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Hey Wendy, | |
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< | Thanks for this really informative piece. I was aware of the international relief effort, but wasn't aware of the criticism levied upon American forces in their handling of the situation in immediate response. The situation in Haiti still seems to be rather dire, and I hope that international aid and response in rebuilding Haiti will continue even though the story has dropped off the "front page news", especially as the hurricane season approaches. I've suggested some changes below, feel free to take the ideas and suggestions that you find useful. I find I'm often a little skeptical/contrarian, but hopefully some of the questions that I raise and suggestions are helpful to you.  My rewrite is below. | >
> | Thanks for this really informative piece. I was aware of the international relief effort, but wasn't aware of the criticism levied upon American forces in their handling of the situation in immediate response. The situation in Haiti still seems to be rather dire, and I hope that international aid and response in rebuilding Haiti will continue even though the story has dropped off the "front page news", especially as the hurricane season approaches. I've suggested some changes below, feel free to take the ideas and suggestions that you find useful. I find I'm often a little skeptical/contrarian, but hopefully some of the questions that I raise and suggestions are helpful to you. I really think inclusion of some links to reports that help support your arguments would be helpful too, and I've included quite a few in my comments. My rewrite is below. Enjoy! | | | Jeff Kao
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< | Rewrite - first attempt, I'm still working on making it more concise. | >
> | Rewrite - my second attempt, I've cut it to an appropriate length. Hopefully I've stayed generally true to what you've said in the original version! | | | | |
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< | It is generally acceptable to say that, anti-interventionist ideals have fallen out of sync with modern notions of justice, thus implying that humanitarian concerns are influencing modern state policy to a greater extent. A humanitarian act can be described as one in which one intervenes to protect those who cannot defend their own rights. Realists would adamantly respond that such undertakings are dangerous and should be avoided. Indeed with every undertaking, there is an associated cost, but intervention has been deemed appropriate where the humanitarian costs of failing to intervene are too high. To allow humanitarian crises to continue is counter to democratic principles and can become a threat to international security. These costs are far too great to ignore. With the Helsinki Final Act the Western states introduced the concept of personal security to define human rights and recognize that situations and acts that threaten it require action, in effect establishing a right of intervention. | >
> | Anti-interventionist ideals have generally fallen out of sync with modern notions of justice, and humanitarian concerns now have a far greater influence in modern state policy. Countries act in humanitarian intervention to protect those who cannot defend their own rights. While realists may regard such undertakings as dangerous, there is an associated cost with every decision, and intervention has been deemed appropriate where the humanitarian costs of failing to act are too high. To allow humanitarian crises to continue is counter to democratic principles and can become a threat to international security. These costs are far too great to ignore. The Helsinki Final Act introduced the concept of personal security to define human rights, recognizing that situations that threaten human rights may require action, and in effect giving states a right of intervention. | | | | |
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< | Today’s democratic states realize that to choose nonintervention in humanitarian crises is to go against the unwritten rule of the protection of human rights. Democratic states view themselves as examples of justice for the rest of the world with respect to human rights, liberty and freedom, and equal opportunities. For these states to allow humanitarian crises and gross human suffering to endure, goes against all of these precepts. | >
> | Democracies realize that nonintervention in humanitarian crises goes against the unwritten rule of the protection of human rights. Democratic states view themselves as examples of rights, liberty and freedom. For these states to allow humanitarian crises and gross human suffering to endure, goes against all of these precepts. | | | | |
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< | Within weeks of the Haiti earthquake, the U.S. had 20,000 troops on the ground in the country. The American state response to the crisis was swift and forceful. Disappointingly, the American security forces entered Haiti, with a main focus on maintaining a minimum level of decency and order by establishing a strong, fear-inducing presence, instead of facilitating medical practitioners, or delivering shiploads of water, food, and supplies. Many doctors and medical professionals complained about being obstructed by the U.S. security forces whose planes of equipment took precedence over the planes of doctors that were circling the airports in the Dominican Republic hoping to be allowed to land. American control of the airports led to lengthy delays and countless diversions of aid flights to Miami. The U.S. entered Haiti at its own expense at a time when many Haitians could not take care of themselves. After all, humanitarian crises can indirectly imperil regional security and set the stage for civil or interstate war due to outbound migration. Democracy cannot be promoted when a humanitarian crisis is lurking in your back yard. Intervention was necessary. But, critical mistakes were made by the occupying American troops in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, which led to an unnecessary loss of life. While the security concerns were largely addressed, Haitians' basic rights to food, water and life were not. | >
