| |
| META TOPICPARENT | name="SecondEssay" |
|---|
| | | -- By ValeriaVouterakou - 02 Dec 2024 | |
<
< | As a dual citizen of Greece and the UK, I often found myself constantly perplexed by the surveillance landscape that underpinned those two societies. I spent the better half of my life in Greece where surveillance was never a prominent topic of public discourse. After having spent a decade in the UK and having then experienced the phenomenon of hyper-surveillance, I realised that the British public was willing to discuss this topic because they were aware of the surveillance issue hanging over like a pendulum threatening their privacy. This paper explores the hidden ways biometric surveillance operates in everyday life in these societies and outlines the legal and practical strategies for resisting the transformation of one’s own self into a data commodity. | >
> | As a dual citizen of Greece and the UK, I have often been perplexed by the surveillance landscape in these two societies. I spent much of my life in Greece, where surveillance was rarely a topic of public discourse. After a decade in the UK, I experienced hyper-surveillance firsthand and noticed that British society openly discussed this issue, aware of its looming presence. This paper explores the hidden ways biometric surveillance operates and outlines practical strategies for resisting the transformation of individuals into data commodities. | | | | |
>
> | The hyper-surveilled UK | | | | |
<
< | The phenomenon of the hyper-surveilled UK
It may not come as a surprise that surveillance is a major concern for British citizens, as the UK has an estimated 6 million CCTV cameras in operation which amounts to the average Londoner being caught on camera over 300 times per day (n1). The Metropolitan Police is undertaking AI-driven real-time facial recognition trials at heavily trafficked public places. The implication of this trial for the day-to-day life of a resident in London is that a mere walk through Picadilly Circus will result in him being unknowingly scanned and compared against police watchlists. The UK National DNA Database holds over 5 million profiles, including of people with no prior criminal record. Fingerprint and DNA retention policies mean that biometric samples will not be deleted unless expressly requested. The reality for a citizen in London is that if he were to be arrested for a minor protest action with no further consequences or charges, the National DNA Database will still keep his DNA indefinitely. | >
> | It is no surprise that surveillance is a major concern in the UK, which has an estimated 6 million CCTV cameras, meaning the average Londoner is caught on camera over 300 times per day (n1). The Metropolitan Police conducts AI-driven real-time facial recognition trials in heavily trafficked areas. This means that merely walking through Piccadilly Circus results in being unknowingly scanned and compared against police watchlists. The UK National DNA Database holds over 5 million profiles. If a citizen is arrested for a minor protest with no further consequences, their DNA remains in the database indefinitely. Fingerprint and DNA retention policies mean biometric samples are not deleted, unless requested. | | |
The illusion of less surveillance in Greece | |
<
< | As a stark contrast to the UK, Greece has significantly far fewer CCTV surveillance and there is generally no large-scale public discussion on biometric tracking, but lack of visible surveillance does not equate to true privacy. For instance, the Greek government is rolling out mandatory biometric ID cards that will replace older forms of identification. So, a Greek citizen must now provide fingerprints which are stored in a centralised EU database in order to apply for a Greek passport. Greece is also part of Eurodac, the EU’s centralised fingerprint database, initially established to track asylum seekers but has seen increasingly wider data collection. Under the Schengen Information System, biometric records are shared across EU law enforcement agencies which means that it is possible that that Greek citizens’ data may be used beyond what was originally anticipated upon their collection. There is a sort of opaqueness when it comes to knowing how these data will be processed across the EU borders and in most cases EU citizens are unaware of these practices. In practical terms, this means that a Greek citizen applying for a visa or crossing the EU border is unknowingly checked against various biometric databases. | >
> | In contrast, Greece has significantly fewer CCTV cameras, and biometric tracking is rarely a public concern. However, a lack of visible surveillance does not equate to true privacy. The Greek government is rolling out mandatory biometric ID cards requiring fingerprints stored in a centralized EU database. Greece is also part of Eurodac, initially established to track asylum seekers but now collecting broader data. Under the Schengen Information System, biometric records are shared across EU law enforcement agencies, meaning that unbeknownst to Greek citizens, their data could be used beyond their original purpose. This also means that every time a Greek citizen applies for a visa or crosses the EU border her data is checked against various biometric databases. | | |
