The Normative Value of Autonomy in Property Law

-- By HuazhouYe - 13 Feb 2023

Outdataed Normative Value

Autonomy as a normative value has been given way to socioeconomic considerations for the past 30 years, as society gets more complex and resources more scarce, it is wasteful and irrational to further autonomy purly like the olden days. However, autonomy is still used as a scapegoat to hide the judge's true motivations. The process of rationalization treats autonomy as an intrinsic, sacred, natural and inalienable right when the reasoning is not strong enough, but it leaves the reasoning inconsistent and non-coherent. Furthermore, grabbing on to autonomy as a sacred right enforceable under law, results in decisions forsaking utilitarian, socio-economic and humanitarian concerns. The court should instead more often argue with social dependence as the underlying normative value, since the rationale behind decisions would flow smoother and more reasonable.

I don't understand how this last sentence follows from the definition given. I don't think the proposition you're stating is faulty, but I don't understand the derivation.

This appears to be a conclusion somehow derived from what judges do, but we have as yet no idea how you know what you claim.

Social Dependence in replacement

Social dependence is as intrinsic and sacred as autonomy. One can only succeed in a society dependent on others. It is only rational that one who depends on society to succeed must pray for the success of society. Social-obligation whereby one must nurture the social structure in order to succeed in society is as intrinsic and sacred as autonomy. Like autonomy, this obligation is objectively present in one’s conduct, but unlike autonomy, decisions derived from it would not be wasteful but humanitarian, and it helps to propagate the norm that cooperation is objectively and intrinsically good. A society of individuals helping others will work to one's own advantage, a more sensible normative value than autonomy, which guards one’s resources in exclusion of others.

You haven't explained anything about the case to which you are referring. Why is there no link?

This is a confusing summary of a case which is again not stated, not linked, not described.

Same problem.

What does this mean?

Case demonstration - using autonomy

Jacque v. Steenberg Homes highlights the irrational nature of ruling for the sake of autonomy. To deliver mobile homes, Steenberg Homes could either cross Jacque’s land or take a snow-covered private road that would require special equipment. Jacque declined the request to cross their land due to land loss in an adverse possession action. The defendant nonetheless cut across the plaintiff's property because it was easier/cheaper than navigating the private road. The court awarded 100,000 dollars to the stubborn plaintiff who treated the defendant with heartless indifference, relying on autonomy. The court first used a deck clearing move to rid the authoritative weight of precedents so it can deem this a new legal issue and reason without the restrictions of binding authority. The authoritative law in the state was Barnard v. Cohen, pertaining to libel, where the court states the general rule of punitive damage: society has little interest in having the unlawful yet harmless conduct deterred, therefore, punitive damages are inappropriate when no harm is done. The court’s fear of propagation of unpunished intentional trespass, however, overrides this sensible and economically efficient law; therefore the court finds the difference in subject matter sufficient to warrant its inapplicability, and ignores the perfectly applicable reasoning behind the law. Since the court is now rid of persuasive precedents by a misleading rationale, it now can use whatever authority it pleases to further its goals. It then sites Merest v. Harvey, a decision from the English Common pleas division 150 years ago as persuasive precedent, stating that behaviors unbecoming of a gentleman warrants large damages. This outdated and outmoded rationale predominantly lies behind the court’s decision to award punitive damages, the rationale being when a man does not accord himself gentlemanlike, damages are proper. However, Merest is a case about hunting and obnoxious behaviors, not pure trespass like Jacque, the court conveniently rids the subject matter consistency it values and relies on it nonetheless. The court proceeds to conclude that in light of private and social interest, intentional trespass cases, although actual harm might be minimal, individuals suffer from a loss of their rights to exclude, which warrants large damage awards. The court here invokes the sacred and natural right of autonomy, and deems it so sacred that trampling on it even without loss of monetary value deserves retribution. The inconsistency of subject matter valuing at display is prominent, the court equates the duty to behave gentlemanly with the right to exclude, and misleads that this decision is consistent with Merest’s rationale, therefore punitive damage is applicable to both. The stark difference is that Merest was about an obnoxious English parliament member who invited himself to the plaintiff’s shooting space and fired shots while disregarding the plaintiff’s rejection, while Jacque was about a difficult choice presented to the defendant of either breaking the law and save a great amount of money or incur unnecessary cost for the sake of not offending a stubborn neighbor. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the two cases should be treated in the same light and both called for punitive damages.

Perhaps because the court knows the faulty logic is not persuasive, it goes into the analysis of the previously mentioned private and public interest, in hope that the slippery slope argument it uses presents an persuasive rationale that could ameliorate the lack of consistency. The court states that social and private interests in punishing and deterring intentional trespasses to preserve the integrity of and people’s faith in the legal system is so strong, that all hell would break loose if the defendant is not punished. This borderline bad-faith argument is irrational to say the least.

Case demonstration - using Social dependence

Suppose the court ruled relying on social dependence frequently as an widely accepted rationale. Steenberg Homes, instead of trespassing while taking the risk of its illegality, would ask the court for permission first since such a request incurs no harm to Jacque. Jacque, in rejecting a passway, would induce great unnecessary spending, thus unlikely to reject since it would be against common law; and also, Jacque would not have the previous concern of adverse possession, since the court would grant passage for the stated purpose only. The court, instead of reasoning by illogical arguments due to worries of unpunished intentional trespass promotes trespass, could rest assured that the good- faith utilitarian intentions of borrowing passageways would not impede the court’s ability to punish bad-faith intentional trespass that goes against social dependence.

This draft says things about cases, but there is no analysis to back the conclusions. "Autonomy," which appears to mean the owner's right to do what she wills with her property, is said to be treated by judges as less absolute than some theoretic definition (ungiven) would—while also leading to "ridiculous" outcomes—require.

The first route to improvement, then, is to read the cases, rather than gesture at them. That done, I expect the conclusion you are now merely asserting can be shown to follow. Courts, as you say, cannot and do not actually behave as though the owner's will were absolute: the essence of "property" as a common-law concept is its inherent compromise between protection of expectations and the necessity of "planning" on the ground. Why that should be treated, as the present drafts treats it, as a bug rather than a feature isn't yet clear, but presumably would also emerge from closer contact with actual decisions.