Law in the Internet Society

View   r3  >  r2  >  r1
EricaPedersenSecondEssay 3 - 26 Jan 2020 - Main.EricaPedersen
Line: 1 to 1
 
META TOPICPARENT name="SecondEssay"
Line: 6 to 6
 -- By EricaPedersen - 09 Dec 2019
Changed:
<
<
In a capitalist economy, how might technology companies be forced to take seriously the ethical implications of their products and business strategies? Eschewing the shareholder primacy model may be a necessary first step.
>
>
In a capitalist economy, how might technology companies be forced to take seriously the ethical implications and social impact of their products and business strategies? As a society, we do not have time to wait for comprehensive federal regulations to provide robust individual and collective privacy protections, break up the big technology companies and federate digital services, or eliminate corporations’ stranglehold on the levers of public policy (although it is imperative we maintain pressure on elected officials to prioritize these issues). In the very near term, we need industry insiders to take responsibility and raise their voices. Eschewing the shareholder primacy model and empowering workers are necessary first steps towards reasserting the public interest in technological development.
 

The Shareholder Primacy Model

Changed:
<
<
In the 1960s, Milton Friedman began to proselytize the theory that the fundamental purpose and singular “social responsibility” of a corporation is to “use its resources and engage in activities designed to” maximize profits for its shareholders (Capitalism and Freedom). The “shareholder primacy” model has since been widely adopted as a central tenet underlying modern American corporate law. Federal and state courts have amassed substantial precedent affirming the shareholder primacy model and prescribing profit maximization as an “unconditioned obligation.” The fiduciary duties of corporate managers and directors are defined and enforced within the context of shareholder wealth maximization. Managers and directors may only consider the interests of other constituencies—such as employees, customers, and the general public—insofar as they will result in corporate benefits which may be passed on to shareholders.
>
>
In the 1960s, Milton Friedman began to proselytize the theory that the fundamental purpose and singular “social responsibility” of a corporation is to use its resources and engage in activities designed to maximize shareholder profits. Federal and state courts have since amassed substantial precedent affirming the shareholder primacy model and prescribing profit maximization as an “unconditioned obligation.” Corporate managers and directors may consider the interests of other constituencies—such as employees, customers, and the general public—only insofar as those interests align with measures which will increase shareholder profit.
 
Changed:
<
<
Proponents argue that the shareholder primacy model ultimately optimizes social benefit by aligning the interests of shareholders and management, reducing agency costs, and incentivizing efficient allocation of firm resources. However, this model has also come under fire in recent years for fostering short-termism, anti-competitive business strategies, and a lack of concern or accountability for the destructive social and environmental externalities of those strategies. The weak counterargument to the latter concern centers on corporations’ dependence on public trust to enhance their reputation, customer base, and market share.
>
>
Proponents argue that the shareholder primacy model ultimately optimizes social benefit by aligning the interests of shareholders and management, reducing agency costs, and incentivizing efficient allocation of firm resources. However, it also fosters short-termism, anti-competitive business strategies, and a lack of concern or accountability for the destructive social and environmental externalities of those strategies.
 