The art of unnoticed surveillance | |
<
< | To craft a vivid portrayal of this invisible surveillance, picture a 30-year-old journalist in London. She wakes up to her smart alarm and as she asks Alexa about the weather, her voice command is processed and stored by AI to refine her consumer profile. She then taps her contactless card at the Tube with her journey data logged by TFL. When she is at the office, Microsoft Teams analytics tracks her screen activity. As she steps out to get lunch, Apple Pay tracks her activity and links it to previous purchases to assess spending habits, all while the coffee shop's WIFI collects device data and potentially shares anonymised location trends with third party advertisers. When she is back at home after a long day at work, she scrolls through social media and the algorithm tracks her activity, searches and location history to refine personalised ad targeting. Finally, as she is about to put the lights out, she checks her fitness tracker which continuously stores her heart rate and sleep cycle, anonymised health data which then will be sold (absent her express consent) to insurers and research institutions to build health risk models. | >
> | Consider a 30-year-old journalist in London. She wakes up, asks Alexa about the weather, and her voice command is processed for consumer profiling. She taps her contactless card at the Tube, her journey logged by TFL. At work, Microsoft Teams tracks her screen activity. Apple Pay logs her lunch purchases while the café’s WIFI collects her device data. At home, social media algorithms track her searches and location history for ad targeting. Before bed, her fitness tracker stores her heart rate and sleep cycle, with anonymized health data potentially sold to insurers and researchers. | | | | |
<
< | In both Greece and the UK, surveillance operates subtly, embedding itself into every-day activities that go unnoticed by the public. This seamless integration takes shape in the form of constant monitoring and tracking. For instance, if an individual lists his property for renting on Facebook Marketplace, he will likely be monitored by local authorities for potential tax obligations. Unbeknownst to them, individuals put out information on social media that is monitored by authorities in an effort to detect unauthorised activities. Many social media platforms utilise AI-powered facial recognition technology to identify individuals in photos even if they are not explicitly tagged. This practice raises serious red flags and people are often unaware of those practices and the opt-out features for facial data automatic tagging. Even though the facial data is allegedly not collected for the purpose of individual identifications, the practice still raises many concerns on the extent to which surveillance is used on social media platforms. This suggests that the Met police could deploy live facial recognition to develop a database of protestors in the UK. | >
> | Digitals platforms are becoming increasingly sophisticated in tracking user activity, often in ways people do not fully grasp. AI-powered facial recognition technology, for example, can recognise people in untagged photos with most users unaware of this function and the option to opt-out from it. This technology has implications beyond social media platforms. In the UK, it could enable law enforcement to build databases of protesters, raising concerns about surveillance and civil liberties. Meanwhile, in the commercial world, biometric tracking is shaping consumer behaviour. Retail spaces and transport hubs use facial recognition to track movements and process reactions and behaviours to predict shopping patterns. | | | | |
<
< | Surveillance has infiltrated the retail space as biometric tracking is now used to collect data on customers. It is often the case that shopping centres and transport hubs make use of facial recognition to track customer movements and companies often use biometric data such as facial recognition systems linking a customer’s history of past visits to predictive purchasing behaviour. While Greece appears, prima facie, less evasive in the biometric tracking practice, the recent transition to cashless transactions has helped institutions create a detailed behavioural profile linking financial patterns to specific locations and activities. When an unsuspected citizen makes a contactless payment in a market in Athens, the technology combined with other data sources can be potentially used to build a more comprehensive picture of an individual's movements. Our digital footprint is so big that a combination of information can reveal so much about our activities and predispositions and it seems like this simple fact falls out of the ambit of matters that preoccupy the Greek public. | >
> | As Greece is slowly transitioning into cashless transactions, digital tracking is intensifying. A simple contactless payment in an Athenian market, when assessed with other data points, can build a highly granular behavioural profile. Yet, most Greeks remain blissfully unaware of how their digital footprint is harvested, analysed and monetised, leaving them exposed to an increasingly surveilled world. | | |
