Law in Contemporary Society

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TheodoreSmith-FirstPaper 26 - 12 Jan 2009 - Main.IanSullivan
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Moral Distance and Procedural Legal Systems

-- By TheodoreSmith - 21 May 2008


TheodoreSmith-FirstPaper 25 - 23 May 2008 - Main.TheodoreSmith
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Moral Distance and Procedural Legal Systems

-- By TheodoreSmith - 21 May 2008


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Note: This is not so much a rewrite as it is an entirely new paper. I interpreted Eben's original comments as suggesting I had been somewhat overreaching in my original choice of a topic, so this rewrite was an attempt to pick one of the themes of that paper and develop it more fully. To see the original paper, please look in the page history.
 

Table of Contents

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Avoiding Overstatement

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Although these three characteristics may be perceived as weaknesses of a procedural system of law, it is important to note that any tendency for the legal actor to morally distance herself is not absolute. Just as Frank was careful to point out that the human role as fact-decider does not preclude justice, we must be careful here to not overstate the power of the disassociating characteristics of a formal legal system. It would be absurd to assert that no lawyer has ever sought to distance herself from the substantive consequences of her actions; however, it would be equally absurd to hold that many judges and attorneys are not deeply morally affected by the outcomes of their cases.
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Although these three characteristics may be perceived as weaknesses of a procedural system of law, it is important to note that any tendency for the legal actor to morally distance herself is not absolute. Just as Frank was careful to point out that the human role as fact-decider does not preclude justice, we must be careful here to not overstate the power of the disassociating characteristics of a formal legal system. It would be absurd to assert that no lawyer has ever sought to distance herself from the substantive consequences of her actions; however, it would be equally absurd to hold that many judges and attorneys are not deeply affected by the outcomes of their cases.
 

Why it matters

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As practitioners within a formal legal system, the practical importance of this analysis can be illustrated on two grounds. First, as lawyers, understanding the nature of these dissociating characteristics may allow us to avoid the trap of self-justification. The smarter the individual, the easier it becomes for him to rationalize his actions; we must be aware of our own potential to evade responsibility or justify not searching for creative legal solutions to our problems. Second, the impetus to reform the legal system will arise out of dissatisfaction with the substantive outcomes of the process. The more we are aware of the morally distancing features of our procedural system, the more likely we are to be able to avoid moral complacency regarding the results of the system and our role as legal actors.
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As practitioners within a formal legal system, the practical importance of this analysis can be illustrated on two levels. First, as lawyers, understanding the nature of these dissociating characteristics may allow us to avoid the trap of self-justification. The smarter the individual, the easier it becomes for him to rationalize his actions; we must be aware of our own potential to evade responsibility or justify not searching for creative legal solutions to our problems. Second, the impetus to reform the legal system will arise out of dissatisfaction with the substantive outcomes of the process. The more we are aware of the morally distancing features of our procedural system, the more likely we are to be able to avoid moral complacency regarding the results of the system and our role as legal actors.
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TheodoreSmith-FirstPaper 24 - 23 May 2008 - Main.TheodoreSmith
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Moral Distance and Procedural Legal Systems

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Legal Roles and Procedural Justice

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A ruled based legal system further distances legal actions from outcomes by providing fixed roles and a normative ethical code to its actors. This aspect of procedural legal systems is particularly noticeable in the adversarial model of American law. A central assumption of this type of system is that a just outcome will tend to arise when each legal actor is effectively performing his or her role in the overall legal process. This assumption, that the system is responsible for the justice (or injustice) of the outcome, has the potential to provide an easy moral scapegoat for the individuals within. Because American legal professionals are encouraged to believe in the efficacy of procedural justice, and because they are bound by an ethical code to zealously perform the duties of their role, it becomes easier to shrug off personally distasteful consequences. Although it should not be implied that individuals in these roles have no eye for the overall just outcome of the system, the focus on procedural rather than substantive justice has the potential to provide an easy moral justification.
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A formal legal system further distances legal actions from outcomes by providing fixed roles and a normative ethical code to its actors. This aspect of procedural legal systems is particularly noticeable in the adversarial model of American law. A central assumption of this type of system is that a just outcome will tend to arise when each legal actor is effectively performing his or her role in the overall legal process. This position, that the system is responsible for the justice (or injustice) of the outcome, has the potential to provide an easy moral scapegoat for the individuals within. Because American legal professionals are encouraged to believe in the efficacy of procedural justice, and because they are bound by an ethical code to zealously perform the duties of their role, it becomes easier to shrug off personally distasteful consequences. Although it should not be implied that individuals in these roles have no eye for the overall just outcome of the system, the focus on procedural rather than substantive justice has the potential to provide easy moral justifications.
 

The Constraints of Procedure


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Individual Responsibility for Legal Outcomes

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Moral Distance and Procedural Legal Systems

 
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-- By TheodoreSmith - 09 Feb 2008


Summary

If we accept the eventual conclusion of Frank's reasoning, that the human role as truth decider ultimately forecloses the possibility of an objective system of "legal science", our development of a just and effective legal system must necessarily focus on developing the reasoning and moral courage of the individual.

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-- By TheodoreSmith - 21 May 2008
 

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The Failure of Rules to Justify Outcomes

Garbage In, Garbage Out: The Argument Against Legal Rules

In "Modern Legal Magic," Jerome Frank outlines a historical transition in the rules governing legal outcomes. In his terms, this shift saw legal decision-makers abandoning the ritual of the legal ordeal, and embracing a conception of law founded on the precepts of logical reasoning. The latter approach is the basis for modern law; the arbitrary legal ritual has been replaced by a presumably rational set of quasi-deterministic legal rules.

Although this change seems profound, Frank questions its meaningfulness. Any system of legal rules must draw its circumstance from the facts surrounding a case. The truth of these facts must in turn be determined by the human processes of investigation and secernment (??) (!!) ; truth must be differentiated and given meaning by a finite and limited individual. This factual basis of law makes decision by legal rules as contingent on human factors and circumstance as the disfavored methods of the ordeal. A system of reason and rules may blind us with its complexity, but is only as good as the truth it is based on.

Where We Stand Post-Frank

A naive response to the failure of legal rules to produce objectivity could be to further refine the system. If we accept Frank's reasoning, this solution cannot possibly succeed. At the heart of any deterministic decision tree of legal rules will be the element of the fact finder and truth decider. This fundamental bias cannot be removed from the system; some mechanism must exist to choose relevant facts and establish truth. This basic requirement of legal decision making forces us to look for a conception of ideal law that transcends a purely deterministic and systematic process.

We find ourselves at an impasse. A refined system of legal rules is unable to achieve the objective legal outcomes that would justify its creation. Law is bound by the personal frailties of the individuals charged with administering the system. If we cannot eliminate the human from the law, it would follow that the law must focus on the development of the human.

  • This does not actually follow. Trying to claim that your bagatelle is entailed by Frank is simply wrong. He wrote, in fact, a book whose title--taken from James Madison--"If Men Were Angels," specifically announced rejection of your supposed inference. Perfectability of man was not his thing, and existentialism likewise. You could have found many ways of introducing your claims, and maybe you still should, although the claims themselves seem to me less compelling than they seem to you. But the way you are going is shut.

Focusing on the Individual

Individual Responsibility for Legal Outcomes

Focusing on law as a systematic decision-making procedure tends to privilege process over outcome. When a judge writes that he is “forced” to rule against his own judgment, we wince, but ultimately accept the decision. The supposed benefits of consistent reasoning are substituted for consistent judgment. This trade-off would be eminently justified if strict adherence to our legal rules produced objectively just decisions; however, a deterministic system based on human and ultimately subjective input cannot take the responsibility for legal outcomes away from the administrators of the law.

If we are unable to justify the results of legal decisions by appealing to the rationality of the system, we must accept that this responsibility ultimately lies with the individual. This change mandates a very different approach to the law. The acceptance of personal responsibility for the consequences of a legal decision requires a vast emotional and moral maturity. The knowledge that one has sent a man to his death based on necessarily imperfect information should be a profoundly disturbing realization. Indeed, a prime function of our obsession with legal rules is to relieve this burden from the consciences of legal actors. The pressure for a student of law to adopt the mythology of a rationally justified legal outcome comes as much from his own moral unease as from the external blandishments of his professors.

For our law system to function in an effective manner, we must produce legal actors (both truth deciders and judges) that are able to accept personal responsibility for the outcome of the legal process. This trait, which we may refer to as moral courage, produces the impetus for the reform and development of the system. An agent of the law with a deep acceptance of her own role in the consequences of judgment cannot escape the moral obligation to produce a personally acceptable outcome.

  • Now you are being simplistic. In the first place, most judges I know are acutely conscious of their personal responsibility for the consequences of error. They are also highly knowledgeable about the environments in which they work, and are profoundly aware of the inevitability that any judgment they can make about most of the social situations that most pain them when seen in their courtroom is beyond their legal power and would not be properly executed even if they had the power to order it. They make the decisions the law allows them to make not only because they know what you are forgetting here, that the judge's power "to produce a personally acceptable outcome" is often nil, but also because they know that despite the tragic nature of impersonal procedural government, it is also the only tool for establishing the rule of law, which they consider (sometimes for sentimental and intellectually vacuous and sometimes for the most refined and thoughtful of reasons) an "inestimable blessing."

Developing Truth-Deciders

By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, the practice of law becomes a personal search for a morally tolerable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this investigation, it cannot alone provide the means. The obligation to produce an acceptable result brings with it an obligation to bring to bear the full weight of human intellect and understanding. Reason, science, and rules are thus able to rejoin the legal process, not as moral crutches, but in their proper places as tools of the intellect. The failure of rule-centric law is not a failure of the techniques themselves, but simply a failure of the system to reduce human responsibility for its outcome.

  • This is a new proposition, which requires defense, and your strong phrasing of the idea almost guarantees that it is indefensible. Everything we think is wrong with formal systems is "simply" a failure to grant judges enough personal discretion? To establish that you have to disestablish many other purportedly contributing elements. Cohen is certain that the problem lies at least in part in properties of formal systems; in order to establish your proposition, you need to show that he is completely wrong. Similarly, you have to have a complete answer for all criticisms that suggest no amount of human moral responsibility will reverse inherent defects in human cognition and limits in human cogitation. Not to mention what I suppose we might call Robespierre Syndrome, or an absolutely virtuous willingness to take total moral responsibility for radical injustice. For which you must possess somewhere about you a complete and indeed retroactive cure good against every form of fanaticism that ever committed judicial murder with self-conscious self-righteousness. Wouldn't a weaker claim make more sense here? Even if it led to a more serious reconsideration of the topic as a whole....

Although the individual decision-maker thus creates the basis of law, her effort alone cannot form the extent of a successful legal system. Law is a social exercise, and must exist as a collaborative effort; a successful truth decider and adjudicator can only succeed within a community of her peers. Constant collaboration and monitoring is not only necessary to produce a flexible and effective legal process, but is essential to maintain the individual sense of morality and responsibility. Feedback from peers can shape and develop the individual’s legal reasoning, but also reinforces the sense of responsibility and duty with which the individual must approach her profession.

Conclusion

A legal system focused on the responsibility of the individual is by its nature mutable. To some, this may suggest an inevitable slippery slope into Nazism or other morally abhorrent condition. This response makes a false assumption about the stability of rule based systems; humans are ultimately responsible for legal outcomes in either case. Our choice is not between objectivity and the despot. The despot will rule regardless. Our choice is between hiding our conscience behind a screen of false objectivity and reason, or forcing ourselves to accept the consequences of our actions - taking full and final responsibility for the outcome of the law.

  • Here you half-admitted the presence of the difficulty, and then chose to put it behind you by mere force of bluster ("slippery slope to Nazism" is not a good way to make me believe you are taking someone else's argument seriously). All arguments in responsible persuasive writing must be "real," that is, they must acknowledge the presence of a serious issue arising from genuine disagreement between those who, sharing common grounds, reach differing conclusions. When you find yourself suddenly putting an unreal argument in the conclusion, you should immediately go from "writer mode" to "editor mode" and ask why a straw man has been slipped in at bedtime. It almost always indicates a serious flaw in some preceding argument now being covered too little, too late.


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Topic Modification - One of the features of a formal system of law is that it helps legal actors avoid taking moral responsibility for their actions.
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Two Lines of Critique

 
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A common theme running through our early readings has been an examination of the various weaknesses of a formal and procedural system of law. Cohen focused on the tendency of formal legal reasoning to become circular and self-justifying, while Frank pointed out the ultimately human and contingent basis of legal decision making. For the purposes of this essay, these critiques of the legal system may collectively be thought of as addressing different aspects of humanity’s impact on the formal system. Although law is necessarily dependent on individuals for its operation, Cohen’s nonsense and Frank’s fact-deciding may here be considered examples of problems that arise when the formal legal system is placed within the context of human _
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A common theme running through our early readings has been an examination of the various weaknesses of formal and procedural systems of law. Cohen focused on the tendency of formal legal reasoning to become circular and self-justifying, while Frank pointed out the ultimately human and contingent basis of legal decision making. Insofar as the practice of law is inseparable from its component actors, Cohen’s nonsense and Frank’s fact-deciding may be considered examples of problems fundamental to the practical execution of a formal legal process.
 
