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< | The Normative Value of Autonomy in Property Law | >
> | The Normative Value of Autonomy in Property Law and its Alternative | | | -- By HuazhouYe - 13 Feb 2023 | |
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< | Outdataed Normative Value | >
> | Functional advantage of Social Dependence | | | | |
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The concept, idea or philosophy of autonomy underlies all property law. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) states that "[i]n the strict legal sense, property is an aggregate of rights of use and enjoyment for lawful purposes, which includes not only ownership and possession, which are guaranteed and protected by the government." The right to exercise dominion over resources and the legal limitations against that right gave rise to the authoritative laws over properties.
I don't understand how this last sentence follows from the definition given. I don't think the proposition you're stating is faulty, but I don't understand the derivation.
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> | Autonomy as a normative value has been given way to socioeconomic considerations – as society gets more complex and resources more scarce, it is irrationally wasteful to further autonomy without socioeconomic considerations. Nevertheless, autonomy is still treated as an intrinsic, sacred, natural and inalienable right. Unfortunately, this contradicting phenomenon gave rise to judges using autonomy as a scapegoat to hide their true motivations when the rationale of the opinion is inadequate or illogical. Furthermore, holding on to autonomy as a sacred right results in decisions forsaking utilitarian and socioeconomic concerns. The court should instead more often use social dependence as the underlying normative value instead of autonomy, since the rationale behind their opinions would flow smoother and more reasonable. | | | | |
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This appears to be a conclusion somehow derived from what judges do, but we have as yet no idea how you know what you claim.
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> | Social dependence is as intrinsic and sacred as autonomy. One can only succeed in a society dependent on others. It is only rational that one who depends on society to succeed must pray for the society’s success. Social-obligation as a normative value whereby one must nurture the social structure in order to succeed in society is as intrinsic and sacred as autonomy. Like autonomy, this obligation is objectively present in one’s conduct, but unlike autonomy, decisions derived from it would be humanitarian instead of wasteful, and it helps to propagate the norm that cooperation is objectively and intrinsically good. | | | | |
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< | Case Analysis | >
> | Autonomy in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes | | | | |
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In Pile v. Pedrick, the expectation of autonomy is given absolute reference in the court’s application of the automatic injunction rule, where if trespass occurs, then injunction is appropriate if the property owner wishes so. The defendants in this case made the mistake of encroaching the factory’s foundation wall onto Pile’s property below the surface by one and three-eighths inches, for 50 feet. | >
> | Jacque v. Steenberg Homes highlights the irrational nature of ruling for the sake of autonomy. To deliver mobile homes, Steenberg Homes could either cross Jacque’s land or take a snow-covered private road that would require special equipment. Jacque declined the request to cross their land due to fear of land loss in an adverse possession action. The defendant nonetheless cut across the plaintiff's property because it was easier/cheaper than navigating the private road. The court awarded 100,000 dollars to the stubborn plaintiff who treated the defendant with heartless indifference, relying on autonomy.
The court first used a deck clearing move to rid the authoritative weight of precedents so it can deem this a new legal issue and reason without the restrictions of binding authority. The authoritative law in the state was Barnard v. Cohen, pertaining to libel, where the court states the general rule of punitive damage: society has little interest in having the unlawful yet harmless conduct deterred, therefore, punitive damages are inappropriate when no harm is done. The court’s fear of propagation of unpunished intentional trespass, however, overrides this sensible and economically efficient law; therefore the court conveniently finds the subject matter inconsistency sufficient to warrant its inapplicability, and ignores the perfectly applicable reasoning behind the law. | | | | |
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> | Since the court is now rid of persuasive precedents by a misleading rationale, it now can use whatever authority it pleases to further its goals. It then cites Merest v. Harvey, a decision from the English Common pleas division 150 years ago, stating that behaviors unbecoming of a gentleman warrants large damages. This outdated and outmoded rationale predominantly lies behind the court’s decision to award punitive damages, the rationale being when a man does not accord himself gentlemanlike, damages are proper. However, Merest is a case about hunting and obnoxious behaviors, not pure trespass like Jacque, the court conveniently rids the subject matter consistency it claims to value and relies on it nonetheless.