Changed:
<
<

Shareholder Primacy in the Digital Tech Industry

>
>

Building an Enormously Profitable Dystopia

 
Changed:
<
<
The digital technology industry is an excellent example of the destructive consequences of shareholder primacy dogma in an anti-competitive and largely unregulated market. The relentless search for increased shareholder value has propelled the centralization of digital services in the hands of a few Tech Giants, the exacerbation of informational disparities, and the hoarding of knowledge in the form of intellectual property and trade secrets. Investors pump capital into early-stage start-ups in the hopes that that the business will disrupt or replace an existing market (Theranos) or industry (Uber, Airbnb), or at least generate enough monetizable data to be purchased by one of the Tech Giants (Snapchat). Seed funding may come with strings attached, but rarely do these provisions relate to minimization of possible negative impacts that the technology’s design or monetization might have on society as a whole. Such concerns are denigrated as the hyperventilations of conservative outsiders flailing against inevitable and socially beneficial technological development. Traditional ethics have no place in this brave new digital world.
>
>
The digital technology industry is an excellent example of the destructive consequences of shareholder primacy dogma in anti-competitive and essentially unregulated markets. The relentless search for increased shareholder value has propelled the centralization of digital services in the hands of a few Tech Giants, the exacerbation of informational disparities, and the hoarding of knowledge in the form of intellectual property and trade secrets. Investors pump capital into early-stage start-ups in the hopes that that the business will disrupt or replace an existing market or industry, or at least generate enough monetizable data to be purchased by one of the Giants. Funding may come with strings attached, but rarely do these provisions relate to minimization of possible negative impacts that the technology’s design or monetization might have on society as a whole. Such concerns are denigrated as the hyperventilations of conservative outsiders flailing against inevitable and socially beneficial technological development. Traditional ethics have no place in this brave new digital world.
 
Changed:
<
<
Eliminating possible constraints on developers’ creativity and destructive capacity is considered the ideal mode of maximizing the profitability of digital technology companies by insiders. Zuckerberg has repeatedly opined in his testimonies to Congress that limiting the applicability of government regulations is necessary to ensure that the United States remains a leader in technological advancement. Mass surveillance of consumers and the invasive and oft-undisclosed collection of sensitive and behavioral data are touted as necessary to feed this development. Some scholars have even raised concerns that, in the current regulatory landscape, the failure to collect and analyze such data might be considered a breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders. Ian Kerr warns that this environment could lead to the development of a “duty to prevent,” under which managers have a fiduciary obligation to use predictive tools built on expansive data collection to mitigate future risk to the corporation. Perceived fiduciary obligations could also be used to rationalize decisions to sell already-collected consumer data to third parties in a perverse race to maximize the value of corporate assets.
>
>
Industry insiders opine that eliminating possible constraints on developers’ creativity and destructive capacity is necessary to sustain economic growth and ensure that the US remains a leader in technological advancement. Mass surveillance of consumers and the invasive and oft-undisclosed collection of sensitive and behavioral data are touted as essential resources to fuel this development. Society is internalizing this norm so quickly that the failure to engage in extensive data collection and analysis might soon be considered a breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders. Perceived fiduciary obligations could also be used to rationalize decisions to retain consumer data and resell to third parties in a perverse race to maximize the value of corporate assets: us.
 
Changed:
<
<
Moreover, the key mechanisms relied upon to incentivize some consideration of social welfare in corporate governance and decision-making, such as public trust and Corporate Social Responsibility doctrine, are effectively neutralized. Digital technology companies are insulated from public scrutiny by trade secrets and copyright protections, as well as the public’s debilitating belief in the complexity of the technology. Moreover, by creating vast webs of integrated services on which consumers increasingly depend for a broad array of day-to-day activities, the Tech Giants have effectively entrapped their constituencies. Crises in public trust thus have little impact on company profit when consumers face substantial switching costs, there are no viable alternative providers, or the alternative providers are likely engaged in the same negligent practices as the original offender. Ignorance, convenience, and social pressure ultimately prevail and the ethical concerns about social impact are thereby rendered moot with respect to the corporation’s profit-maximizing purpose.
>
>
The key mechanisms relied upon to incentivize some consideration of social welfare in corporate governance and decision-making, such as public trust and Corporate Social Responsibility doctrine, are effectively neutralized. Digital technology companies are insulated from public scrutiny by trade secrets and copyright protections, as well as the public’s debilitating belief in the complexity of the technology. Moreover, by creating vast webs of integrated services on which consumers increasingly depend for a broad array of day-to-day activities, the Tech Giants have entrapped their constituencies. Crises in public trust thus have little impact on company profit when consumers face substantial switching costs, there are no viable alternative providers, or the alternative providers are likely engaged in the same negligent practices as the original offender. Ignorance, convenience, and social pressure ultimately prevail and concerns about clearly destructive social impacts are thereby rendered moot with respect to the corporation’s profit-maximizing purpose. a
 