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Another line of criticism may be developed through an examination of the impact of a formal, rule-based system of law on its individual legal actors. In this essay, we shall focus specifically on the degree to which a procedural system makes it easier for lawyers, judges, and other legal professionals to morally distance themselves from the legal outcomes of the process. With this aim, we will look at three related characteristics of a formal legal system that may encourage the disassociation of legal actions from legal consequences, and provide means to avoid taking personal responsibility for morally distasteful legal results. Together, _, although it is important to note that facilitation of moral distance is not a mandate of immorality. It would be wrong to assert that legal professionals are unaware of moral consequences or do not feel deeply responsible for the outcomes of _; the characteristics examined here are simply three traits that make it easier for an actor in a formal legal system to assuage her conscience,
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Shifting our focus from the effectuation of the formal system to its impact on the legal actor, another line of criticism emerges. In this essay, we shall focus specifically on the degree to which a procedural system makes it easier for lawyers, judges, and other legal professionals to morally distance themselves from the outcomes of the legal process. With this aim, we will look at three related characteristics of a formal legal system that may facilitate the disassociation of actions from consequences. Although these features provide a possible mechanism to avoid taking personal responsibility for morally distasteful legal results, it is important to note that mere facilitation of moral distance is not a mandate of immorality. It would be wrong to assert that legal professionals are unaware of moral consequences or do not feel deeply responsible for the outcomes of their actions; the characteristics examined here are simply three traits that make it easier for an actor in a formal legal system to assuage her conscience and distance herself from the results of the process.
 
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The first morally distancing aspect of a procedural legal system arises out of the psychological concept of indirectness bias. Indirectness bias refers to the human tendency to place greater moral weight on activities that are a direct, rather than indirect, result of their actions. The idea that directness generally factors into moral calculations and moral liability has been shown experimentally, and is reflected in some of our justifications for proximate cause and other legal doctrines.
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Indirectness Bias

 
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A procedural system of law creates indirectness by its very nature. A rule-centric legal system creates a procedural decision tree, making the consequences of actions dependant on a sequence of subsequent events, and possibly influenced by a number of other legal actors. The testimony of a policeman lying under oath in a complex trial may be influenced by several levels of procedural __, spin by attorneys, motions, Regardless of the degree to which these subsequent influences actually have an intervening effect, the mere appearance of
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The first distancing feature of a procedural legal system arises out of the psychological concept of indirectness bias. Indirectness bias refers to the tendency of humans to place greater moral weight on activities that are a direct, rather than indirect, result of their actions. The idea that directness generally factors into moral calculations and moral liability has been shown experimentally, and is reflected in a number of our justifications for proximate cause and other legal doctrines.
 
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A ruled based legal system further distances legal actions from outcomes by providing fixed roles and an _ ethical code to its actors. This aspect of procedural legal systems is particularly prevalent in the adversarial model of American law. A central assumption of this type of system is that a just outcome will tend to arise when each legal actor is effectively performing his or her role in the overall legal process. This assumption, that the system is responsible for the justice (or injustice) of the outcome, has the potential to provide a easy moral scapegoat for the individuals working within the system. Because American legal professionals are taught to believe in the efficacy of procedural justice, and because they are bound by an ethical code to zealously perform the duties of their role, it again becomes easier to shrug off personally distasteful consequences of their actions. Indeed, a strong belief in procedural justice may imply that there is no basis for personal moral judgment whatsoever – if justice simply is what is produced by the formal system (Frank’s critiques not withstanding), it would seem to be __ NOT to feel moral discomfort at the outcomes of the system. It is important to note that Although it should not be implied that the individuals within the legal system have no eye for the overall just outcome of, this
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A procedural system of law creates indirectness by its very nature. A rule-centric legal system creates a procedural decision tree, making the consequences of actions dependent on a sequence of subsequent events, and possibly influenced by a number of other legal actors. The testimony of a policeman lying under oath in a complex trial is separated from the actual outcome of the case by a substantial number of procedural steps and interposed actions. Regardless of the degree to which these subsequent influences actually have an intervening effect, the mere appearance of indirectness allows the actor to discount his own moral culpability for the results of the process.
 
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A third, related morally distancing characteristic of procedural law can be found in the restraints it places on its actors to influence the consequences of the process. A system based on ethical and procedural rules necessarily limits the impact that each legal actor can have on the outcome. Regardless of the actual inviolability of the constraints, the facial appearance of powerlessness can provide a powerful moral crutch for an individual confronted with a dissatisfying outcome. Not only can the apparent powerlessness of the individual help to personally excuse an unjust result, but the supposed constraints imposed by the system may discourage a legal actor from searching for a more creative legal solution.
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Legal Roles and Procedural Justice

 
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Although these three characteristics may be perceived as weaknesses of a procedural system of law, it is important to note that any tendency for the legal actor to morally distance herself is not absolute. Just as Frank was careful to point out that the human role as fact-decider does not preclude justice, we must be careful here to not overstate the power of the disassociating characteristics of a formal legal system. It would be absurd to assert that judges and attorneys are not morally affected by the outcomes of their cases.
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A ruled based legal system further distances legal actions from outcomes by providing fixed roles and a normative ethical code to its actors. This aspect of procedural legal systems is particularly noticeable in the adversarial model of American law. A central assumption of this type of system is that a just outcome will tend to arise when each legal actor is effectively performing his or her role in the overall legal process. This assumption, that the system is responsible for the justice (or injustice) of the outcome, has the potential to provide an easy moral scapegoat for the individuals within. Because American legal professionals are encouraged to believe in the efficacy of procedural justice, and because they are bound by an ethical code to zealously perform the duties of their role, it becomes easier to shrug off personally distasteful consequences. Although it should not be implied that individuals in these roles have no eye for the overall just outcome of the system, the focus on procedural rather than substantive justice has the potential to provide an easy moral justification.
 
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Conclusion - Why does this matter and implications. Matters because change can come from the moral dissatisfaction of the actors within the system, and matters because as potential actors within the system, we need to be aware of these possible self-justifications and not be lazy. It may be easier in come cases to use these features of the system to avoid responsibility or to justify not looking for a hidden legal solution to a problem, and understanding the nature of these characteristics may help us to not fall into a trap of self-justifying complacency.
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The Constraints of Procedure

 
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A third distancing characteristic of procedural law can be found within the restraints it places on its actors to influence the consequences of the process. A system based on ethical and procedural rules necessarily limits the impact that each legal actor can have on its outcome. Regardless of the actual inviolability of the constraints, the facial appearance of powerlessness can provide a powerful moral crutch for an individual confronted with a dissatisfying outcome. Not only can the apparent powerlessness of the individual help to personally excuse an unjust result, but the supposed constraints imposed by the system may discourage a legal actor from searching for a more creative legal solution.
 
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  • A formal system provides a decision tree that makes the consequences of an action indirect. Psychology and moral intuition show that we feel less moral culpability when distanced from the consequences of an action.
  • A formal system allows us to play a role, and satisfy our conscience by pointing to the general efficacy of the system.
  • A formal system limits the actions we can take to generate a personally satisfactory moral outcome, thereby increasing our moral distance from the consequences by dint of sheer powerlessness.
  • Focusing on these three issues, they boil down to indirect consequences, scapegoat, and powerlessness.
  • What would it look like if we modified the system? Part of the point is the "separation of powers" idea.
  • Go to more judge directed system like we see in some civil law countries?
  • Is there a way to maintain balancing benefits of a formal system while making actors feel more responsible for outcomes.
  • What is the point of all this? Impetus for change comes from within a system, we want to make injustice as morally unacceptable as possible for the actors
  • Be sure to emphasize that this is not hiding responsibility and tricking people, but simply making it easier for some to ignore.
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Avoiding Overstatement

 
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Although these three characteristics may be perceived as weaknesses of a procedural system of law, it is important to note that any tendency for the legal actor to morally distance herself is not absolute. Just as Frank was careful to point out that the human role as fact-decider does not preclude justice, we must be careful here to not overstate the power of the disassociating characteristics of a formal legal system. It would be absurd to assert that no lawyer has ever sought to distance herself from the substantive consequences of her actions; however, it would be equally absurd to hold that many judges and attorneys are not deeply morally affected by the outcomes of their cases.
 
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"But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions." - James Madison (Federalist No.51)
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Why it matters

 
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Topic Modification - Madison was discussing ways to maintain "the necessary partition of power among the several departments" of the government. He was trying to reason out a structural what he saw as the human tendency to self-aggrandize. The solution discussed in his brief essay was
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As practitioners within a formal legal system, the practical importance of this analysis can be illustrated on two grounds. First, as lawyers, understanding the nature of these dissociating characteristics may allow us to avoid the trap of self-justification. The smarter the individual, the easier it becomes for him to rationalize his actions; we must be aware of our own potential to evade responsibility or justify not searching for creative legal solutions to our problems. Second, the impetus to reform the legal system will arise out of dissatisfaction with the substantive outcomes of the process. The more we are aware of the morally distancing features of our procedural system, the more likely we are to be able to avoid moral complacency regarding the results of the system and our role as legal actors.

TheodoreSmith-FirstPaper 22 - 26 Mar 2008 - Main.TheodoreSmith
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Individual Responsibility for Legal Outcomes

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 A common theme running through our early readings has been an examination of the various weaknesses of a formal and procedural system of law. Cohen focused on the tendency of formal legal reasoning to become circular and self-justifying, while Frank pointed out the ultimately human and contingent basis of legal decision making. For the purposes of this essay, these critiques of the legal system may collectively be thought of as addressing different aspects of humanity’s impact on the formal system. Although law is necessarily dependent on individuals for its operation, Cohen’s nonsense and Frank’s fact-deciding may here be considered examples of problems that arise when the formal legal system is placed within the context of human _
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Another line of criticism may be developed through an examination of the impact of a formal, rule-based system of law on its individual legal actors. In this essay, we shall focus specifically on the degree to which a procedural system makes it easier for lawyers, judges, and other legal professionals to morally distance themselves from legal outcomes. With this aim, we will look at three related characteristics of a formal legal system that may encourage the disassociation of legal actions from legal consequences, and provide means to avoid taking personal responsibility for morally distasteful legal results. Together, _, although it is important to note that facilitation of moral distance is not a mandate of immorality, and it would be naïve to assert that many legal professionals feel no
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Another line of criticism may be developed through an examination of the impact of a formal, rule-based system of law on its individual legal actors. In this essay, we shall focus specifically on the degree to which a procedural system makes it easier for lawyers, judges, and other legal professionals to morally distance themselves from the legal outcomes of the process. With this aim, we will look at three related characteristics of a formal legal system that may encourage the disassociation of legal actions from legal consequences, and provide means to avoid taking personal responsibility for morally distasteful legal results. Together, _, although it is important to note that facilitation of moral distance is not a mandate of immorality. It would be wrong to assert that legal professionals are unaware of moral consequences or do not feel deeply responsible for the outcomes of _; the characteristics examined here are simply three traits that make it easier for an actor in a formal legal system to assuage her conscience,
 
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The first morally distancing aspect of a procedural legal system arises from of the psychological concept of indirectness bias. Indirectness bias refers to the human tendency to place greater moral weight on activities that are a direct, rather than indirect, result of their actions. The idea that directness generally factors into moral calculations and moral liability has been shown experimentally, and is reflected in many of our justifications for proximate cause and other legal doctrines.
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The first morally distancing aspect of a procedural legal system arises out of the psychological concept of indirectness bias. Indirectness bias refers to the human tendency to place greater moral weight on activities that are a direct, rather than indirect, result of their actions. The idea that directness generally factors into moral calculations and moral liability has been shown experimentally, and is reflected in some of our justifications for proximate cause and other legal doctrines.
 A procedural system of law creates indirectness by its very nature. A rule-centric legal system creates a procedural decision tree, making the consequences of actions dependant on a sequence of subsequent events, and possibly influenced by a number of other legal actors. The testimony of a policeman lying under oath in a complex trial may be influenced by several levels of procedural __, spin by attorneys, motions, Regardless of the degree to which these subsequent influences actually have an intervening effect, the mere appearance of

A ruled based legal system further distances legal actions from outcomes by providing fixed roles and an _ ethical code to its actors. This aspect of procedural legal systems is particularly prevalent in the adversarial model of American law. A central assumption of this type of system is that a just outcome will tend to arise when each legal actor is effectively performing his or her role in the overall legal process. This assumption, that the system is responsible for the justice (or injustice) of the outcome, has the potential to provide a easy moral scapegoat for the individuals working within the system. Because American legal professionals are taught to believe in the efficacy of procedural justice, and because they are bound by an ethical code to zealously perform the duties of their role, it again becomes easier to shrug off personally distasteful consequences of their actions. Indeed, a strong belief in procedural justice may imply that there is no basis for personal moral judgment whatsoever – if justice simply is what is produced by the formal system (Frank’s critiques not withstanding), it would seem to be __ NOT to feel moral discomfort at the outcomes of the system. It is important to note that Although it should not be implied that the individuals within the legal system have no eye for the overall just outcome of, this

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A third, related morally distancing characteristic of procedural law can be found in the restraints it places on its actors to influence the consequences of the process. An ethical and procedural code necessarily limits the impact that each legal actor can have on the outcome. These constraints Although the facilitation of moral distance may be perceived as a weakness of a procedural system of law, it is important to note that such a tendency is not absolute. Just as Frank was careful to point out that the human role as fact-decider does not preclude justice, we must be careful here to not overstate the power of the disassociating characteristics of a formal legal system. It would be naïve to assert that judges and attorneys are
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A third, related morally distancing characteristic of procedural law can be found in the restraints it places on its actors to influence the consequences of the process. A system based on ethical and procedural rules necessarily limits the impact that each legal actor can have on the outcome. Regardless of the actual inviolability of the constraints, the facial appearance of powerlessness can provide a powerful moral crutch for an individual confronted with a dissatisfying outcome. Not only can the apparent powerlessness of the individual help to personally excuse an unjust result, but the supposed constraints imposed by the system may discourage a legal actor from searching for a more creative legal solution.

Although these three characteristics may be perceived as weaknesses of a procedural system of law, it is important to note that any tendency for the legal actor to morally distance herself is not absolute. Just as Frank was careful to point out that the human role as fact-decider does not preclude justice, we must be careful here to not overstate the power of the disassociating characteristics of a formal legal system. It would be absurd to assert that judges and attorneys are not morally affected by the outcomes of their cases.