The court proceeds to conclude that in light of private and social interest, intentional trespass cases, although actual harm might be minimal, individuals suffer from a loss of their rights to exclude, which warrants large damage awards. The court then invokes the sacred right of autonomy, so sacred that trampling on it even without loss of monetary value deserves retribution. The inconsistency of subject matter valuing at display is apparent, the court equates the duty to behave gentlemanly with the right to exclude. Merest was about an obnoxious English parliament member who invited himself to the plaintiff’s shooting space and fired shots while disregarding the plaintiff’s rejection, while Jacque was about a difficult choice presented to the defendant of either breaking the law and save a great amount of money or incur unnecessary cost for the sake of not offending a stubborn neighbor. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the two cases should be treated in the same light. | | | | |
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< | The court seems to neglect autonomy or deem it as unimportant when utilitarian concerns can be justly presented without legal conceptual justifications. In Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, the court in presenting a utilitarians argument on airplanes inability to pay landowners everytime it fly over, dismissed autonomy as deserving retribution if violated, in complete contradiction to the holy status of autonomy esteemed in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes. Autonomy sacrifice for the general good. | >
> | Perhaps because the court knows the faulty logic is not persuasive, it goes into the analysis of the previously mentioned private and public interest, in hope that the slippery slope argument it uses presents an persuasive rationale that could ameliorate the arbitrary decision. The court states that social and private interests in punishing and deterring intentional trespasses to preserve the integrity of and people’s faith in the legal system is so strong, that all hell would break loose if the defendant is not punished. This borderline bad-faith argument is irrational to say the least. | | | | |
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< | In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the court embraces the lawmaking power though it’s not supposed to, and argues that extending conversion would be problematic, therefore due to concerns for disincentivizing investment in research due to potential exposure to liability, autonomy should not be considered. respect for dignity and autonomy manifests in and requires recognition of property rights, the court here sacrifices these values for immediate economic benefits. | >
> | Using Social Dependence as an Alternative in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes | | | | |
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< | In Midler v. Ford Motor Company, court argues that autonomy, personhood, and identity are the basis of the property protection, but the ultimate ruling is disconnected, as there’s no connection between the normative values of personhood/autonomy and the final ruling, imitations are still allowed without commercial purpose. The court imposes two utilitarian limitations that have no connection to autonomy on the recognition of property rights; ironically, the limitations of autonomy make it a workable doctrine.
Even more ironically, sometimes when it’s time to determine and balance autonomy between two parties, the court will just avoid the question and leave the issue convoluted. In Ploof v. Putnam, two theories for recovery were presented, trespass, which structures around property law’s autonomy; and negligence, which around tort law’s duty of care, the court just refused to answer the question as framed by the plaintiff and didn’t signal which theory Plaintiff's recovery is based on. Autonomy here is purposefully avoided by the court in order to render a just ruling.
When it comes to dead hand control, the court is highly skeptical as to the amount of leeway and deference that is afforded to property owners when they are dead, so the court uses autonomy as a way to argue that dead people don’t have autonomy. In Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co, the court does not say the value of autonomy cannot be morally applied to dead people, but engages in lawmaking as it invalidates provisions of the will in the name of public policy. The court here sacrifices the autonomy interest of people when making their wills to further public policy concerns.
When autonomy is strictly followed, ridiculous results occur. The court applied autonomy in its absolute sense in Pile v. Pedrick, where autonomy was given absolute value, the court deferred to the whims of the plaintiff, no matter how ridiculously unnecessary and wasteful the remedy is. While if the court took utilitarianism into consideration, such wasteful ruling could be avoided.
Autonomy works differently when it is applied to states as supposed to citizens. In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the state owned land intended for sale and the land was held in trust for the people of the state. The court correctly applied the normative value of autonomy. But in this case autonomy is actually sovereignty. Sovereignty recognizes supremacy and operates between political organizations, property is subordinate to/subject to the dictates of sovereignty and captures interaction between the sovereign state and the property owner and between property owners. The court here sacrificed property and autonomy rights of the company to preserve the sovereignty rights of the state. Autonomy is applied to the sovereign but not the individual actor.
You haven't explained anything about the case to which you are referring. Why is there no link?
This is a confusing summary of a case which is again not stated, not linked, not described.
Same problem.
What does this mean?
Conclusion
Courts can broaden/narrow the time frame of autonomy, expand/shorten the scope of autonomy, embrace/avoid the application of autonomy, construct which parties deserve more/less autonomy, and interpret autonomy in its absolute/meticulously limited sense. The variety of ways of interpreting and applying the normative value of autonomy leaves the court great room for policy making, and that seems like what the court is conducting. Autonomy as a concept, however, either is used as a scapegoat for utilitarian values or deeply unsatisfactory when applied in an absolutist sense.
This draft says things about cases, but there is no analysis to back the conclusions. "Autonomy," which appears to mean the owner's right to do what she wills with her property, is said to be treated by judges as less absolute than some theoretic definition (ungiven) would—while also leading to "ridiculous" outcomes—require.
The first route to improvement, then, is to read the cases, rather than gesture at them. That done, I expect the conclusion you are now merely asserting can be shown to follow. Courts, as you say, cannot and do not actually behave as though the owner's will were absolute: the essence of "property" as a common-law concept is its inherent compromise between protection of expectations and the necessity of "planning" on the ground. Why that should be treated, as the present drafts treats it, as a bug rather than a feature isn't yet clear, but presumably would also emerge from closer contact with actual decisions.
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> | Suppose the court ruled relying on social dependence frequently as a widely accepted rationale in common law. Steenberg Homes, instead of taking the risk of trespassing, would ask the court for permission first since the requested action incurs no harm to Jacque and is considerably valuable to Steenberg Homes. Jacque, in rejecting, would induce significant unnecessary spending, thus unlikely to reject as it would be against common law; Moreover, Jacque would not have the previous concern of adverse possession, since the court would grant passage for the requested purpose only. The court, instead of reasoning by illogical arguments due to worries of unpunished intentional trespasses, could rest assured that the good-faith utilitarian intentions of borrowing passageways would not impede the court’s ability to punish bad-faith intentional trespass. Social dependence would emphasize sharing resources with others while creating no detriment upon the sharer and bypass procedural deficiencies that autonomy creates. A society of individuals helping others will work to one's own advantage. Instead of normalizing autonomy as the ruling rationale which guards one’s resources in exclusion of others, social dependence constitutes a more sensible legal normative value. | | |
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