Changed:
<
<

Reconceptualizing Corporate Governance for the Digital Age

>
>

Shifting the Balance of Power

 
Changed:
<
<
Some scholars have advocated for the adoption of a “information fiduciary” legal obligation which would, in theory, require executives to forego shareholder profit maximization in favor of the public interest under certain circumstances. This idea is analogous to the fiduciary duties owed by professionals engaged in providing direct services to clients with whom they have a relationship of trust and confidence, such as doctors and attorneys. A similar idea is reflected in the practice of Data Stewardship, the holding of consumer data in a public trust governed by ethical principles. However, given the environmental nature of the threat that pervasive digital monitoring poses to privacy, such a fiduciary duty would only be helpful if it is also applied proactively when the company is making important decisions regarding software architecture, market opportunity, and business strategy.
>
>
Given the collective nature of the threat that pervasive digital monitoring poses to privacy and autonomy, careful analyses of social and ethical impacts of new technologies must be performed early and often, informing critical decisions regarding product design, software architecture, and business strategy. The adoption of an “information fiduciary” legal obligation—which would, in theory, require executives to forego profit maximization in favor of the public interest under certain circumstances—or voluntary “Data Stewardship” policies are wholly insufficient. Feigned efforts at after-the-fact harm reduction will only reinforce the Silicon Valley development mantra: take now and (if you get caught) seek forgiveness later.
 
Changed:
<
<
Empowering other stakeholders in corporate decision-making could also provide a helpful incentive. Employee activism has played a key role in forcing executives to reconsider unethical business ventures. The inclusion of ethics in computer science curricula and widespread promotion of professional standards would facilitate conscientious and effective employee oversight. However, as Google has demonstrated, employment-at-will doctrine allows companies to easily quash employee dissent through terminations. Unionization of workers in the digital technology industry and actual enforcement of protections for whistleblowers would help to shift this balance of power.
>
>
Empowering other stakeholders in corporate decision-making would provide an even more powerful incentive towards ensuring corporate accountability and enhancing public awareness. Historically, grassroots activism and employee whistleblowing have been integral to raising public awareness of and eventually curbing environmental threats and harmful resource extraction practices. Similarly, employee activism has played a key role in forcing tech executives to reconsider some unethical business ventures. Programmers and software architects are in the best position to predict, explain, measure, and monitor the threats posed by new technologies. However, as Google has demonstrated, employment-at-will doctrine allows companies to easily quash employee dissent through terminations. Unionization of workers in the digital technology industry would help to shift this balance of power, encourage transparency by management, and provide legal protections for whistleblowers. The inclusion of ethics in computer science curricula and widespread promotion of professional standards would also facilitate conscientious and effective employee oversight.
 
Changed:
<
<

Faced with organizations behaving badly, it is said, we can impose standards of care on them and charge them if they deviate from those standards. Or we can attempt to change the internal balance of power within them in the direction of behaving better. Who says that? Well, pretty much everybody (including you here) who doesn't think we should do something fundamental to disempower them altogether.

In that sense, centrism is the primary purpose of this essay: laissez-faire is unsuitable, and so is structural upheaval of the socio-economic or socio-political landscape. So let's do what we do and if it doesn't work out at least we did it.

But the gravest problems of this next half-century are the ones (privacy destruction, climate change, radical inequality of wealth) that aren't responding and won't respond to these measures. Sense of helplessness, collapse of social trust, and loss of political coherence are resulting. What is your analysis of the appropriateness of scale of your proposals against the scale of the problem, and the appropriateness of the timeline of those proposals against the tempo of the problem? Realism on those points would be improvement.

>
>
Structural reform and comprehensive regulation are necessary to forestall dystopia. However, we are not powerless in the interim. Digital tech companies rely heavily on younger generations to develop, spread, and sustain their platforms. Insiders mustn’t be so quick to drink the Kool-Aid.
 