Conclusion - Why does this matter and implications. Matters because change can come from the moral dissatisfaction of the actors within the system, and matters because as potential actors within the system, we need to be aware of these possible self-justifications and not be lazy. It may be easier in come cases to use these features of the system to avoid responsibility or to justify not looking for a hidden legal solution to a problem, and understanding the nature of these characteristics may help us to not fall into a trap of self-justifying complacency.

 

  • A formal system provides a decision tree that makes the consequences of an action indirect. Psychology and moral intuition show that we feel less moral culpability when distanced from the consequences of an action.

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A common theme running through our early readings has been an examination of the various weaknesses of a formal and procedural system of law. Cohen focused on the tendency of formal legal reasoning to become circular and self-justifying, while Frank pointed out the ultimately human and contingent basis of legal decision making. For the purposes of this essay, these critiques of the legal system may collectively be thought of as addressing different aspects of humanity’s impact on the formal system. Although law is necessarily dependent on individuals for its operation, Cohen’s nonsense and Frank’s fact-deciding may here be considered examples of problems that arise when the formal legal system is placed within the context of human _

Another line of criticism may be developed through an examination of the impact of a formal, rule-based system of law on its individual legal actors. In this essay, we shall focus specifically on the degree to which a procedural system makes it easier for lawyers, judges, and other legal professionals to morally distance themselves from legal outcomes. With this aim, we will look at three related characteristics of a formal legal system that may encourage the disassociation of legal actions from legal consequences, and provide means to avoid taking personal responsibility for morally distasteful legal results. Together, _, although it is important to note that facilitation of moral distance is not a mandate of immorality, and it would be naïve to assert that many legal professionals feel no

The first morally distancing aspect of a procedural legal system arises from of the psychological concept of indirectness bias. Indirectness bias refers to the human tendency to place greater moral weight on activities that are a direct, rather than indirect, result of their actions. The idea that directness generally factors into moral calculations and moral liability has been shown experimentally, and is reflected in many of our justifications for proximate cause and other legal doctrines.

A procedural system of law creates indirectness by its very nature. A rule-centric legal system creates a procedural decision tree, making the consequences of actions dependant on a sequence of subsequent events, and possibly influenced by a number of other legal actors. The testimony of a policeman lying under oath in a complex trial may be influenced by several levels of procedural __, spin by attorneys, motions, Regardless of the degree to which these subsequent influences actually have an intervening effect, the mere appearance of

A ruled based legal system further distances legal actions from outcomes by providing fixed roles and an _ ethical code to its actors. This aspect of procedural legal systems is particularly prevalent in the adversarial model of American law. A central assumption of this type of system is that a just outcome will tend to arise when each legal actor is effectively performing his or her role in the overall legal process. This assumption, that the system is responsible for the justice (or injustice) of the outcome, has the potential to provide a easy moral scapegoat for the individuals working within the system. Because American legal professionals are taught to believe in the efficacy of procedural justice, and because they are bound by an ethical code to zealously perform the duties of their role, it again becomes easier to shrug off personally distasteful consequences of their actions. Indeed, a strong belief in procedural justice may imply that there is no basis for personal moral judgment whatsoever – if justice simply is what is produced by the formal system (Frank’s critiques not withstanding), it would seem to be __ NOT to feel moral discomfort at the outcomes of the system. It is important to note that Although it should not be implied that the individuals within the legal system have no eye for the overall just outcome of, this

A third, related morally distancing characteristic of procedural law can be found in the restraints it places on its actors to influence the consequences of the process. An ethical and procedural code necessarily limits the impact that each legal actor can have on the outcome. These constraints Although the facilitation of moral distance may be perceived as a weakness of a procedural system of law, it is important to note that such a tendency is not absolute. Just as Frank was careful to point out that the human role as fact-decider does not preclude justice, we must be careful here to not overstate the power of the disassociating characteristics of a formal legal system. It would be naïve to assert that judges and attorneys are

 

  • A formal system provides a decision tree that makes the consequences of an action indirect. Psychology and moral intuition show that we feel less moral culpability when distanced from the consequences of an action.

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Notes for Rewrite

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Topic Modification - One of the features of a formal system of law is that it helps legal actors avoid taking moral responsibility for their actions.
 
  • A formal system provides a decision tree that makes the consequences of an action indirect. Psychology and moral intuition show that we feel less moral culpability when distanced from the consequences of an action.
  • A formal system allows us to play a role, and satisfy our conscience by pointing to the general efficacy of the system.

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 "But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions." - James Madison (Federalist No.51)

Topic Modification - Madison was discussing ways to maintain "the necessary partition of power among the several departments" of the government. He was trying to reason out a structural what he saw as the human tendency to self-aggrandize. The solution discussed in his brief essay was

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 "But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions." - James Madison (Federalist No.51)

Topic Modification - Madison was discussing ways to maintain "the necessary partition of power among the several departments" of the government. He was trying to reason out a structural what he saw as the human tendency to self-aggrandize. The solution discussed in his brief essay was

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  • Here you half-admitted the presence of the difficulty, and then chose to put it behind you by mere force of bluster ("slippery slope to Nazism" is not a good way to make me believe you are taking someone else's argument seriously). All arguments in responsible persuasive writing must be "real," that is, they must acknowledge the presence of a serious issue arising from genuine disagreement between those who, sharing common grounds, reach differing conclusions. When you find yourself suddenly putting an unreal argument in the conclusion, you should immediately go from "writer mode" to "editor mode" and ask why a straw man has been slipped in at bedtime. It almost always indicates a serious flaw in some preceding argument now being covered too little, too late.


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Topic Modification - One of the problems with a formal system of law is that it helps legal actors avoid taking moral responsibility for their actions.

  • A formal system provides a decision tree that makes the consequences of an action indirect. Psychology and moral intuition show that we feel less moral culpability when distanced from the consequences of an action.
  • A formal system allows us to play a role, and satisfy our conscience by pointing to the general efficacy of the system.
  • A formal system limits the actions we can take to generate a personally satisfactory moral outcome, thereby increasing our moral distance from the consequences by dint of sheer powerlessness.
  • Focusing on these three issues, they boil down to indirect consequences, scapegoat, and powerlessness.
  • What would it look like if we modified the system? Part of the point is the "separation of powers" idea.
  • Go to more judge directed system like we see in some civil law countries?
  • Is there a way to maintain balancing benefits of a formal system while making actors feel more responsible for outcomes.
  • What is the point of all this? Impetus for change comes from within a system, we want to make injustice as morally unacceptable as possible for the actors
  • Be sure to emphasize that this is not hiding responsibility and tricking people, but simply making it easier for some to ignore.

"But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions." - James Madison (Federalist No.51)

Topic Modification - Madison was discussing ways to maintain "the necessary partition of power among the several departments" of the government. He was trying to reason out a structural what he saw as the human tendency to self-aggrandize. The solution discussed in his brief essay was


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 In "Modern Legal Magic," Jerome Frank outlines a historical transition in the rules governing legal outcomes. In his terms, this shift saw legal decision-makers abandoning the ritual of the legal ordeal, and embracing a conception of law founded on the precepts of logical reasoning. The latter approach is the basis for modern law; the arbitrary legal ritual has been replaced by a presumably rational set of quasi-deterministic legal rules.
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Although this change seems profound, Frank questions its meaningfulness. Any system of legal rules must draw its circumstance from the facts surrounding a case. The truth of these facts must in turn be determined by the human processes of investigation and secernment (??); truth must be differentiated and given meaning by a finite and limited individual. This factual basis of law makes decision by legal rules as contingent on human factors and circumstance as the disfavored methods of the ordeal. A system of reason and rules may blind us with its complexity, but is only as good as the truth it is based on.
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Although this change seems profound, Frank questions its meaningfulness. Any system of legal rules must draw its circumstance from the facts surrounding a case. The truth of these facts must in turn be determined by the human processes of investigation and secernment (??) (!!) ; truth must be differentiated and given meaning by a finite and limited individual. This factual basis of law makes decision by legal rules as contingent on human factors and circumstance as the disfavored methods of the ordeal. A system of reason and rules may blind us with its complexity, but is only as good as the truth it is based on.
 

Where We Stand Post-Frank


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 In "Modern Legal Magic," Jerome Frank outlines a historical transition in the rules governing legal outcomes. In his terms, this shift saw legal decision-makers abandoning the ritual of the legal ordeal, and embracing a conception of law founded on the precepts of logical reasoning. The latter approach is the basis for modern law; the arbitrary legal ritual has been replaced by a presumably rational set of quasi-deterministic legal rules.
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Although this change seems profound, Frank questions its meaningfulness. Any system of legal rules must draw its circumstance from the facts surrounding a case. The truth of these facts must in turn be determined by the human processes of investigation and secernment; truth must be differentiated and given meaning by a finite and limited individual. This factual basis of law makes decision by legal rules as contingent on human factors and circumstance as the disfavored methods of the ordeal. A system of reason and rules may blind us with its complexity, but is only as good as the truth it is based on.
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Although this change seems profound, Frank questions its meaningfulness. Any system of legal rules must draw its circumstance from the facts surrounding a case. The truth of these facts must in turn be determined by the human processes of investigation and secernment (??); truth must be differentiated and given meaning by a finite and limited individual. This factual basis of law makes decision by legal rules as contingent on human factors and circumstance as the disfavored methods of the ordeal. A system of reason and rules may blind us with its complexity, but is only as good as the truth it is based on.
 

Where We Stand Post-Frank

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 We find ourselves at an impasse. A refined system of legal rules is unable to achieve the objective legal outcomes that would justify its creation. Law is bound by the personal frailties of the individuals charged with administering the system. If we cannot eliminate the human from the law, it would follow that the law must focus on the development of the human.
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  • This does not actually follow. Trying to claim that your bagatelle is entailed by Frank is simply wrong. He wrote, in fact, a book whose title--taken from James Madison--"If Men Were Angels," specifically announced rejection of your supposed inference. Perfectability of man was not his thing, and existentialism likewise. You could have found many ways of introducing your claims, and maybe you still should, although the claims themselves seem to me less compelling than they seem to you. But the way you are going is shut.
 

Focusing on the Individual

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 For our law system to function in an effective manner, we must produce legal actors (both truth deciders and judges) that are able to accept personal responsibility for the outcome of the legal process. This trait, which we may refer to as moral courage, produces the impetus for the reform and development of the system. An agent of the law with a deep acceptance of her own role in the consequences of judgment cannot escape the moral obligation to produce a personally acceptable outcome.
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  • Now you are being simplistic. In the first place, most judges I know are acutely conscious of their personal responsibility for the consequences of error. They are also highly knowledgeable about the environments in which they work, and are profoundly aware of the inevitability that any judgment they can make about most of the social situations that most pain them when seen in their courtroom is beyond their legal power and would not be properly executed even if they had the power to order it. They make the decisions the law allows them to make not only because they know what you are forgetting here, that the judge's power "to produce a personally acceptable outcome" is often nil, but also because they know that despite the tragic nature of impersonal procedural government, it is also the only tool for establishing the rule of law, which they consider (sometimes for sentimental and intellectually vacuous and sometimes for the most refined and thoughtful of reasons) an "inestimable blessing."
 

Developing Truth-Deciders

By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, the practice of law becomes a personal search for a morally tolerable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this investigation, it cannot alone provide the means. The obligation to produce an acceptable result brings with it an obligation to bring to bear the full weight of human intellect and understanding. Reason, science, and rules are thus able to rejoin the legal process, not as moral crutches, but in their proper places as tools of the intellect. The failure of rule-centric law is not a failure of the techniques themselves, but simply a failure of the system to reduce human responsibility for its outcome.

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  • This is a new proposition, which requires defense, and your strong phrasing of the idea almost guarantees that it is indefensible. Everything we think is wrong with formal systems is "simply" a failure to grant judges enough personal discretion? To establish that you have to disestablish many other purportedly contributing elements. Cohen is certain that the problem lies at least in part in properties of formal systems; in order to establish your proposition, you need to show that he is completely wrong. Similarly, you have to have a complete answer for all criticisms that suggest no amount of human moral responsibility will reverse inherent defects in human cognition and limits in human cogitation. Not to mention what I suppose we might call Robespierre Syndrome, or an absolutely virtuous willingness to take total moral responsibility for radical injustice. For which you must possess somewhere about you a complete and indeed retroactive cure good against every form of fanaticism that ever committed judicial murder with self-conscious self-righteousness. Wouldn't a weaker claim make more sense here? Even if it led to a more serious reconsideration of the topic as a whole....
 Although the individual decision-maker thus creates the basis of law, her effort alone cannot form the extent of a successful legal system. Law is a social exercise, and must exist as a collaborative effort; a successful truth decider and adjudicator can only succeed within a community of her peers. Constant collaboration and monitoring is not only necessary to produce a flexible and effective legal process, but is essential to maintain the individual sense of morality and responsibility. Feedback from peers can shape and develop the individual’s legal reasoning, but also reinforces the sense of responsibility and duty with which the individual must approach her profession.
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 A legal system focused on the responsibility of the individual is by its nature mutable. To some, this may suggest an inevitable slippery slope into Nazism or other morally abhorrent condition. This response makes a false assumption about the stability of rule based systems; humans are ultimately responsible for legal outcomes in either case. Our choice is not between objectivity and the despot. The despot will rule regardless. Our choice is between hiding our conscience behind a screen of false objectivity and reason, or forcing ourselves to accept the consequences of our actions - taking full and final responsibility for the outcome of the law.
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  • Here you half-admitted the presence of the difficulty, and then chose to put it behind you by mere force of bluster ("slippery slope to Nazism" is not a good way to make me believe you are taking someone else's argument seriously). All arguments in responsible persuasive writing must be "real," that is, they must acknowledge the presence of a serious issue arising from genuine disagreement between those who, sharing common grounds, reach differing conclusions. When you find yourself suddenly putting an unreal argument in the conclusion, you should immediately go from "writer mode" to "editor mode" and ask why a straw man has been slipped in at bedtime. It almost always indicates a serious flaw in some preceding argument now being covered too little, too late.
 

