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Lane v. Cotton | | | Summary of Case | |
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< | A postmaster is not answerable for packet delivered to receiver at post office which was subsequently opened and from which enclosed Exchequer bills were removed. Receiver of packet, Underhill Breese, was appointed by postmasters who were placed in their positions by letters patent of the King. Nonetheless, Breese is paid from revenue of post office and is an officer of the King, as opposed to a deputy to the postmasters. | >
> | A postmaster is not answerable for packet delivered to clerk at post office which was subsequently opened and from which enclosed Exchequer bills were removed. Receiver of packet, Underhill Breese, was appointed by postmasters who were placed in their positions by letters patent of the King. Nonetheless, Breese is paid from revenue of post office and is an officer of the King, as opposed to a deputy to the postmasters. | | | | |
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< | The judges’ reasons for determining that the postmasters were not liable for the loss included: 1) post is there to promote trade and the Act erecting it (Act of 12 Car. 2, c. 35) is not regarded as creating absolute security for dispatches; 2) Breese though appointed by the postmasters had charge and trust of himself and is not a deputy to the defendants; 3) relevant statute includes provision providing for penalties of postmasters and statute did not intend that they be liable to private actions; 4) nature of post office doesn’t allow for protection of individual letters, as the office is too extensive and rushed with many people having access; 5) reward for postmasters is too small in proportion to the hazard; 6) Breese exceeded his authority in accepting the bills where his trust is only to carry letters; 7) concern about creating opportunities for fraud; and 8) statute lays out price tied to size and weight of packet and thus there is no consideration for content. | >
> | The judges’ reasons for determining that the postmasters were not liable for the loss included: 1) post is there to promote trade and the Act erecting it (Act of 12 Car. 2, c. 35) is not regarded as creating absolute security for dispatches; 2) clerk though appointed by the postmasters had charge and trust of himself and is not a deputy to the defendants; 3) relevant statute includes provision providing for penalties of postmasters and statute did not intend that they be liable to private actions; 4) nature of post office doesn’t allow for protection of individual letters, as the office is too extensive and rushed with many people having access; 5) reward for postmasters is too small in proportion to the hazard; 6) clerk exceeded his authority in accepting the bills where his trust is only to carry letters; 7) concern about creating opportunities for fraud; and 8) statute lays out price tied to size and weight of packet and thus there is no consideration for value of content. | | | Analysis | |
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< | One of the reasons for this case’s significance is the influence of Chief Justice Holt’s dissenting opinion, which advances a notion of public employment and a broader vision of employer liability than envisioned by the other justices. In Lane, Holt argues that the postmaster’s situation should be analogous to that of the innkeeper and carrier (1 Ld. Raym. 646, 652—53), and he draws analogies to the responsibilities of the sheriff and gaoler for prisoners and impounded goods (651). He specifically argues that non governmental officials in public office (e.g. ship captain and inn keeper) were strictly liable for loss and thus, it would be anomalous to immunize a public servant whose office was created by statute as a means of protecting the public. Furthermore, prior to the establishment of post office, any person who erected a post office would be liable for miscarriage and thus, in Holt's opinion, subjects who are now locked into using the services of this postmaster general shouldn’t be deprived of a remedy that they previously had. | >
> | One of the reasons for this case’s significance is the influence of Chief Justice Holt’s dissenting opinion, which advances a notion of public employment and a broader vision of employer liability than envisioned by the other justices. In Lane, Holt argues that the postmaster’s situation should be analogous to that of the innkeeper and carrier (1 Ld. Raym. 646, 652—53), and he draws analogies to the responsibilities of the sheriff and gaoler for prisoners and impounded goods (651). He specifically argues that non governmental officials in public office (e.g. ship captain and inn keeper) were strictly liable for loss and thus, it would be anomalous to immunize a public servant whose office was created by statute as a means of protecting the public (12 Mod. 473, 485). Furthermore, prior to the establishment of post office, any person who erected a post office would be liable for miscarriage and thus, in Holt's opinion, subjects who are now locked into using the services of this postmaster general shouldn’t be deprived of a remedy that they previously had (12 Mod. 473, 488). | | | Notion of Public Employment | |
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< | The dissent in Lane v. Cotton is seen as expanding liability by advancing the notion that people who hold themselves open to the public take on a duty to serve. Joseph Singer bases this view in part on Justice Holt’s assertion that, “where-ever any subject takes upon himself a public trust for the benefit of the rest of his fellow-subjects, he is eo ipso bound to serve the subject in all the things that are within the reach and comprehension of such an office, under the pain of an action against him.” Joseph Singer. No Right To Exclude. 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1283 at 1306, citing 88 Eng. Rep. 1458 (K.B. 1701) at 1464 (Holt, C.J., dissenting). Holt asserts that one in the public employment can not refuse the duty incumbent upon him and that there would thus be causes of action for a postmaster refusing a letter, inn keeper refusing a guest or blacksmith refusing to shoe a horse. Importantly, the existence of alternative means by which the public could accomplish these tasks would not be a valid defense. | >
> | The dissent in Lane v. Cotton is seen as expanding liability by advancing the notion that people who hold themselves open to the public take on a duty to serve. Joseph Singer bases this view in part on Justice Holt’s assertion that, “where-ever any subject takes upon himself a public trust for the benefit of the rest of his fellow-subjects, he is eo ipso bound to serve the subject in all the things that are within the reach and comprehension of such an office, under the pain of an action against him.” Joseph Singer. No Right To Exclude. 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1283 at 1306, citing 88 Eng. Rep. 1458 (K.B. 1701) at 1464 (Holt, C.J., dissenting). Holt asserts that one in the public employment can not refuse the duty incumbent upon him and that there would thus be causes of action for a postmaster refusing a letter, inn keeper refusing a guest or blacksmith refusing to shoe a horse (12 Mod. 473, 484). Importantly, the existence of alternative means by which the public could accomplish these tasks would not be a valid defense (12 Mod. 473, 488). | | | Singer claims that Holt advances this notion of public duty only in very broad strokes: “Holt does not explain what a ‘public employment’ is except to say that it involves taking on a ‘public trust’ for the benefit of one's fellow subjects or ‘a trade which is for the public good.’ The notion of public employment is refined in a subsequent case, Gisbourn v. Hurst, which takes up where Holt left off. In Gisbourn, holding oneself open to the public (by engaging in a common calling) immediately meant that one was engaged in public employment. Singer at 1306—07 citing 91 Eng. Rep. 220 (K.B. 1710). |
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