occasions, directly to all English subjects. For instance, the Magna Carta, the first major declaration of the liberties of the English, was issued five separate times by three different kings. The first three times, it was issued to appease a group who mounted a credible threat to the king. The last two times, it was issued as a concession demanded by the barons in exchange for new taxes requested by the king. The Provisions of Oxford, establishing Parliament as a check on the monarchy, was only issued because Henry III tried to place his son on the throne of Sicily, but did not have the economic means to do so. He was forced to ask his barons for funding, who agreed only on the condition that he first had to accept the Provisions.
There was one set of circumstances where the barons and Parliament held even more power over the monarch: when the throne was empty. Several times throughout English history an insecure claimant to the throne would be forced by a powerful faction to promise certain grants of liberty in exchange for their backing in putting him on the throne. The Charter of Liberties, forerunner to the Magna Carta, was issued by Henry I as a condition of the support of the nobility who felt that his brother, William II, had over-taxed them. Henry’s acquiescence to being bound by the laws of the kingdom was the bargaining chip that placed him on the throne. Almost 600 an angry populace ejected the Catholic James VII from his throne. With no obvious claimant to a vacant throne, Parliament offered it to the Protestant William and Mary, on the condition that they first accept the Bill of Rights of 1689. With Parliament holding all the cards the future king and queen replied, “we thankfully accept what you have offered us.”
The French foreign minister once noted that “the English buy peace rather than make it.” Throughout English history kings bought piece between themselves and their subjects. The price they paid was their power over government and individuals. Over time, the kings were forced to nickel-and-dime this power away for short-term gains, until they became the ceremonial figure-heads they are today and the citizens of the UK had the power they have today.
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