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 -- By TheodoreSmith - 09 Feb 2008
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Summary

 
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If we accept the eventual conclusion of Frank's reasoning, that the human role as truth decider ultimately forecloses the possibility of a consistent system of "legal science", our development of a just and effective legal system must necessarily focus on developing the reasoning and moral courage of the individual.
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If we accept the eventual conclusion of Frank's reasoning, that the human role as truth decider ultimately forecloses the possibility of an objective system of "legal science", our development of a just and effective legal system must necessarily focus on developing the reasoning and moral courage of the individual.
 
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The Failure of Rule Based Law to Justify Outcomes

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The Failure of Rules to Justify Outcomes

 
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Garbage In, Garbage Out: The Argument Against Legal Rules as a Mechanism of Justice

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Garbage In, Garbage Out: The Argument Against Legal Rules

 
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In "Modern Legal Magic," Jerome Frank outlines a historical transition in the rules governing legal outcomes. In his terms, this shift saw legal decision makers abandoning the ritualistic and magical rite of the legal ordeal, and embracing the development of a system of law based on the precepts of logical reasoning. The latter approach is the basis for modern law; the arbitrary legal ritual has been replaced by a scientific and rational set of deterministic legal rules.
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In "Modern Legal Magic," Jerome Frank outlines a historical transition in the rules governing legal outcomes. In his terms, this shift saw legal decision-makers abandoning the ritual of the legal ordeal, and embracing a conception of law founded on the precepts of logical reasoning. The latter approach is the basis for modern law; the arbitrary legal ritual has been replaced by a presumably rational set of quasi-deterministic legal rules.

Although this change seems profound, Frank questions its meaningfulness. Any system of legal rules must draw its circumstance from the facts surrounding a case. The truth of these facts must in turn be determined by the human processes of investigation and secernment; truth must be differentiated and given meaning by a finite and limited individual. This factual basis of law makes decision by legal rules as contingent on human factors and circumstance as the disfavored methods of the ordeal. A system of reason and rules may blind us with its complexity, but is only as good as the truth it is based on.

 
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Although this change seems profound, Frank questions its meaningfulness. Any system of legal rules must draw input from the facts surrounding a case. The truth of these facts must in turn be determined by the human process of investigation and secernment. Indeed, Frank claims this fact gathering activity is so bound in individual nature that it may better be understood as a process of "truth deciding." The necessity of fact as the basis for law makes decision by legal rules as contingent on human factors and circumstance as the disfavored methods of the ordeal. A system based on a system of legal rules may blind us with its complexity, but is only as good as the truth it is based on. In the language of computer science, "Garbage in, Garbage out."
 

Where We Stand Post-Frank

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A naive response to the failure of legal rules to produce objectively just decisions could be to further refine our system. If we accept Frank's reasoning, this solution cannot possibly succeed. At the heart of any deterministic decision tree of legal rules will be the element of the fact finder and truth decider. This fundamental bias cannot be removed from the system; some mechanism must exist to choose relevant facts and establish truth. This basic requirement of legal decision making forces us to look for a conception of ideal law that transcends our attempts to form a purely rational and systematic process.
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A naive response to the failure of legal rules to produce objectivity could be to further refine the system. If we accept Frank's reasoning, this solution cannot possibly succeed. At the heart of any deterministic decision tree of legal rules will be the element of the fact finder and truth decider. This fundamental bias cannot be removed from the system; some mechanism must exist to choose relevant facts and establish truth. This basic requirement of legal decision making forces us to look for a conception of ideal law that transcends a purely deterministic and systematic process.
 
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We find ourselves at an impasse. A refined scientific system of legal rules is unable to achieve the objective legal outcomes that would justify its creation. Law is bound by the subjective human frailties of the individuals charged with administering the system. If we cannot eliminate the human from the law, it would follow that the development of a just legal system must focus on the moral and intellectual development of the legal actor.
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We find ourselves at an impasse. A refined system of legal rules is unable to achieve the objective legal outcomes that would justify its creation. Law is bound by the personal frailties of the individuals charged with administering the system. If we cannot eliminate the human from the law, it would follow that the law must focus on the development of the human.
 
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Focusing on the Individual as a Replacement for Rules

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Focusing on the Individual

 

Individual Responsibility for Legal Outcomes

Focusing on law as a systematic decision-making procedure tends to privilege process over outcome. When a judge writes that he is “forced” to rule against his own judgment, we wince, but ultimately accept the decision. The supposed benefits of consistent reasoning are substituted for consistent judgment. This trade-off would be eminently justified if strict adherence to our legal rules produced objectively just decisions; however, a deterministic system based on human and ultimately subjective input cannot take the responsibility for legal outcomes away from the administrators of the law.

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If we are unable to justify the results of legal decisions by appealing to the rationality of the system, we must accept that this responsibility ultimately lies with the individual. This change mandates a very different approach to the law. The mere acceptance of personal responsibility for the consequences of a legal decision requires a vast emotional and moral maturity. The knowledge that one has sent a man to his death based on necessarily imperfect information should be a profoundly disturbing realization. Indeed, a prime function of our obsession with legal rules is to relieve this burden from the consciences of legal actors. The pressure for a student of law to adopt the mythology of a rationally justified legal outcome comes as much from his own moral unease as from the external blandishments of his professors.
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If we are unable to justify the results of legal decisions by appealing to the rationality of the system, we must accept that this responsibility ultimately lies with the individual. This change mandates a very different approach to the law. The acceptance of personal responsibility for the consequences of a legal decision requires a vast emotional and moral maturity. The knowledge that one has sent a man to his death based on necessarily imperfect information should be a profoundly disturbing realization. Indeed, a prime function of our obsession with legal rules is to relieve this burden from the consciences of legal actors. The pressure for a student of law to adopt the mythology of a rationally justified legal outcome comes as much from his own moral unease as from the external blandishments of his professors.
 
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For our law system to function in an ideal fashion, we must produce legal actors (both “truth deciders” and judges) that are able to accept personal responsibility for the outcome of the legal process. This trait, which we may refer to as moral courage, produces the impetus for the reform and development of the system. An agent of the law with a deep acceptance of her own role in the consequences of judgment cannot escape the moral obligation to produce a personally acceptable result.
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For our law system to function in an effective manner, we must produce legal actors (both truth deciders and judges) that are able to accept personal responsibility for the outcome of the legal process. This trait, which we may refer to as moral courage, produces the impetus for the reform and development of the system. An agent of the law with a deep acceptance of her own role in the consequences of judgment cannot escape the moral obligation to produce a personally acceptable outcome.
 
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Developing Truth-Deciders

 
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By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, the practice of law becomes a personal search for a morally tolerable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this investigation, courage alone cannot provide the means. The obligation to produce an acceptable result brings with it an obligation to bring to bear the full weight of human intellect and understanding. Although this does not commit the actor to any particular analytical technique, a strong case could be made for the necessity of what Frank refers to as the "scientific spirit." (Frank, Legal Science and Legal Engineering, p.219.) Science and reason are thus able to rejoin the legal process, not as a means of justification or moral crutch, but in their proper places as tools of the intellect.

Although the individual decision-maker thus creates the basis of the legal system, her effort alone cannot form the extent of a successful legal system. Law is a social exercise, and must exist as a collaborative effort; a successful truth decider and adjudicator can only succeed within a community of her peers. Constant collaboration and monitoring is not only necessary to produce a flexible and effective legal process, but is essential to maintain an individual sense of morality and responsibility. Feedback from peers can shape and develop the individual’s legal reasoning, but also reinforces the sense of responsibility and duty with which the individual must approach her profession.

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Developing Truth-Deciders

 
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A focus on the role of the individual does not preclude the use of legal rules any more than it precludes rational and scientific thought. The failure of rule-centric law is not a failure of the rules themselves, but simply a failure of the system to reduce human responsibility for legal outcomes. Rules serve many purposes, and would continue to be useful in an individually focused system of law. Beyond the oft-stated value of legal rules in providing various normative and warning functions, rules would be important in order to codify the evolving structure of the legal system, and thereby force debate and discussion among legal actors.
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By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, the practice of law becomes a personal search for a morally tolerable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this investigation, it cannot alone provide the means. The obligation to produce an acceptable result brings with it an obligation to bring to bear the full weight of human intellect and understanding. Reason, science, and rules are thus able to rejoin the legal process, not as moral crutches, but in their proper places as tools of the intellect. The failure of rule-centric law is not a failure of the techniques themselves, but simply a failure of the system to reduce human responsibility for its outcome.
 
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Although the individual decision-maker thus creates the basis of law, her effort alone cannot form the extent of a successful legal system. Law is a social exercise, and must exist as a collaborative effort; a successful truth decider and adjudicator can only succeed within a community of her peers. Constant collaboration and monitoring is not only necessary to produce a flexible and effective legal process, but is essential to maintain the individual sense of morality and responsibility. Feedback from peers can shape and develop the individual’s legal reasoning, but also reinforces the sense of responsibility and duty with which the individual must approach her profession.
 

Conclusion

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A legal system focused on the responsibility of the individual legal actor is by its nature mutable. It is constantly adapting to meet the challenges of a changing world. It could be claimed that this scheme would therefore have no defense against _. This argument misses the fundamental flaw of a rule based system. Humans are going to be ultimately responsible for legal outcomes in either scheme, and a system that places the responsibility for outcomes directly on the individual is going to be far less vulnerable to the moral whims of the community. Objective and __ is impossible, and (something about using rules to avoiding responsibility)

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A legal system focused on the responsibility of the individual is by its nature mutable. To some, this may suggest an inevitable slippery slope into Nazism or other morally abhorrent condition. This response makes a false assumption about the stability of rule based systems; humans are ultimately responsible for legal outcomes in either case. Our choice is not between objectivity and the despot. The despot will rule regardless. Our choice is between hiding our conscience behind a screen of false objectivity and reason, or forcing ourselves to accept the consequences of our actions - taking full and final responsibility for the outcome of the law.
 

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-- By TheodoreSmith - 09 Feb 2008

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Abstract

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Developing Truth-Deciders

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 By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, the practice of law becomes a personal search for a morally tolerable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this investigation, courage alone cannot provide the means. The obligation to produce an acceptable result brings with it an obligation to bring to bear the full weight of human intellect and understanding. Although this does not commit the actor to any particular analytical technique, a strong case could be made for the necessity of what Frank refers to as the "scientific spirit." (Frank, Legal Science and Legal Engineering, p.219.) Science and reason are thus able to rejoin the legal process, not as a means of justification or moral crutch, but in their proper places as tools of the intellect.

Although the individual decision-maker thus creates the basis of the legal system, her effort alone cannot form the extent of a successful legal system. Law is a social exercise, and must exist as a collaborative effort; a successful truth decider and adjudicator can only succeed within a community of her peers. Constant collaboration and monitoring is not only necessary to produce a flexible and effective legal process, but is essential to maintain an individual sense of morality and responsibility. Feedback from peers can shape and develop the individual’s legal reasoning, but also reinforces the sense of responsibility and duty with which the individual must approach her profession.

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A legal system focused on the responsibility of the individual legal actor is by its nature mutable. It is constantly shifting and adapting to meet the challenges of a changing world. Arguments

One might expect two primary arguments to be leveled against such a scheme. The first argument focuses on the perceived instability or subjectivity of the system. This argument might assert that a system without a fixed and rational basis for decision lacks any bulwark against the swamp of moral relativism. Nothing prevents such a system from falling into a pattern of racial persecution and perceived immorality. This argument misses the fundamental point that a rule based system provides no greater moral stability. Humans, and therefore the prevailing social context in which individual conduct is based, are responsible for the eventual outcome in either scheme. This argument actually cuts against the ... in system focused on our personal responsibility for the A second argument against XXXXXX could point to the clear ambiguities inherent in the development of the XXXXXX. The brief Unclear and chaotic ... this is not a flaw, but the fundamental nature of the system. The very idea behind structuring a legal system around the individual is that we do not, nor cannot, have a static system which meets the ever-changing goals of the law. This argument falls back on the assumption that a rational and __ system adds

>
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A legal system focused on the responsibility of the individual legal actor is by its nature mutable. It is constantly adapting to meet the challenges of a changing world. It could be claimed that this scheme would therefore have no defense against _. This argument misses the fundamental flaw of a rule based system. Humans are going to be ultimately responsible for legal outcomes in either scheme, and a system that places the responsibility for outcomes directly on the individual is going to be far less vulnerable to the moral whims of the community. Objective and __ is impossible, and (something about using rules to avoiding responsibility)
 

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-- By TheodoreSmith - 09 Feb 2008

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Abstract

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By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, the practice of law becomes a personal search for a morally tolerable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this investigation, courage alone cannot provide the means. The obligation to produce an acceptable result brings with it an obligation to bring to bear the full weight of human intellect and understanding. Although this does not commit the actor to any particular analytical technique, a strong case could be made for the necessity of what Frank refers to as the "scientific spirit." (Frank, Legal Science and Legal Engineering, p.219.) This idea simply encompasses the XXXXXXXXXXXXXX of modern scientific and rational thought: an open mind, a skepticism towards prior assumptions and theories, and an empirical approach to XXXXXXXXXXXX. Science and reason are thus able to rejoin the legal process, not as a means of justification or moral crutch, but in their proper places as a tools of the intellect.
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By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, the practice of law becomes a personal search for a morally tolerable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this investigation, courage alone cannot provide the means. The obligation to produce an acceptable result brings with it an obligation to bring to bear the full weight of human intellect and understanding. Although this does not commit the actor to any particular analytical technique, a strong case could be made for the necessity of what Frank refers to as the "scientific spirit." (Frank, Legal Science and Legal Engineering, p.219.) Science and reason are thus able to rejoin the legal process, not as a means of justification or moral crutch, but in their proper places as tools of the intellect.
 