> | Within weeks of the Haiti earthquake, the U.S. had 20,000 troops on the ground in the country. The American state response to the crisis was swift; but disappointingly, the American security forces entered with a focus on maintaining a minimum level of order by establishing a strong, fear-inducing presence instead of facilitating medical services, or delivering water, food, and supplies. Many doctors complained about the U.S. security forces whose equipment planes took precedence over planes of doctors hoping to land. American control of airports led to lengthy delays and countless diversions of aid flights to Miami. The U.S. entered Haiti at a time when many Haitians could not take care of themselves. Intervention was necessary to preserve regional security, prevent civil or interstate war caused by outbound migration, and preserve Haitian governmental authority. However, critical mistakes were made by the occupying American troops in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake which led to an unnecessary loss of life. While the security concerns were largely addressed, Haitians' basic rights to food, water and life were not. | | | | |
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< | To me, the U.S.’s response was eerily similar to what took place in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. After Katrina, the government was heavily criticized, and currently police officers are being prosecuted, for their obsession with maintaining security, at all costs, in the face of extreme lack and dire need. In both instances, the U.S. presence had the appearance of containment and policing rather than relief and aid. While American troops did provide aid to the Haitians, there was an overemphasis on the security of the distribution of aid. The violence that occurred in Haiti after the earthquake was largely sporadic, and arguably less severe than before the earthquake. Most residents were simply trying to survive and obtain basic necessities, not trying to commit crimes or loot. The crimes that inevitably did occur were in the absence of a public safety force was quelled by citizens enforcing vigilante justice. Refugee camps even self self-organized in a way to facilitate effective delivery of aid. To target petty crimes - the symptoms of this dire need - would be to leave the root problem unaddressed. | >
> | The U.S. actions were eerily similar to the response in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. The government was heavily criticized after Katrina in its obsession with maintaining security at all costs in the face of dire need. In both instances, the U.S. presence had the appearance of containment rather than providing effective relief. The violence that occurred in Haiti after the earthquake was largely sporadic, and arguably less severe than before the earthquake. Most residents were not trying to commit crimes or loot, but needed basics such as food and water. Crimes in the absence of a public safety force were quelled by citizen justice. Refugee camps self self-organized to facilitate effective delivery of aid. To target petty crimes - the symptoms of this dire need - would be to leave the root problem unaddressed. | | | | |
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< | Intervention is complicated by self-interest, and as Gayatri Spivak explains, the classic humanitarian scenario of a “dispenser of human rights” aiding the “subaltern recipient of human rights bounty.” Firstly, state self-interest continues to be a problem in legitimizing intervention with an international community wary of hegemonic dominance (especially by the U.S.). Problems of perception would therefore likely exist even if intervention for humanitarian aid is established as an international policy that is blind to nationality, culture, economic risks, or economic interest because of the neo-colonial (in the sense of a value-regulating mechanism) dynamic of humanitarianism. The American historical record of intervention outside its borders, even within Haiti, has often colored international perception of the U.S. military, as in this case. Whether the initial response to the Haiti earthquake was undermined by American self interest or not, the disaster relief effort is a recent example of the continuing trend of failed American attempt at humanitarian intervention. The intense focus on security in the face of a severe health concerns creates an uncomfortable tension between the ideals of humanitarianism and what that translates to in reality. | >
> | Intervention is complicated by self-interest, and as Gayatri Spivak explains, the classic humanitarian scenario of a “dispenser of human rights” aiding the “subaltern recipient of human rights bounty.” Firstly, self-interest continues to be a problem to legitimate intervention in an international community wary of hegemonic dominance (especially by the U.S.). Problems of perception would likely exist regardless of good intention because of the neo-colonial (in the sense of a value-regulating mechanism) dynamic of humanitarianism. The American historical record of intervention outside its borders, even within Haiti, has often colored international perception of American intervention. The intense focus on security in the face of a severe health concerns creates an uncomfortable tension between the ideals of humanitarianism and what that translates to in reality, and only serve to perpetuate that perception of self-interest. | | | | |