A Guide to Digital Anonymity | |
<
< | Whilst the surveillance picture painted looks grim, reducing one’s digital footprint is still feasible and it can be achieved by resisting biometric data collection, following technological strategies for increased anonymity and minimising social media presence. | >
> | Despite the grim picture, reducing one’s digital footprint is possible. Under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, individuals can request the deletion of their DNA and fingerprints if they have no criminal record. In 2020, the English courts ruled that South Wales Police’s automated facial recognition technology was unlawful (n2). Infrared-blocking glasses and accessories that distort AI-based facial recognition can help avoid tracking in heavily surveilled areas. De-Googled phones, disabling WIFI and Bluetooth in public, and using burner SIM cards for EU travel can further enhance privacy. | | | | |
<
< | Under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, individuals can request the deletion of their DNA and fingerprints absent a past criminal record. In 2020, the English Courts deemed the automated facial recognition technology used by South Wales Police unlawful and a violation of privacy rights in the case of Ed Bridges v South Wales Police (n2). Another way to protect someone’s identity is by using infrared-blocking glasses and opting for accessories that distort AI-based face recognition in highly surveilled areas of London to avoid facial recognition and tracking. The use of de-Googled phones can also prevent passive location tracking. In a similar manner disabling WIFI and Bluetooth in public spaces can reduce digital footprint. To prevent cross-border tracking in the EU, a traveller can use burner SIM cards. | >
> | The General Data Protection Regulation grants individuals the right to request access to and deletion of biometric data. Greek citizens should leverage this right and delay adopting biometric ID cards. Residents of both Greece and the UK should use encrypted messaging apps and opt out of data collection. VPNs and Tor Browser can help prevent ISP tracking. Using burner emails and block trackers enhances anonymity while turning off location services, avoiding smart assistants like Alexa and Siri, and opting for cash transactions provide additional privacy measures. | | | | |
<
< | The General Data Protection Regulation provides a stronger legal protection because it gives individuals the option to request access and deletion of their biometric data. Greek citizens can take advantage of this option and also delay the adoption the new biometric ID cards that the Greek government is in the process of implementing. Both residents in Greece and the UK should opt for encrypted messaging apps, use privacy-focused search engines like Startpage and opt-out of all data collection. To achieve secure internet usage, they can use VPNs to prevent ISP tracking and a Tor Browser. The use of burner emails such as ProtonMail? and Temp Mail as well as the use of block trackers can also add to digital anonymity. To ensure location privacy, individuals are advised to turn off location services and opt for privacy focused phones while removing any smart assistants like Alexa and Siri. Opting for privacy-friendly payment methods and cash payments can also ensure transaction privacy. | | | | |
<
< | Conclusion | >
> | Reality check | | | | |
<
< | While the road to full anonymity seems utopic for the UK given the heightened surveillance landscape, residents still have the option to implement changes in their day-to-day life to minimise surveillance. Notwithstanding that Greece is less surveilled, it has adopted EU-wide biometric control measures. Greek residents must become increasingly aware of the surveillance force that looms over, unseen, yet inescapable. The surveillance elephant is not merely in the room, it is expanding exponentially, shaping the very space we navigate and it is about time Greeks acknowledged the weight it carries into their lives. | >
> | The practical steps listed above while justifiable, ultimately fall short. We are too far down the rabbit hole of surveillance, too deeply entangled in systems that know us better than we know ourselves. True anonymity demands individual sacrifice. It is microwaving your passport chip and facing interrogation at the airport. It is refusing a bank account and surviving without credit, navigating a world designed for the tracked. It is turning down jobs that require biometric logins, losing opportunities because you will not comply. It is never booking a flight in your own name again, choosing gruelling bus rides over the ease of air travel. And even then, you are left wondering if this is enough, if the cameras, the algorithms and the data points have already mapped you out beyond escape. This slow erosion of convenience and weight of constant suspicion is the price someone has to pay in the name of true anonymity. Because in a world where surveillance is seamless, where data is currency, choosing to remain unseen is not just difficult, it is an act of defiance. | | |
Endnotes: |
|