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Although the individual decision-maker thus creates the basis of the legal system, her effort alone cannot form the extent of a successful legal system. Law is a social exercise, and must exist as a collaborative effort; a successful truth decider and adjudicator can only succeed within a community of her peers. Constant collaboration and monitoring is not only necessary to produce a flexible and effective legal process, but is essential to maintain an individual sense of morality and responsibility. The very subjectivity of methods and goals that demands a focus on the legal actor requires that decisions be made within the context of a larger legal network. Feedback from peers can shape and develop the individual’s legal reasoning, but also reinforces the sense of responsibility and duty with which the individual must approach her profession. The more intelligent the actor, the easier it becomes to justify one's actions - creating excuses rather than taking up the requisite moral burden. Acting within a XXXXXXXX impressing upon one another the awesome responsibility that they are XXXXXX
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Although the individual decision-maker thus creates the basis of the legal system, her effort alone cannot form the extent of a successful legal system. Law is a social exercise, and must exist as a collaborative effort; a successful truth decider and adjudicator can only succeed within a community of her peers. Constant collaboration and monitoring is not only necessary to produce a flexible and effective legal process, but is essential to maintain an individual sense of morality and responsibility. Feedback from peers can shape and develop the individual’s legal reasoning, but also reinforces the sense of responsibility and duty with which the individual must approach her profession.
 A focus on the role of the individual does not preclude the use of legal rules any more than it precludes rational and scientific thought. The failure of rule-centric law is not a failure of the rules themselves, but simply a failure of the system to reduce human responsibility for legal outcomes. Rules serve many purposes, and would continue to be useful in an individually focused system of law. Beyond the oft-stated value of legal rules in providing various normative and warning functions, rules would be important in order to codify the evolving structure of the legal system, and thereby force debate and discussion among legal actors.
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Conclusion

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A legal system focused on the responsibility of the individual legal actor is by its nature mutable. It is constantly shifting and adapting to meet the challenges of a changing world. One might expect two primary arguments to be leveled against such a scheme. The first argument focuses on the perceived instability or subjectivity of the system. This argument might assert that a system without a fixed and rational basis for decision lacks any bulwark against the swamp of moral relativism. Nothing prevents such a system from falling into a pattern of racial persecution and perceived immorality. This argument misses the fundamental point that a rule based system provides no greater moral stability. Humans, and therefore the prevailing social context in which individual conduct is based, are responsible for the eventual outcome in either scheme. This argument actually cuts against the ... in system focused on our personal responsibility for the
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A legal system focused on the responsibility of the individual legal actor is by its nature mutable. It is constantly shifting and adapting to meet the challenges of a changing world. Arguments

One might expect two primary arguments to be leveled against such a scheme. The first argument focuses on the perceived instability or subjectivity of the system. This argument might assert that a system without a fixed and rational basis for decision lacks any bulwark against the swamp of moral relativism. Nothing prevents such a system from falling into a pattern of racial persecution and perceived immorality. This argument misses the fundamental point that a rule based system provides no greater moral stability. Humans, and therefore the prevailing social context in which individual conduct is based, are responsible for the eventual outcome in either scheme. This argument actually cuts against the ... in system focused on our personal responsibility for the

 A second argument against XXXXXX could point to the clear ambiguities inherent in the development of the XXXXXX. The brief Unclear and chaotic ... this is not a flaw, but the fundamental nature of the system. The very idea behind structuring a legal system around the individual is that we do not, nor cannot, have a static system which meets the ever-changing goals of the law. This argument falls back on the assumption that a rational and __ system adds



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-- By TheodoreSmith - 09 Feb 2008

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Abstract

If we accept the eventual conclusion of Frank's reasoning, that the human role as truth decider ultimately forecloses the possibility of a consistent system of "legal science", our development of a just and effective legal system must necessarily focus on developing the reasoning and moral courage of the individual.

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Garbage In, Garbage Out: The Argument Against Legal Rules as a Mechanism of Justice

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In "Modern Legal Magic," Jerome Frank outlines a historical transition in the rules governing legal outcomes. In his terms, this shift saw legal decision makers abandoning the ritualistic and magical rite of the legal ordeal, and embracing the development of a system of law based on the precepts of logical reasoning. The latter approach is the basis for modern law; the arbitrary nature of the magical legal ritual has been improved upon and replaced by a scientific and rational set of deterministic legal rules.

Although this change seems profound, Frank questions the meaningfulness of the distinction. Any system of legal rules must draw its input from the facts surrounding a case. The truth of these facts must in turn necessarily be determined by the human process of investigation and secernment. Indeed, Frank claims this activity is so bound in the nature of the individual that it may better be understood as a process of "truth deciding." Extending Frank's reasoning, the necessity of fact as the basis for law makes decision by legal rules as contingent on human factors and circumstance as the disfavored methods of the ordeal. A system based on a interconnected system of legal rules may blind us with its refined complexity, but is only as good as the truth it is based on. In the language of computer science, "Garbage in, Garbage out."

Setting a Course: The Difficulty of Assigning Heuristics to Legal Outcomes

Any effort to reform the law must begin with an examination of the possible goals of a legal system. Although a detailed treatment of this topic is vastly outside the scope of this essay, we may posit as an example three goals arguably central to the success of any legal system: consistency of legal judgment, the efficient production of social utility, and adherence to the moral expectations of the community. While these goals are prima facia reasonable, they are bound to encounter the same difficulties of definition that plague our legal system as a whole. Consistency must be measured in terms of truth, the unknowability of which is the foundation of Frank's argument. Utility and morality are even more vague, depending on the subjective understanding of some undefined set of individuals.

Although the inability to even define adequate heuristics may seem like the death knell for the reformation of law, it strengthens the conclusion that the ideal system of law cannot be the simple result of a sufficiently complex legal system. The very goals of law are dependent on the same human factors that make legal science untenable. Even if the development of a objective system of legal rules was possible, the subjectiveness of our intentions would force us to look elsewhere for purpose or guidance in the development of law.

>
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In "Modern Legal Magic," Jerome Frank outlines a historical transition in the rules governing legal outcomes. In his terms, this shift saw legal decision makers abandoning the ritualistic and magical rite of the legal ordeal, and embracing the development of a system of law based on the precepts of logical reasoning. The latter approach is the basis for modern law; the arbitrary legal ritual has been replaced by a scientific and rational set of deterministic legal rules.
 
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Although this change seems profound, Frank questions its meaningfulness. Any system of legal rules must draw input from the facts surrounding a case. The truth of these facts must in turn be determined by the human process of investigation and secernment. Indeed, Frank claims this fact gathering activity is so bound in individual nature that it may better be understood as a process of "truth deciding." The necessity of fact as the basis for law makes decision by legal rules as contingent on human factors and circumstance as the disfavored methods of the ordeal. A system based on a system of legal rules may blind us with its complexity, but is only as good as the truth it is based on. In the language of computer science, "Garbage in, Garbage out."
 

Where We Stand Post-Frank

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A naive response to the failure of legal rules to produce objectively 'correct' decisions could be to further refine our system. This response stems from our tendency, pointed at in Frank's "Legal Science and Legal Engineering", to view the law as a potentially deterministic and scientific process. If we accept Frank's reasoning, this solution cannot possibly succeed. At the heart of any deterministic decision tree of legal rules will be the element of the fact finder and truth decider. This fundamental bias cannot be removed from the system; some mechanism must exist to choose relevant facts and establish the truth for the purposes of law. This basic requirement of legal decision making forces us to look for a conception of law that transcends our attempts to form a purely rational and systematic process.
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A naive response to the failure of legal rules to produce objectively just decisions could be to further refine our system. If we accept Frank's reasoning, this solution cannot possibly succeed. At the heart of any deterministic decision tree of legal rules will be the element of the fact finder and truth decider. This fundamental bias cannot be removed from the system; some mechanism must exist to choose relevant facts and establish truth. This basic requirement of legal decision making forces us to look for a conception of ideal law that transcends our attempts to form a purely rational and systematic process.
 
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We find ourselves at an impasse. A refined scientific system of legal rules is unable to achieve the objective legal outcomes that would justify its creation. We are likewise unable to set objective goals to measure our system in terms of. Law is bound to the subjective human frailties of the individuals charged with administering the system. If we cannot eliminate the human from the law, it would follow that the development of a just legal system must focus on the moral and intellectual development of the legal administrator.
>
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We find ourselves at an impasse. A refined scientific system of legal rules is unable to achieve the objective legal outcomes that would justify its creation. Law is bound by the subjective human frailties of the individuals charged with administering the system. If we cannot eliminate the human from the law, it would follow that the development of a just legal system must focus on the moral and intellectual development of the legal actor.
 

Focusing on the Individual as a Replacement for Rules

Individual Responsibility for Legal Outcomes

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Focusing on law as a systematic decision-making procedure tends to privilege process over outcome. When a judge writes that he is “forced” to rule against his own judgment, we wince, but ultimately accept the decision. The supposed benefits of consistent reasoning are substituted for consistent judgment. This trade-off would be eminently justified if strict adherence to our legal rules produced objectively just decisions; however, a deterministic system based on human and ultimately subjective input cannot take the responsibility for legal outcomes away from the adjudicators of the law.

>
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Focusing on law as a systematic decision-making procedure tends to privilege process over outcome. When a judge writes that he is “forced” to rule against his own judgment, we wince, but ultimately accept the decision. The supposed benefits of consistent reasoning are substituted for consistent judgment. This trade-off would be eminently justified if strict adherence to our legal rules produced objectively just decisions; however, a deterministic system based on human and ultimately subjective input cannot take the responsibility for legal outcomes away from the administrators of the law.
 
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If we are unable to justify the results of legal decisions by appealing to the rationality of the system, we must accept that this responsibility ultimately lies with the individual. This change mandates a very different approach to the law. A legal regime that places responsibility for outcomes on the actors within the system must focus on substantially different areas of development than a system that considers rules a justification of results. The mere acceptance of personal responsibility for the consequences of a legal decision requires a vast emotional and moral maturity. The knowledge that one has chosen to send a man to his death based on necessarily imperfect information should be a profoundly difficult realization. Indeed, a prime function of our obsession with the development of the system is to relieve this burden from the consciences of legal actors. The pressure for a student of law to adopt the mythology of a rationally justified legal outcome comes as much from his own moral unease as from the external blandishments of his professors.
>
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If we are unable to justify the results of legal decisions by appealing to the rationality of the system, we must accept that this responsibility ultimately lies with the individual. This change mandates a very different approach to the law. The mere acceptance of personal responsibility for the consequences of a legal decision requires a vast emotional and moral maturity. The knowledge that one has sent a man to his death based on necessarily imperfect information should be a profoundly disturbing realization. Indeed, a prime function of our obsession with legal rules is to relieve this burden from the consciences of legal actors. The pressure for a student of law to adopt the mythology of a rationally justified legal outcome comes as much from his own moral unease as from the external blandishments of his professors.
 
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For our law system to function in an ideal fashion, we must produce legal agents (both “truth deciders” and judges) that are able to accept personal responsibility for the outcome of the legal process. This trait, which we may refer to as moral courage, produces the impetus for the reform and development of the system. An agent of the law with a deep acceptance of her own role in the consequences of judgment cannot escape the moral obligation to produce a personally acceptable result.
>
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For our law system to function in an ideal fashion, we must produce legal actors (both “truth deciders” and judges) that are able to accept personal responsibility for the outcome of the legal process. This trait, which we may refer to as moral courage, produces the impetus for the reform and development of the system. An agent of the law with a deep acceptance of her own role in the consequences of judgment cannot escape the moral obligation to produce a personally acceptable result.
 

Developing Truth-Deciders

(Section Under Construction)

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By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, the practice of law becomes a personal search for a morally acceptable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this investigation, courage alone cannot provide the means. The obligation to produce an acceptable result brings with it an obligation to bring to bear the full weight of human intellect and understanding. Although this does not commit the actor to any particular analytical technique, a strong case could be made for the necessity of what Frank refers to as the "scientific spirit." (Frank, Legal Science and Legal Engineering, p.219.) This idea simply encompasses the __ of modern scientific and rational thought: an open mind, a skepticism to assumption and theory, and a _. Science and reason is thus able to rejoin the legal process, not as a means of justification or moral crutch, but in its proper place as a tool of the intellect.

Although the individual decision-maker thus creates the basis of the legal system, her effort alone cannot form the extent of a successful legal system. Law is a social exercise, and must exist as a collaborative effort; a successful truth decider and adjudicator can only succeed within a community of her peers. Constant collaboration and monitoring is not only necessary to produce a flexible and effective legal process, but is essential to maintain an individual sense of morality and responsibility. The very subjectivity of methods and goals that demands a focus on the legal actor requires that decisions be made within the context of a larger legal network. Feedback from peers can shape and develop the individuals legal reasoning, but also reinforce the sense of responsibility and duty with which the individual must approach her profession. A smart the easier it becomes to justify ones actions, creating excuses rather than taking up the moral burden impressing upon one another the awesome responsibility that they are

>
>
By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, the practice of law becomes a personal search for a morally tolerable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this investigation, courage alone cannot provide the means. The obligation to produce an acceptable result brings with it an obligation to bring to bear the full weight of human intellect and understanding. Although this does not commit the actor to any particular analytical technique, a strong case could be made for the necessity of what Frank refers to as the "scientific spirit." (Frank, Legal Science and Legal Engineering, p.219.) This idea simply encompasses the XXXXXXXXXXXXXX of modern scientific and rational thought: an open mind, a skepticism towards prior assumptions and theories, and an empirical approach to XXXXXXXXXXXX. Science and reason are thus able to rejoin the legal process, not as a means of justification or moral crutch, but in their proper places as a tools of the intellect.
 