EricaPedersenSecondEssay 2 - 18 Jan 2020 - Main.EbenMoglen
Line: 1 to 1
 
META TOPICPARENT name="SecondEssay"
Line: 29 to 29
 Empowering other stakeholders in corporate decision-making could also provide a helpful incentive. Employee activism has played a key role in forcing executives to reconsider unethical business ventures. The inclusion of ethics in computer science curricula and widespread promotion of professional standards would facilitate conscientious and effective employee oversight. However, as Google has demonstrated, employment-at-will doctrine allows companies to easily quash employee dissent through terminations. Unionization of workers in the digital technology industry and actual enforcement of protections for whistleblowers would help to shift this balance of power.
Added:
>
>

Faced with organizations behaving badly, it is said, we can impose standards of care on them and charge them if they deviate from those standards. Or we can attempt to change the internal balance of power within them in the direction of behaving better. Who says that? Well, pretty much everybody (including you here) who doesn't think we should do something fundamental to disempower them altogether.

In that sense, centrism is the primary purpose of this essay: laissez-faire is unsuitable, and so is structural upheaval of the socio-economic or socio-political landscape. So let's do what we do and if it doesn't work out at least we did it.

But the gravest problems of this next half-century are the ones (privacy destruction, climate change, radical inequality of wealth) that aren't responding and won't respond to these measures. Sense of helplessness, collapse of social trust, and loss of political coherence are resulting. What is your analysis of the appropriateness of scale of your proposals against the scale of the problem, and the appropriateness of the timeline of those proposals against the tempo of the problem? Realism on those points would be improvement.

 

EricaPedersenSecondEssay 1 - 09 Dec 2019 - Main.EricaPedersen
Line: 1 to 1
Added:
>
>
META TOPICPARENT name="SecondEssay"

Ethical Technological Development and Corporate Governance

-- By EricaPedersen - 09 Dec 2019

In a capitalist economy, how might technology companies be forced to take seriously the ethical implications of their products and business strategies? Eschewing the shareholder primacy model may be a necessary first step.

The Shareholder Primacy Model

In the 1960s, Milton Friedman began to proselytize the theory that the fundamental purpose and singular “social responsibility” of a corporation is to “use its resources and engage in activities designed to” maximize profits for its shareholders (Capitalism and Freedom). The “shareholder primacy” model has since been widely adopted as a central tenet underlying modern American corporate law. Federal and state courts have amassed substantial precedent affirming the shareholder primacy model and prescribing profit maximization as an “unconditioned obligation.” The fiduciary duties of corporate managers and directors are defined and enforced within the context of shareholder wealth maximization. Managers and directors may only consider the interests of other constituencies—such as employees, customers, and the general public—insofar as they will result in corporate benefits which may be passed on to shareholders.

Proponents argue that the shareholder primacy model ultimately optimizes social benefit by aligning the interests of shareholders and management, reducing agency costs, and incentivizing efficient allocation of firm resources. However, this model has also come under fire in recent years for fostering short-termism, anti-competitive business strategies, and a lack of concern or accountability for the destructive social and environmental externalities of those strategies. The weak counterargument to the latter concern centers on corporations’ dependence on public trust to enhance their reputation, customer base, and market share.

Shareholder Primacy in the Digital Tech Industry

The digital technology industry is an excellent example of the destructive consequences of shareholder primacy dogma in an anti-competitive and largely unregulated market. The relentless search for increased shareholder value has propelled the centralization of digital services in the hands of a few Tech Giants, the exacerbation of informational disparities, and the hoarding of knowledge in the form of intellectual property and trade secrets. Investors pump capital into early-stage start-ups in the hopes that that the business will disrupt or replace an existing market (Theranos) or industry (Uber, Airbnb), or at least generate enough monetizable data to be purchased by one of the Tech Giants (Snapchat). Seed funding may come with strings attached, but rarely do these provisions relate to minimization of possible negative impacts that the technology’s design or monetization might have on society as a whole. Such concerns are denigrated as the hyperventilations of conservative outsiders flailing against inevitable and socially beneficial technological development. Traditional ethics have no place in this brave new digital world.

