II. Collection and the Use of Personal Information During the Pandemic in East Asian Countries and its Problems

A. South Korea

1. Location Information Tracking

2. Disclosure of Movement Paths

B. Singapore

To slow down the spread of COVID-19, Singapore adopted a logging system called “SafeEntry,” which allows users to scan QR codes to check in to businesses and public venues, and an application called “TraceTogether,” which uses Bluetooth technology to detect and identify people who had close contact with the user of that application. If a citizen of Singapore is diagnosed positive with COVID-19, he or she must provide their "TraceTogether" data to the government. Although the government claimed that both of these measures were designed to minimize the invasion of citizens’ privacy, there was certain skepticism among the citizens because it was apparent that the government was collecting personal information such as mobile phone numbers and other identification data. Moreover, citizens were not happy when they later found out that the police actually had access to personal information collected by these measures.

C. Hong Kong

Hong Kong citizens are required to use a contact tracing application called “LeaveHomeSafe,” which utilizes QR codes to conduct anonymous contact tracing. Unlike "TraceTogether" used in Singapore, "LeaveHomeSafe" users have a choice on whether or not to upload their contact tracing data to a centralized server even when they were diagnosed positive with COVID-19. The voluntary characteristic of "LeaveHomeSafe," coupled with a relatively low number of COVID-19 cases in Hong Kong during the early days of the pandemic, caused fewer citizens to use this technology, and as a result, concerns about invasion of privacy were relatively low compared to other countries.

After all, some countries are now beginning to second-guess the effectiveness of these privacy-invading new technologies. After experiencing an uncontrollable spike in the number of new COVID-19 cases caused by Delta and Omicron variants, Singapore and South Korea have removed nearly all COVID-19-related restrictions and abandoned the use of their new technologies, which naturally made people wonder whether the use of these privacy-invading new technologies was really necessary in the first place. Sacrificing individual citizens’ privacy even in the name of public interest should never be taken lightly. It is important to keep our eyes open and never let the government become a "big brother."

It seems to me that the best route to improvement is to begin by editing hard to create space for more ideas. What is presently being said in 958 words can be said in 500. Every word not actually pulling weight should go. After the slack words are gone, each sentence should be rewritten to use fewer words and simpler grammar. In the space you have made, you can then actually consider more than just South Korea. "Striking a balance" among objectives such as those you describe depends on many aspects (the society's material wealth, its size, population density, degree of federalism, and so on. Cultural attitudes towards surveillance and autocratic government are also relevant.

But no one actually suppressed Covid-19 by technological means. Even the original, less communicable, forms of the virus outran the utility to contact tracing in any form. By the time societies like Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan that had believed in the utility of such measures met Delta and Omicron, they changed their minds. So it might be worth asking whether "balance" was actually the right goal after all. Perhaps just saying no and refusing to carry a smartassphone during the epidemic was actually the correct policy. Worked for me.

Crisis of Privacy in the Time of the Pandemic

-- By BaiksungYang - 10 Mar 2022

I. Introduction

In responding to the unprecedented pandemic, countries worldwide have recently taken various measures limiting individual freedom to a great extent. Among those countries, South Korea adopted drastic measures known as “location information tracking” and “disclosure of movement paths.” While these measures showed some efficacy in the battle against COVID-19, they also caused serious collateral damage, such as an infringement on the privacy of many citizens. Naturally, they raised the issue of how much privacy should be or can be sacrificed for the public interest, such as public health. By looking deeper into some of the problems that these measures revealed, I hope to start a discussion about “to what extent the government in a modern society where technology is highly advanced should be allowed to collect and use personal information of its citizens.”

II. Collection and the Use of Personal Information During the Pandemic in South Korea and its Problems

1. Location Information Tracking

Every citizens’ personal information in South Korea is protected by the Personal Information Protection Act, which has its foundation in the Privacy Clause(“The privacy of citizen shall not be infringed.”) of the Constitution. According to the Personal Information Protection Act, there are certain restrictions that public institutions have to follow when collecting personal information, and every citizen has a right to determine whether or not to consent and the scope of consent regarding the processing of such personal information. However, according to the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, the government can collect personal location information of patients with infectious diseases and persons suspected of contracting infectious diseases to prevent and block the spread of infection.

The biggest problem is that this personal location information, which can undoubtedly cause serious and immediate harm to one’s privacy if misused, can be collected without any prior notice as long as the government unilaterally decides that it is necessary to collect such information. There is no way for the individual to refuse or prevent the government from collecting it. Another major problem is that the government can also collect other types of important personal information in order to ultimately collect personal location information. These other important personal information include personal identification information, mobile phone location information, credit, debit, prepaid, public transit card transaction information, immigration records, prescription and medical records, and CCTV records, which are easily and quickly collected with the help of the advanced technology. When the government combines all these different types of personal information, it can figure out what someone did in the past and eventually predict what someone is likely to do in the near future. Another thing to remember is that the very nature of the pandemic made millions of people become patients or at least have close contact with patients, and as a result, the government was able to collect personal information of all those citizens whenever deemed necessary, without any supervised by the judiciary at all.

2. Disclosure of Movement Paths

The frightening consequences of allowing the government to collect citizens’ personal information in the name of public health were clearly revealed as the government began to disclose it to the entire nation. In the early days of the pandemic, there were no laws or regulations regarding the disclosure of movement paths of patients diagnosed with COVID-19. There was no particular guideline for the specific content or period of the information being disclosed and the disclosure method. Central and local governments competitively disclosed every single patients’ detailed movement paths by posting them on the website and sending emergency text messages to everyone living within its jurisdiction without any consent of the recipients, which eventually led to criticisms, rumors, and wild speculations about each patient.

Thankfully, after the National Human Rights Commission issued a statement expressing deep concerns over infringement on the privacy of COVID-19 patients, the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act and its subordinate statutes along with the government’s guidelines for disclosure of movement paths were amended a few times to find a balance between the private interest and the public interest. Even so, the government still has broad discretion to determine whether or not to disclose the movement paths of a particular COVID-19 patient and the specific details of the disclosure. Also, the right to dispute through an objection is not adequately guaranteed because the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act states that the relevant person may file an objection only when any disclosed information is different from the actual fact.

III. Conclusion

It was quite surprising to find out how much harm can be done to individual citizens' privacy when highly advanced technology and centralized government are combined with other citizens’ indifference or ignorance. What worries me is that whenever another serious risk to the public interest emerges in the future, the governments might be more than willing to infringe on individual citizens’ privacy without hesitation because they have already successfully done so during this pandemic. And the real hidden problem is that people might not be so sensitive anymore about the government collecting and using their personal information, which will eventually give more power to the government. As history proves, it takes a long time and a tremendous amount of effort to gain individual freedom, but losing it is relatively easy.

This is a common issue that countries all over the world faced during the pandemic. This issue concerns various constitutional duties and fundamental rights, such as the country's duty to protect its people, the right to be healthy, the right to know, and the right to privacy. We must try to find a balance between them rather than just ignore and sacrifice individual privacy in the name of the greater good. We should keep our eyes open and never let the governments turn into a "big brother."

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