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(PARAGRAPH ABOUT LEGAL RULES)
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Although the individual decision-maker thus creates the basis of the legal system, her effort alone cannot form the extent of a successful legal system. Law is a social exercise, and must exist as a collaborative effort; a successful truth decider and adjudicator can only succeed within a community of her peers. Constant collaboration and monitoring is not only necessary to produce a flexible and effective legal process, but is essential to maintain an individual sense of morality and responsibility. The very subjectivity of methods and goals that demands a focus on the legal actor requires that decisions be made within the context of a larger legal network. Feedback from peers can shape and develop the individual’s legal reasoning, but also reinforces the sense of responsibility and duty with which the individual must approach her profession. The more intelligent the actor, the easier it becomes to justify one's actions - creating excuses rather than taking up the requisite moral burden. Acting within a XXXXXXXX impressing upon one another the awesome responsibility that they are XXXXXX
 
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A focus on the role of the individual does not preclude the use of legal rules any more than it precludes rational and scientific thought. The failure of _ was not a failure of the rules themselves, but simply a failure of _ to justify themselves

Likewise the focus on the rationality and maturity of the truth decider does not eliminate the need for rules. elimination of our system does not supercede a role for legal rules. The notion of developing individuals rather than refining systems takes some of our intellectual focus off of legal rules, however * Placing our focus on the rationality and maturity of the truth decider does not, however, eliminate the need for rules. While the justification and responsibility for the judicial decision must ultimately rest with the individual, rules can serve other functions than creating the illusion of objectivity. * Rules serve some sort of normative function, both in setting positive standards for ethical or moral conduct, and making clear any community proscriptions on conduct. * Rules assist individual decision makers i codify force debate

>
>
A focus on the role of the individual does not preclude the use of legal rules any more than it precludes rational and scientific thought. The failure of rule-centric law is not a failure of the rules themselves, but simply a failure of the system to reduce human responsibility for legal outcomes. Rules serve many purposes, and would continue to be useful in an individually focused system of law. Beyond the oft-stated value of legal rules in providing various normative and warning functions, rules would be important in order to codify the evolving structure of the legal system, and thereby force debate and discussion among legal actors.
 

Conclusion

(Section Under Construction)
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A legal system focused on the __ of the individual is by its nature chaotic. It is a changing and This could happen in any system, but in system focused on our personal responsibility for the Unclear and chaotic ... this is not a flaw, but the fundamental nature of the system. The very idea behind structuring law around the individual is that we do not, nor cannot, have a static system which meets the ever-changing goals of the law. This argument falls back on the assumption that a rational and __ system adds

Notes (scrap writings I am keeping here as I edit)

The development of modern law has generally been viewed (by whom? this is a terrible sentence!) as the development of a rational system of interconnected legal rules. In "Modern Legal Magic," Jerome Frank outlines a transition from the ritualistic _ of the ordeal, to the development of a system of law based on the precepts of logical reasoning.

Although this shift in the basis of legal judgment...

Frank's criticism of the modern reliance on systems of legal rules

Although Frank holds out some hope that justice will be done If we are unable to reach a just and consistent outcome through a system of legal rules, we are If justice and consistency cannot be effected through the use of a deterministic system of legal rules, we must

Any effort to reform the law must begin with an examination of the possible goals of a legal system. Although a detailed treatment of this topic is vastly outside the scope of this essay, I will briefly _ three goals arguably central to the success of any legal system: consistency of legal judgment, the efficient production of utility, and adherence to the moral expectations of the citizenry. While these goals are prima facia reasonable, they are bound to encounter the same difficulties of definition that plague our legal system as a whole. Consistency must be measured in terms of truth, the unknowability of which is the foundation of Frank's argument. Utility and morality are even more vague, depending on the subjective understanding of some undefined set of individuals. Although this inability to even define adequate heuristics may seem like the death knell for the reformation of law, it strengthens the conclusion that the ideal system of law cannot be the simple result of sufficiently refined legal rules. _ _ the very goals of law are dependent on the human factors that make a scientific analysis untenable. The _ of injustice arises because we are sublimating our natural _ to the _ of a system. Consistent reasoning is substituted for consistent judgment. A instinctual _ at the problem might be to further refine the system, and eliminate _ from the functioning of the . If we accept Frank's reasoning, this solution cannot possibly succeed. Law itself is a deeply human activity, and the further refinement of a mechanistic system of reasoning can only mask the __. If a scientific system of legal rules is unable to eliminate the ^^human factors^^, it would follow that the development of a just legal system must focus on the moral and intellectual development.

We are focusing on producing scientists when we desperately need artists. Note that legal rules do serve some kind of normative function.

>
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A legal system focused on the responsibility of the individual legal actor is by its nature mutable. It is constantly shifting and adapting to meet the challenges of a changing world. One might expect two primary arguments to be leveled against such a scheme. The first argument focuses on the perceived instability or subjectivity of the system. This argument might assert that a system without a fixed and rational basis for decision lacks any bulwark against the swamp of moral relativism. Nothing prevents such a system from falling into a pattern of racial persecution and perceived immorality. This argument misses the fundamental point that a rule based system provides no greater moral stability. Humans, and therefore the prevailing social context in which individual conduct is based, are responsible for the eventual outcome in either scheme. This argument actually cuts against the ... in system focused on our personal responsibility for the A second argument against XXXXXX could point to the clear ambiguities inherent in the development of the XXXXXX. The brief Unclear and chaotic ... this is not a flaw, but the fundamental nature of the system. The very idea behind structuring a legal system around the individual is that we do not, nor cannot, have a static system which meets the ever-changing goals of the law. This argument falls back on the assumption that a rational and __ system adds
 
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 By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, the practice of law becomes a personal search for a morally acceptable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this investigation, courage alone cannot provide the means. The obligation to produce an acceptable result brings with it an obligation to bring to bear the full weight of human intellect and understanding. Although this does not commit the actor to any particular analytical technique, a strong case could be made for the necessity of what Frank refers to as the "scientific spirit." (Frank, Legal Science and Legal Engineering, p.219.) This idea simply encompasses the __ of modern scientific and rational thought: an open mind, a skepticism to assumption and theory, and a _. Science and reason is thus able to rejoin the legal process, not as a means of justification or moral crutch, but in its proper place as a tool of the intellect.
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Although the individual decision-maker thus forms the basis of the legal system, her effort alone cannot be the _ of a successful legal system. Law is a social effort, and must exist as a collaborative force. A successful truth decider and adjudicator can only be successful within a community of her peers. Constant collaboration and monitoring is not only necessary to maintain a flexible and effective legal process, but is essential to maintain an individual sense of morality and responsibility. (PARAGRAPH ABOUT COLLABERATION AND MONITORING) • Our truth deciders must have the responsibility to monitor one another to ensure that they are taking this duty with the seriousness required. This becomes particularly important ... without support and _ from the legal community, it balanced on a razor's edge. The constant discussion and reexamination of assumptions and _ is necessary for the stability of a system putting such a moral weight on the individualv
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Although the individual decision-maker thus creates the basis of the legal system, her effort alone cannot form the extent of a successful legal system. Law is a social exercise, and must exist as a collaborative effort; a successful truth decider and adjudicator can only succeed within a community of her peers. Constant collaboration and monitoring is not only necessary to produce a flexible and effective legal process, but is essential to maintain an individual sense of morality and responsibility. The very subjectivity of methods and goals that demands a focus on the legal actor requires that decisions be made within the context of a larger legal network. Feedback from peers can shape and develop the individuals legal reasoning, but also reinforce the sense of responsibility and duty with which the individual must approach her profession. A smart the easier it becomes to justify ones actions, creating excuses rather than taking up the moral burden impressing upon one another the awesome responsibility that they are
 (PARAGRAPH ABOUT LEGAL RULES)
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Just as a focus on the role of the individual does not preclude methods of rational and scientific thought, the _ does not supercede a role for legal rules. The notion of developing individuals rather than refining systems takes some of our intellectual focus off of legal rules, however
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A focus on the role of the individual does not preclude the use of legal rules any more than it precludes rational and scientific thought. The failure of _ was not a failure of the rules themselves, but simply a failure of _ to justify themselves

Likewise the focus on the rationality and maturity of the truth decider does not eliminate the need for rules. elimination of our system does not supercede a role for legal rules. The notion of developing individuals rather than refining systems takes some of our intellectual focus off of legal rules, however

  * Placing our focus on the rationality and maturity of the truth decider does not, however, eliminate the need for rules. While the justification and responsibility for the judicial decision must ultimately rest with the individual, rules can serve other functions than creating the illusion of objectivity. * Rules serve some sort of normative function, both in setting positive standards for ethical or moral conduct, and making clear any community proscriptions on conduct.

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Abstract

If we accept the eventual conclusion of Frank's reasoning, that the human role as truth decider ultimately forecloses the possibility of a consistent system of "legal science", our development of a just and effective legal system must necessarily focus on developing the reasoning and moral courage of the individual.


Table of Contents

 
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Topic Sentence

 
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Topic: If we accept the eventual conclusion of Frank's reasoning, that the human role as truth decider ultimately forecloses the possibility of a consistent system of "legal science", our development of a just and effective legal system must necessarily focus on developing the reasoning and moral courage of the individual.
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Outline

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The Failure of Rule Based Law to Justify Outcomes

Line: 42 to 49
 Focusing on law as a systematic decision-making procedure tends to privilege process over outcome. When a judge writes that he is “forced” to rule against his own judgment, we wince, but ultimately accept the decision. The supposed benefits of consistent reasoning are substituted for consistent judgment. This trade-off would be eminently justified if strict adherence to our legal rules produced objectively just decisions; however, a deterministic system based on human and ultimately subjective input cannot take the responsibility for legal outcomes away from the adjudicators of the law.
Changed:
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If we are unable to justify the results of legal decisions by appealing to the rationality of the system, we must accept that this responsibility ultimately lies with the individual. This change mandates a very different approach to the law. A legal regime that places responsibility for outcomes on the actors within the system must focus on substantially different areas of development than a system that considers rules a justification of results. The mere acceptance of personal responsibility for the consequences of a legal decision requires a vast emotional and moral maturity. The knowledge that you have chosen to send a man to his death based on necessarily imperfect information should be a profoundly difficult realization. Indeed, a prime function of our obsession with the development of the system is to relieve this burden from the consciences of legal actors. The pressure for a student of law to adopt the mythology of a rationally justified legal outcome comes as much from his own moral unease as from the external blandishments of his professors.
>
>
If we are unable to justify the results of legal decisions by appealing to the rationality of the system, we must accept that this responsibility ultimately lies with the individual. This change mandates a very different approach to the law. A legal regime that places responsibility for outcomes on the actors within the system must focus on substantially different areas of development than a system that considers rules a justification of results. The mere acceptance of personal responsibility for the consequences of a legal decision requires a vast emotional and moral maturity. The knowledge that one has chosen to send a man to his death based on necessarily imperfect information should be a profoundly difficult realization. Indeed, a prime function of our obsession with the development of the system is to relieve this burden from the consciences of legal actors. The pressure for a student of law to adopt the mythology of a rationally justified legal outcome comes as much from his own moral unease as from the external blandishments of his professors.
 For our law system to function in an ideal fashion, we must produce legal agents (both “truth deciders” and judges) that are able to accept personal responsibility for the outcome of the legal process. This trait, which we may refer to as moral courage, produces the impetus for the reform and development of the system. An agent of the law with a deep acceptance of her own role in the consequences of judgment cannot escape the moral obligation to produce a personally acceptable result.
Line: 50 to 57
 

Developing Truth-Deciders

(Section Under Construction)

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By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, the practice of law becomes a personal search for a morally acceptable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this search, it is clear that courage alone can provide (PARAGRAPH ABOUT REASON) • Our truth deciders must use reason and “science referred to by Frank, in addition to this sense of responsibility for moral outcome.
 
Added:
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(PARAGRAPH ABOUT REASON) By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, the practice of law becomes a personal search for a morally acceptable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this investigation, courage alone cannot provide the means. The obligation to produce an acceptable result brings with it an obligation to bring to bear the full weight of human intellect and understanding. Although this does not commit the actor to any particular analytical technique, a strong case could be made for the necessity of what Frank refers to as the "scientific spirit." (Frank, Legal Science and Legal Engineering, p.219.) This idea simply encompasses the __ of modern scientific and rational thought: an open mind, a skepticism to assumption and theory, and a _. Science and reason is thus able to rejoin the legal process, not as a means of justification or moral crutch, but in its proper place as a tool of the intellect.
 
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Although the individual decision-maker forms the basis of the legal system, individual MOMENTUM? alone cannot be the basis of a successful legal system. Law is a societal effort, and (PARAGRAPH ABOUT COLLABERATION AND MONITORING)
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Although the individual decision-maker thus forms the basis of the legal system, her effort alone cannot be the _ of a successful legal system. Law is a social effort, and must exist as a collaborative force. A successful truth decider and adjudicator can only be successful within a community of her peers. Constant collaboration and monitoring is not only necessary to maintain a flexible and effective legal process, but is essential to maintain an individual sense of morality and responsibility. (PARAGRAPH ABOUT COLLABERATION AND MONITORING)
 • Our truth deciders must have the responsibility to monitor one another to ensure that they are taking this duty with the seriousness required.
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This becomes particularly important ... without support and _ from the legal community, it balanced on a razor's edge. The constant discussion and reexamination of assumptions and _ is necessary for the stability of a system putting such a moral weight on the individualv

(PARAGRAPH ABOUT LEGAL RULES)

 
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A focus on the role of the individual in the __ does not supercede a role for legal rules. (PARAGRAPH ABOUT LEGAL RULES) * The notion of developing humanity rather than refining systems takes some of the focus off of legal rules.
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Just as a focus on the role of the individual does not preclude methods of rational and scientific thought, the _ does not supercede a role for legal rules. The notion of developing individuals rather than refining systems takes some of our intellectual focus off of legal rules, however
  * Placing our focus on the rationality and maturity of the truth decider does not, however, eliminate the need for rules.
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* While the justification and responsibility for the judicial decision must ultimately rest with the individual, rules can serve other functions than creating the illusion of objectivity.
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While the justification and responsibility for the judicial decision must ultimately rest with the individual, rules can serve other functions than creating the illusion of objectivity.
  * Rules serve some sort of normative function, both in setting positive standards for ethical or moral conduct, and making clear any community proscriptions on conduct. * Rules assist individual decision makers i codify
Line: 69 to 80
 

Conclusion

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(Section Under Construction) A legal system focused on the __ of the individual is by its nature chaotic. It is a changing and This could happen in any system, but in system focused on our personal responsibility for the Unclear and chaotic ... this is not a flaw, but the fundamental nature of the system. The very idea behind structuring law around the individual is that we do not, nor cannot, have a static system which meets the ever-changing goals of the law. This argument falls back on the assumption that a rational and __ system adds
 

Notes (scrap writings I am keeping here as I edit)


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Paper Title

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Developing Truth-Deciders

(Section Under Construction)

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By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, law becomes a personal search for a morally acceptable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this search, it is clear that courage (PARAGRAPH ABOUT REASON)
>
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By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, the practice of law becomes a personal search for a morally acceptable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this search, it is clear that courage alone can provide (PARAGRAPH ABOUT REASON)
 • Our truth deciders must use reason and “science referred to by Frank, in addition to this sense of responsibility for moral outcome.