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< | There is a victim-savior complex, but the savior is not there to help the victim get what he needs, but rather to protect the victim from what it believes the victim will devolve into should its presence be absent. Thus, the U.S. intervention is again guilty of a misunderstanding that leads to a focus on the wrong problem. The American actions do not seem to be concerned that Haitians will starve to death, but instead, troops are deployed such that Haitians will not become unruly, harm Americans who are there to help, take to the seas and head for the U.S. or kill. As discussed above, this is simply an erroneous understanding of the situation on the ground in Haiti. For example, NYU law professor Margaret Sattherthwaite states that the misunderstanding of the situation on the ground in Haiti that has motivated many countries, including the U.S. (one of the first responders) to send military aid instead of civilian aid. But, American military presence alone cannot guarantee the real security that the U.S. should invest in—an economically stable and prosperous Haiti. If the U.S. is going to value the security of its shores, above all other needs that the earthquake has created or exacerbated, I think it would be best that it not intervene at all. The commitment the U.S. made seems to be to the U.S. and Caribbean region’s security, not to the helpless and needy earthquake victims. This commitment does not need to be made by placing 20,000 troops in Haiti. As Mark Weisbrot notes, the past history of American intervention in Haiti has been marred by misunderstanding and a need to control. This time was no different. | >
> | There is a victim-savior complex, but the savior is not there to help, but rather to protect the victim from what it believes the victim will devolve into should it be absent. Thus, the U.S. intervention is again guilty of a misunderstanding that focuses on the wrong problem. American actions do not seem to be concerned that Haitians will starve to death, but instead, troops are deployed such that Haitians will not become unruly, harm Americans who are there to help, take to the seas and head for the U.S. or kill. Margaret Sattherthwaite states that the misunderstanding of the ground situation in Haiti has motivated countries including the U.S. to send military aid instead of civilian aid; however, military presence alone cannot guarantee the real security in which America should invest—an economically stable and prosperous Haiti. If the U.S. will value the security of its shores, above all other humanitarian needs, it would be best not to intervene at all. The commitment the U.S. made seems to be to regional security, not to the helpless and needy earthquake victims. As Mark Weisbrot notes, the past history of American intervention in Haiti has been marred by misunderstanding and a need to control. This time appears no different. | | | | |
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< | When American troops landed in Haiti, their primary goal was setting up barricades and security. As the first ones on the ground, they commandeered the airport and what was left of the roads, limiting other states’ ability and the needed access to provide aid. The U.S. is not obligated to manage or coordinate relief efforts, but it cannot shut out others that are willing to assist in that capacity. The U.S. wanted to prevent chaos in the streets, but caused chaos in the airports and relief sites, the places where chaos caused great harm. Security and social organization are definitely priorities, but I hope that in the upcoming months, underlying fears of chaotic outbreaks will not cloud the pressing needs of health and sustenance. Otherwise, the U.S. may find itself trapped in a cycle in which it plants the seeds of violence, instability, and underdevelopment by blocking access to basic material resources, only to later provide aid, for example in the form of loans, to alleviate the distress that it caused, creating an economy of victims. | >
> | As the first ones on the ground, American troops commandeered the airport and what was left of the roads, limiting other states’ ability to provide aid. While not obligated to coordinate aid efforts, America cannot shut out others willing to assist in relief. Security is a priority, but I hope that in the upcoming months, fears of chaotic outbreaks will not obscure the pressing basic needs of health and sustenance. Otherwise, the U.S. may find planting the seeds of instability, and underdevelopment, only to later provide band-aid solutions, for example in the form of loans, to alleviate the distress that it caused, creating a cycle of victims.
There is something destructive about macro security objectives that fail to equally value the basic needs of the individuals whose cooperation is needed to maintain security. The situation in Haiti has yet to fully play out, but I see Iraq and realize that the presence of troops does not guarantee security, nor does it guarantee recovery. | | | | |
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< | There is something destructive about macro security objectives that fail to equally value the basic concerns of the individuals whose cooperation is needed to maintain security. The situation in Haiti has yet to fully play out, but I see Iraq and realize that the presence of American troops does not guarantee security, and does not guarantee recovery. | | | |
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