Eliminating possible constraints on developers’ creativity and destructive capacity is considered the ideal mode of maximizing the profitability of digital technology companies by insiders. Zuckerberg has repeatedly opined in his testimonies to Congress that limiting the applicability of government regulations is necessary to ensure that the United States remains a leader in technological advancement. Mass surveillance of consumers and the invasive and oft-undisclosed collection of sensitive and behavioral data are touted as necessary to feed this development. Some scholars have even raised concerns that, in the current regulatory landscape, the failure to collect and analyze such data might be considered a breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders. Ian Kerr warns that this environment could lead to the development of a “duty to prevent,” under which managers have a fiduciary obligation to use predictive tools built on expansive data collection to mitigate future risk to the corporation. Perceived fiduciary obligations could also be used to rationalize decisions to sell already-collected consumer data to third parties in a perverse race to maximize the value of corporate assets.

Moreover, the key mechanisms relied upon to incentivize some consideration of social welfare in corporate governance and decision-making, such as public trust and Corporate Social Responsibility doctrine, are effectively neutralized. Digital technology companies are insulated from public scrutiny by trade secrets and copyright protections, as well as the public’s debilitating belief in the complexity of the technology. Moreover, by creating vast webs of integrated services on which consumers increasingly depend for a broad array of day-to-day activities, the Tech Giants have effectively entrapped their constituencies. Crises in public trust thus have little impact on company profit when consumers face substantial switching costs, there are no viable alternative providers, or the alternative providers are likely engaged in the same negligent practices as the original offender. Ignorance, convenience, and social pressure ultimately prevail and the ethical concerns about social impact are thereby rendered moot with respect to the corporation’s profit-maximizing purpose.

Reconceptualizing Corporate Governance for the Digital Age

Some scholars have advocated for the adoption of a “information fiduciary” legal obligation which would, in theory, require executives to forego shareholder profit maximization in favor of the public interest under certain circumstances. This idea is analogous to the fiduciary duties owed by professionals engaged in providing direct services to clients with whom they have a relationship of trust and confidence, such as doctors and attorneys. A similar idea is reflected in the practice of Data Stewardship, the holding of consumer data in a public trust governed by ethical principles. However, given the environmental nature of the threat that pervasive digital monitoring poses to privacy, such a fiduciary duty would only be helpful if it is also applied proactively when the company is making important decisions regarding software architecture, market opportunity, and business strategy.

Empowering other stakeholders in corporate decision-making could also provide a helpful incentive. Employee activism has played a key role in forcing executives to reconsider unethical business ventures. The inclusion of ethics in computer science curricula and widespread promotion of professional standards would facilitate conscientious and effective employee oversight. However, as Google has demonstrated, employment-at-will doctrine allows companies to easily quash employee dissent through terminations. Unionization of workers in the digital technology industry and actual enforcement of protections for whistleblowers would help to shift this balance of power.

Note: TWiki has strict formatting rules for preference declarations. Make sure you preserve the three spaces, asterisk, and extra space at the beginning of these lines. If you wish to give access to any other users simply add them to the comma separated ALLOWTOPICVIEW list.


Revision 3r3 - 26 Jan 2020 - 22:18:40 - EricaPedersen
Revision 2r2 - 18 Jan 2020 - 15:35:20 - EbenMoglen
Revision 1r1 - 09 Dec 2019 - 18:57:51 - EricaPedersen
This site is powered by the TWiki collaboration platform.
All material on this collaboration platform is the property of the contributing authors.
All material marked as authored by Eben Moglen is available under the license terms CC-BY-SA version 4.
Syndicate this site RSSATOM