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META TOPICPARENT name="FirstPaper%25"

Paper Title

Line: 26 to 26
 Although the inability to even define adequate heuristics may seem like the death knell for the reformation of law, it strengthens the conclusion that the ideal system of law cannot be the simple result of a sufficiently complex legal system. The very goals of law are dependent on the same human factors that make legal science untenable. Even if the development of a objective system of legal rules was possible, the subjectiveness of our intentions would force us to look elsewhere for purpose or guidance in the development of law.
Added:
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>
 

Where We Stand Post-Frank

Changed:
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A naive response to the failure of legal rules to produce objectively 'correct' decisions could be to further refine our system. This response stems from our tendency, pointed at in Frank's "Legal Science and Legal Engineering", to view the law as a potentially deterministic and scientific process. If we accept Frank's reasoning, this solution cannot possibly succeed. At the heart of any deterministic decision tree of legal rules will be the element of the fact finder and truth decider. This fundamental bias cannot be removed from the system; some mechanism must exist to choose relevant facts and establish the truth for the purposes of law. This fundamental requirement of legal decision making forces us to look beyond a purely rational and systematic process to judicial decision making.
>
>
A naive response to the failure of legal rules to produce objectively 'correct' decisions could be to further refine our system. This response stems from our tendency, pointed at in Frank's "Legal Science and Legal Engineering", to view the law as a potentially deterministic and scientific process. If we accept Frank's reasoning, this solution cannot possibly succeed. At the heart of any deterministic decision tree of legal rules will be the element of the fact finder and truth decider. This fundamental bias cannot be removed from the system; some mechanism must exist to choose relevant facts and establish the truth for the purposes of law. This basic requirement of legal decision making forces us to look for a conception of law that transcends our attempts to form a purely rational and systematic process.

We find ourselves at an impasse. A refined scientific system of legal rules is unable to achieve the objective legal outcomes that would justify its creation. We are likewise unable to set objective goals to measure our system in terms of. Law is bound to the subjective human frailties of the individuals charged with administering the system. If we cannot eliminate the human from the law, it would follow that the development of a just legal system must focus on the moral and intellectual development of the legal administrator.

 

Focusing on the Individual as a Replacement for Rules

Individual Responsibility for Legal Outcomes

Changed:
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(Section under construction) If a scientific system of legal rules is unable to eliminate the fundamental bias caused by human intrepretation , it would follow that the development of a just legal system must focus on the moral and intellectual development. _The _ of injustice arises because we are sublimating our natural _ to the _ of a system. Consistent reasoning is substituted for consistent judgment. A instinctual _ at the problem might be to further refine the system, and eliminate _ from the functioning of the .
>
>
(Section Under Construction)

Focusing on law as a systematic decision-making procedure tends to privilege process over outcome. When a judge writes that he is “forced” to rule against his own judgment, we wince, but ultimately accept the decision. The supposed benefits of consistent reasoning are substituted for consistent judgment. This trade-off would be eminently justified if strict adherence to our legal rules produced objectively just decisions; however, a deterministic system based on human and ultimately subjective input cannot take the responsibility for legal outcomes away from the adjudicators of the law.

If we are unable to justify the results of legal decisions by appealing to the rationality of the system, we must accept that this responsibility ultimately lies with the individual. This change mandates a very different approach to the law. A legal regime that places responsibility for outcomes on the actors within the system must focus on substantially different areas of development than a system that considers rules a justification of results. The mere acceptance of personal responsibility for the consequences of a legal decision requires a vast emotional and moral maturity. The knowledge that you have chosen to send a man to his death based on necessarily imperfect information should be a profoundly difficult realization. Indeed, a prime function of our obsession with the development of the system is to relieve this burden from the consciences of legal actors. The pressure for a student of law to adopt the mythology of a rationally justified legal outcome comes as much from his own moral unease as from the external blandishments of his professors.

For our law system to function in an ideal fashion, we must produce legal agents (both “truth deciders” and judges) that are able to accept personal responsibility for the outcome of the legal process. This trait, which we may refer to as moral courage, produces the impetus for the reform and development of the system. An agent of the law with a deep acceptance of her own role in the consequences of judgment cannot escape the moral obligation to produce a personally acceptable result.

 

Developing Truth-Deciders

Changed:
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<
(Section under construction)
>
>
(Section Under Construction) By placing the responsibility for legal outcomes on the individual legal actor, law becomes a personal search for a morally acceptable result. Although moral courage must provide the impetus for this search, it is clear that courage (PARAGRAPH ABOUT REASON) • Our truth deciders must use reason and “science referred to by Frank, in addition to this sense of responsibility for moral outcome.
 
Deleted:
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A Place for Legal Rules

 
Changed:
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(Section under construction)
>
>
Although the individual decision-maker forms the basis of the legal system, individual MOMENTUM? alone cannot be the basis of a successful legal system. Law is a societal effort, and (PARAGRAPH ABOUT COLLABERATION AND MONITORING) • Our truth deciders must have the responsibility to monitor one another to ensure that they are taking this duty with the seriousness required.

A focus on the role of the individual in the __ does not supercede a role for legal rules. (PARAGRAPH ABOUT LEGAL RULES)

 
  • The notion of developing humanity rather than refining systems takes some of the focus off of legal rules.
  • Placing our focus on the rationality and maturity of the truth decider does not, however, eliminate the need for rules.
Changed:
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  • While the justification and responsibility for the judicial decision must ultimately rest with the individual, legal rules and standards can serve other functions than creating the illusion of objectivity.
  • Rules codify the thinking of a community
  • Rules force debate
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* While the justification and responsibility for the judicial decision must ultimately rest with the individual, rules can serve other functions than creating the illusion of objectivity.
 
  • Rules serve some sort of normative function, both in setting positive standards for ethical or moral conduct, and making clear any community proscriptions on conduct.
Changed:
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  • Rules assist individual decision makers
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* Rules assist individual decision makers i codify force debate
 

Conclusion


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META TOPICPARENT name="FirstPaper%25"

Paper Title

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Setting a Course: The Difficulty of Assigning Heuristics to Legal Outcomes

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The Goals of a Legal System

 Any effort to reform the law must begin with an examination of the possible goals of a legal system. Although a detailed treatment of this topic is vastly outside the scope of this essay, we may posit as an example three goals arguably central to the success of any legal system: consistency of legal judgment, the efficient production of social utility, and adherence to the moral expectations of the community. While these goals are prima facia reasonable, they are bound to encounter the same difficulties of definition that plague our legal system as a whole. Consistency must be measured in terms of truth, the unknowability of which is the foundation of Frank's argument. Utility and morality are even more vague, depending on the subjective understanding of some undefined set of individuals.
Changed:
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<

The Effect of Subjective Goals

Although the inability to even define adequate heuristics may seem like the death knell for the reformation of law, it strengthens the conclusion that the ideal system of law cannot be the simple result of sufficiently complex legal rules. The very goals of law are dependent on the human factors that make a scientific analysis untenable. Even if the development of a objective and scientific legal system was possible, the subjectiveness of our goals... (paragraph not complete)

>
>
Although the inability to even define adequate heuristics may seem like the death knell for the reformation of law, it strengthens the conclusion that the ideal system of law cannot be the simple result of a sufficiently complex legal system. The very goals of law are dependent on the same human factors that make legal science untenable. Even if the development of a objective system of legal rules was possible, the subjectiveness of our intentions would force us to look elsewhere for purpose or guidance in the development of law.
 

Where We Stand Post-Frank

Changed:
<
<
A naive response to the failure of legal rules to produce objective and rational decisions could be to further refine our system. This response stems from our tendency, pointed at in Frank's "Legal Science and Legal Engineering", to view the law as a potentially deterministic and scientific process. ... (paragraph not complete)
>
>
A naive response to the failure of legal rules to produce objectively 'correct' decisions could be to further refine our system. This response stems from our tendency, pointed at in Frank's "Legal Science and Legal Engineering", to view the law as a potentially deterministic and scientific process. If we accept Frank's reasoning, this solution cannot possibly succeed. At the heart of any deterministic decision tree of legal rules will be the element of the fact finder and truth decider. This fundamental bias cannot be removed from the system; some mechanism must exist to choose relevant facts and establish the truth for the purposes of law. This fundamental requirement of legal decision making forces us to look beyond a purely rational and systematic process to judicial decision making.
 

Focusing on the Individual as a Replacement for Rules

Individual Responsibility for Legal Outcomes

Changed:
<
<
The _ of injustice arises because we are sublimating our natural _ to the _ of a system. Consistent reasoning is substituted for consistent judgment. A instinctual _ at the problem might be to further refine the system, and eliminate _ from the functioning of the . _(paragraph not complete)
>
>
(Section under construction) If a scientific system of legal rules is unable to eliminate the fundamental bias caused by human intrepretation , it would follow that the development of a just legal system must focus on the moral and intellectual development. _The _ of injustice arises because we are sublimating our natural _ to the _ of a system. Consistent reasoning is substituted for consistent judgment. A instinctual _ at the problem might be to further refine the system, and eliminate _ from the functioning of the .
 

Developing Truth-Deciders

Added:
>
>
(Section under construction)
 

A Place for Legal Rules

Added:
>
>
(Section under construction)
  • The notion of developing humanity rather than refining systems takes some of the focus off of legal rules.
  • Placing our focus on the rationality and maturity of the truth decider does not, however, eliminate the need for rules.
  • While the justification and responsibility for the judicial decision must ultimately rest with the individual, legal rules and standards can serve other functions than creating the illusion of objectivity.
  • Rules codify the thinking of a community
  • Rules force debate
  • Rules serve some sort of normative function, both in setting positive standards for ethical or moral conduct, and making clear any community proscriptions on conduct.
  • Rules assist individual decision makers
 

Conclusion


TheodoreSmith-FirstPaper 5 - 11 Feb 2008 - Main.TheodoreSmith
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META TOPICPARENT name="FirstPaper%25"

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Garbage In, Garbage Out: The Argument Against Legal Rules as a Mechanism of Justice

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Frank and the Role of Truth in a Legal System

 In "Modern Legal Magic," Jerome Frank outlines a historical transition in the rules governing legal outcomes. In his terms, this shift saw legal decision makers abandoning the ritualistic and magical rite of the legal ordeal, and embracing the development of a system of law based on the precepts of logical reasoning. The latter approach is the basis for modern law; the arbitrary nature of the magical legal ritual has been improved upon and replaced by a scientific and rational set of deterministic legal rules.
Changed:
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<
Although this change seems profound, Frank questions the validity of the distinction. Any system of legal rules must draw its input from the facts surrounding a case. The truth of these facts must necessarily be determined by the human process of investigation and secernment. Indeed, Frank claims this activity is so bound in the nature of individual that it may better be understood as a process of "truth deciding." Extending Frank's reasoning, we find that the necessity of fact as the basis for law makes decision by legal rules as contingent on human factors and circumstance as the disfavored methods of the ordeal. A system based on a interconnected system of legal rules may blind us with its refined complexity, but is only as good as the truth it is based on. In an expression used by engineers of information systems, "Garbage in, Garbage out."

The Failure of Further Refining Rules

An naive response to the failure of legal rules to produce objective and rational decisions could be to further refine our system. This response stems from our tendency, pointed at in Frank's "Legal Science and Legal Engineering", to view the law as a potentially deterministic and scientific process... (paragraph not complete)

>
>
Although this change seems profound, Frank questions the meaningfulness of the distinction. Any system of legal rules must draw its input from the facts surrounding a case. The truth of these facts must in turn necessarily be determined by the human process of investigation and secernment. Indeed, Frank claims this activity is so bound in the nature of the individual that it may better be understood as a process of "truth deciding." Extending Frank's reasoning, the necessity of fact as the basis for law makes decision by legal rules as contingent on human factors and circumstance as the disfavored methods of the ordeal. A system based on a interconnected system of legal rules may blind us with its refined complexity, but is only as good as the truth it is based on. In the language of computer science, "Garbage in, Garbage out."
 

Setting a Course: The Difficulty of Assigning Heuristics to Legal Outcomes

The Goals of a Legal System

Changed:
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Any effort to reform the law must begin with an examination of the possible goals of a legal system.... (paragraph not complete)
>
>
Any effort to reform the law must begin with an examination of the possible goals of a legal system. Although a detailed treatment of this topic is vastly outside the scope of this essay, we may posit as an example three goals arguably central to the success of any legal system: consistency of legal judgment, the efficient production of social utility, and adherence to the moral expectations of the community. While these goals are prima facia reasonable, they are bound to encounter the same difficulties of definition that plague our legal system as a whole. Consistency must be measured in terms of truth, the unknowability of which is the foundation of Frank's argument. Utility and morality are even more vague, depending on the subjective understanding of some undefined set of individuals.
 

The Effect of Subjective Goals

Changed:
<
<
Although this inability to even define adequate heuristics may seem like the death knell for the reformation of law, it strengthens the conclusion that the ideal system of law cannot be the simple result of sufficiently refined legal rules. The very goals of law are dependent on the human factors that make a scientific analysis untenable.... (paragraph not complete)
>
>
Although the inability to even define adequate heuristics may seem like the death knell for the reformation of law, it strengthens the conclusion that the ideal system of law cannot be the simple result of sufficiently complex legal rules. The very goals of law are dependent on the human factors that make a scientific analysis untenable. Even if the development of a objective and scientific legal system was possible, the subjectiveness of our goals... (paragraph not complete)
 

Where We Stand Post-Frank

Added:
>
>
A naive response to the failure of legal rules to produce objective and rational decisions could be to further refine our system. This response stems from our tendency, pointed at in Frank's "Legal Science and Legal Engineering", to view the law as a potentially deterministic and scientific process. ... (paragraph not complete)
 

Focusing on the Individual as a Replacement for Rules

Individual Responsibility for Legal Outcomes

Added:
>
>
The _ of injustice arises because we are sublimating our natural _ to the _ of a system. Consistent reasoning is substituted for consistent judgment. A instinctual _ at the problem might be to further refine the system, and eliminate _ from the functioning of the . _(paragraph not complete)
 

Developing Truth-Deciders

A Place for Legal Rules

Line: 64 to 62
 Any effort to reform the law must begin with an examination of the possible goals of a legal system. Although a detailed treatment of this topic is vastly outside the scope of this essay, I will briefly _ three goals arguably central to the success of any legal system: consistency of legal judgment, the efficient production of utility, and adherence to the moral expectations of the citizenry. While these goals are prima facia reasonable, they are bound to encounter the same difficulties of definition that plague our legal system as a whole. Consistency must be measured in terms of truth, the unknowability of which is the foundation of Frank's argument. Utility and morality are even more vague, depending on the subjective understanding of some undefined set of individuals. Although this inability to even define adequate heuristics may seem like the death knell for the reformation of law, it strengthens the conclusion that the ideal system of law cannot be the simple result of sufficiently refined legal rules. _ _ the very goals of law are dependent on the human factors that make a scientific analysis untenable. The _ of injustice arises because we are sublimating our natural _ to the _ of a system. Consistent reasoning is substituted for consistent judgment. A instinctual _ at the problem might be to further refine the system, and eliminate _ from the functioning of the . If we accept Frank's reasoning, this solution cannot possibly succeed. Law itself is a deeply human activity, and the further refinement of a mechanistic system of reasoning can only mask the __. If a scientific system of legal rules is unable to eliminate the ^^human factors^^, it would follow that the development of a just legal system must focus on the moral and intellectual development.

We are focusing on producing scientists when we desperately need artists.

Added:
>
>
Note that legal rules do serve some kind of normative function.
 
To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" on the next line:

TheodoreSmith-FirstPaper 4 - 11 Feb 2008 - Main.TheodoreSmith
Line: 1 to 1
 
META TOPICPARENT name="FirstPaper%25"

Paper Title

Line: 18 to 18
 

Frank and the Role of Truth in a Legal System

Added:
>
>
In "Modern Legal Magic," Jerome Frank outlines a historical transition in the rules governing legal outcomes. In his terms, this shift saw legal decision makers abandoning the ritualistic and magical rite of the legal ordeal, and embracing the development of a system of law based on the precepts of logical reasoning. The latter approach is the basis for modern law; the arbitrary nature of the magical legal ritual has been improved upon and replaced by a scientific and rational set of deterministic legal rules.

Although this change seems profound, Frank questions the validity of the distinction. Any system of legal rules must draw its input from the facts surrounding a case. The truth of these facts must necessarily be determined by the human process of investigation and secernment. Indeed, Frank claims this activity is so bound in the nature of individual that it may better be understood as a process of "truth deciding." Extending Frank's reasoning, we find that the necessity of fact as the basis for law makes decision by legal rules as contingent on human factors and circumstance as the disfavored methods of the ordeal. A system based on a interconnected system of legal rules may blind us with its refined complexity, but is only as good as the truth it is based on. In an expression used by engineers of information systems, "Garbage in, Garbage out."

 

The Failure of Further Refining Rules

Added:
>
>
An naive response to the failure of legal rules to produce objective and rational decisions could be to further refine our system. This response stems from our tendency, pointed at in Frank's "Legal Science and Legal Engineering", to view the law as a potentially deterministic and scientific process... (paragraph not complete)
 

Setting a Course: The Difficulty of Assigning Heuristics to Legal Outcomes

The Goals of a Legal System

Added:
>
>
Any effort to reform the law must begin with an examination of the possible goals of a legal system.... (paragraph not complete)
 

The Effect of Subjective Goals

Added:
>
>
Although this inability to even define adequate heuristics may seem like the death knell for the reformation of law, it strengthens the conclusion that the ideal system of law cannot be the simple result of sufficiently refined legal rules. The very goals of law are dependent on the human factors that make a scientific analysis untenable.... (paragraph not complete)
 

Where We Stand Post-Frank

Focusing on the Individual as a Replacement for Rules

Line: 53 to 63
 Any effort to reform the law must begin with an examination of the possible goals of a legal system. Although a detailed treatment of this topic is vastly outside the scope of this essay, I will briefly _ three goals arguably central to the success of any legal system: consistency of legal judgment, the efficient production of utility, and adherence to the moral expectations of the citizenry. While these goals are prima facia reasonable, they are bound to encounter the same difficulties of definition that plague our legal system as a whole. Consistency must be measured in terms of truth, the unknowability of which is the foundation of Frank's argument. Utility and morality are even more vague, depending on the subjective understanding of some undefined set of individuals. Although this inability to even define adequate heuristics may seem like the death knell for the reformation of law, it strengthens the conclusion that the ideal system of law cannot be the simple result of sufficiently refined legal rules. _ _ the very goals of law are dependent on the human factors that make a scientific analysis untenable. The _ of injustice arises because we are sublimating our natural _ to the _ of a system. Consistent reasoning is substituted for consistent judgment. A instinctual _ at the problem might be to further refine the system, and eliminate _ from the functioning of the . If we accept Frank's reasoning, this solution cannot possibly succeed. Law itself is a deeply human activity, and the further refinement of a mechanistic system of reasoning can only mask the __. If a scientific system of legal rules is unable to eliminate the ^^human factors^^, it would follow that the development of a just legal system must focus on the moral and intellectual development.
Added:
>
>
We are focusing on producing scientists when we desperately need artists.
 
To restrict access to your paper simply delete the "#" on the next line:

TheodoreSmith-FirstPaper 3 - 10 Feb 2008 - Main.TheodoreSmith
Line: 1 to 1
 
META TOPICPARENT name="FirstPaper%25"

Paper Title

Line: 10 to 10
 Topic: If we accept the eventual conclusion of Frank's reasoning, that the human role as truth decider ultimately forecloses the possibility of a consistent system of "legal science", our development of a just and effective legal system must necessarily focus on developing the reasoning and moral courage of the individual.
Added:
>
>

Outline

 
Added:
>
>

The Failure of Rule Based Law to Justify Outcomes

 
Added:
>
>

Garbage In, Garbage Out: The Argument Against Legal Rules as a Mechanism of Justice

 
Added:
>
>

Frank and the Role of Truth in a Legal System

The Failure of Further Refining Rules

Setting a Course: The Difficulty of Assigning Heuristics to Legal Outcomes

The Goals of a Legal System

The Effect of Subjective Goals

Where We Stand Post-Frank

Focusing on the Individual as a Replacement for Rules

Individual Responsibility for Legal Outcomes

Developing Truth-Deciders

A Place for Legal Rules

Conclusion


Notes (scrap writings I am keeping here as I edit)

The development of modern law has generally been viewed (by whom? this is a terrible sentence!) as the development of a rational system of interconnected legal rules. In "Modern Legal Magic," Jerome Frank outlines a transition from the ritualistic _ of the ordeal, to the development of a system of law based on the precepts of logical reasoning.

Although this shift in the basis of legal judgment...

Frank's criticism of the modern reliance on systems of legal rules

Although Frank holds out some hope that justice will be done If we are unable to reach a just and consistent outcome through a system of legal rules, we are If justice and consistency cannot be effected through the use of a deterministic system of legal rules, we must

Any effort to reform the law must begin with an examination of the possible goals of a legal system. Although a detailed treatment of this topic is vastly outside the scope of this essay, I will briefly _ three goals arguably central to the success of any legal system: consistency of legal judgment, the efficient production of utility, and adherence to the moral expectations of the citizenry. While these goals are prima facia reasonable, they are bound to encounter the same difficulties of definition that plague our legal system as a whole. Consistency must be measured in terms of truth, the unknowability of which is the foundation of Frank's argument. Utility and morality are even more vague, depending on the subjective understanding of some undefined set of individuals. Although this inability to even define adequate heuristics may seem like the death knell for the reformation of law, it strengthens the conclusion that the ideal system of law cannot be the simple result of sufficiently refined legal rules. _ _ the very goals of law are dependent on the human factors that make a scientific analysis untenable. The _ of injustice arises because we are sublimating our natural _ to the _ of a system. Consistent reasoning is substituted for consistent judgment. A instinctual _ at the problem might be to further refine the system, and eliminate _ from the functioning of the . If we accept Frank's reasoning, this solution cannot possibly succeed. Law itself is a deeply human activity, and the further refinement of a mechanistic system of reasoning can only mask the __. If a scientific system of legal rules is unable to eliminate the ^^human factors^^, it would follow that the development of a just legal system must focus on the moral and intellectual development.

 
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Ramblings

The development of modern law has generally been viewed (by whom? this is a terrible sentence!) as the development of a rational system of interconnected legal rules. In "Modern Legal Magic," Jerome Frank outlines a transition from the ritualistic _ of the ordeal, to the development of a system of law based on the precepts of logical reasoning.

Although this shift in the basis of legal judgment...

Frank's criticism of the modern reliance on systems of legal rules

Although Frank holds out some hope that justice will be done If we are unable to reach a just and consistent outcome through a system of legal rules, we are If justice and consistency cannot be effected through the use of a deterministic system of legal rules, we must

Any effort to reform the law must begin with an examination of the possible goals of a legal system. Although a detailed treatment of this topic is vastly outside the scope of this essay, I will briefly _ three goals arguably central to the success of any legal system: consistency of legal judgment, the efficient production of utility, and adherence to the moral expectations of the citizenry. While these goals are prima facia reasonable, they are bound to encounter the same difficulties of definition that plague our legal system as a whole. Consistency must be measured in terms of truth, the unknowability of which is the foundation of Frank's argument. Utility and morality are even more vague, depending on the subjective understanding of some undefined set of individuals. Although this inability to even define adequate heuristics may seem like the death knell for the reformation of law, it strengthens the conclusion that the ideal system of law cannot be the simple result of sufficiently refined legal rules. _ _ the very goals of law are dependent on the human factors that make a scientific analysis untenable. The _ of injustice arises because we are sublimating our natural _ to the _ of a system. Consistent reasoning is substituted for consistent judgment. A instinctual _ at the problem might be to further refine the system, and eliminate _ from the functioning of the . If we accept Frank's reasoning, this solution cannot possibly succeed. Law itself is a deeply human activity, and the further refinement of a mechanistic system of reasoning can only mask the __. If a scientific system of legal rules is unable to eliminate the ^^human factors^^, it would follow that the development of a just legal system must focus on the moral and intellectual development.

 
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-- By TheodoreSmith - 09 Feb 2008

Topic Sentence

Topic: If we accept the eventual conclusion of Frank's reasoning, that the human role as truth decider ultimately forecloses the possibility of a consistent system of "legal science", our development of a just and effective legal system must necessarily focus on developing the reasoning and moral courage of the individual.

Ramblings

The development of modern law has generally been viewed (by whom? this is a terrible sentence!) as the development of a rational system of interconnected legal rules. In "Modern Legal Magic," Jerome Frank outlines a transition from the ritualistic _ of the ordeal, to the development of a system of law based on the precepts of logical reasoning.

Although this shift in the basis of legal judgment...

Frank's criticism of the modern reliance on systems of legal rules

Although Frank holds out some hope that justice will be done If we are unable to reach a just and consistent outcome through a system of legal rules, we are If justice and consistency cannot be effected through the use of a deterministic system of legal rules, we must

Any effort to reform the law must begin with an examination of the possible goals of a legal system. Although a detailed treatment of this topic is vastly outside the scope of this essay, I will briefly _ three goals arguably central to the success of any legal system: consistency of legal judgment, the efficient production of utility, and adherence to the moral expectations of the citizenry. While these goals are prima facia reasonable, they are bound to encounter the same difficulties of definition that plague our legal system as a whole. Consistency must be measured in terms of truth, the unknowability of which is the foundation of Frank's argument. Utility and morality are even more vague, depending on the subjective understanding of some undefined set of individuals. Although this inability to even define adequate heuristics may seem like the death knell for the reformation of law, it strengthens the conclusion that the ideal system of law cannot be the simple result of sufficiently refined legal rules. _ _ the very goals of law are dependent on the human factors that make a scientific analysis untenable. The _ of injustice arises because we are sublimating our natural _ to the _ of a system. Consistent reasoning is substituted for consistent judgment. A instinctual _ at the problem might be to further refine the system, and eliminate _ from the functioning of the . If we accept Frank's reasoning, this solution cannot possibly succeed. Law itself is a deeply human activity, and the further refinement of a mechanistic system of reasoning can only mask the __. If a scientific system of legal rules is unable to eliminate the ^^human factors^^, it would follow that the development of a just legal system must focus on the moral and intellectual development.


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