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ArmanAntonyanFirstEssay 6 - 17 Oct 2023 - Main.ArmanAntonyan
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Nationalism, imperialism, and Nagorno-Karabakh
-- By ArmanAntonyan - 16 Feb 2023
I have long wondered: if I could be published tomorrow in the New York Times, what would I say about Karabakh, and what would it matter? Recently, I happened to meet the person that did it—Chris Bohjalian, a bestselling author who has published op-eds in the NYT and other big papers about Karabakh. With his pen, he has reached a level of fame higher than most authors ever will. I asked him what did it all matter, and how he kept going seeing that the violence continued. He told me that he asks himself the same question every day, and that you just have to keep trying no matter what.
I was happy to find the closure of his answer. It led me to conclude that it doesn’t matter what I write about Karabakh, in the sense that I won’t be saving the lives of Karabakh Armenians. It didn’t even matter when the US called on Azerbaijan to end its blockade of the Lachin Corridor—which has cut the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh off from the world for six months now. These people live at the edge of destruction, and at this point many, if not most are likely to move out of Karabakh once they are allowed to. The Armenian government is ready to give them up, too: its prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, has announced that Armenia is prepared to recognize the region of Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. Yet Armenia is not prepared for the likely consequences of this decision—120,000 refugees in a country of 3 million, for one thing.
Bigger issues are at play, beyond the capacity of national rhetoric. The issue is not just that the world’s eyes are on Ukraine, to the exclusion of other conflicts. The fate of Armenians in Karabakh is tied cruelly to the success of the Russian imperial project in Ukraine. Russia was bombing my great uncle’s city of Kharkiv last year. The fact that Russia did not successfully conquer his city and many others in Ukraine opened the door for Azerbaijan to conquer a village in Karabakh last year—one that was in the zone of responsibility of Russian peacekeepers since 2020—and to kill hundreds of Armenian soldiers in border incursions. The EU’s decision to wean off of Russian oil forever has lead it to deepen its strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, another petro-state. Russia, meanwhile, is also more dependent on Azerbaijan and its close ally Turkey than ever. Despite its security alliance with Armenia, Russia cannot currently afford to prevent Azerbaijan’s aggression. All these factors have made the uneasy peace made between Armenia and Azerbaijan after the 2020 war only more lopsided. The factors that lead to my great uncle’s safety also mean that my cousin, who will be conscripted to the Armenian army soon, is more likely to be killed in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
In this patchwork, the Armenian Prime Minister believes that by recognizing Karabakh as Azerbaijan, and by alienating Russia, he is cutting Armenia’s Gordian Knot and paving the way to the Western panacea. But the collapse of Russian power would create a vacuum that would lead to the rise of Turkish power in the Caucasus. A century ago, during World War I, when imperial Russia was collapsing to the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian troops’ withdrawal from the Caucasus and Western Armenia spelled the continuation of the Armenian Genocide by Ottoman and then Turkish Republican troops. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was the final straw that spelled war between Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijan. Today, the pain of a weakening Russia can be felt in Nagorno-Karabakh the most. It is a cause for excitement in Azerbaijan, and elsewhere too. The Ukrainian government sporadically speaks in support of Azerbaijani conquests in Karabakh, and hopes to open “second fronts” in places like Georgia. It makes sense—their very existence is threatened too. Former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, whose party is the main opposition in Georgia, recently stated that “Ukraine will break through the front, Russia will disintegrate, and we will have a chance to regain Abkhazia … Georgia should prepare for a common border with Ukraine.” This is an extreme view, but it becomes increasingly reasonable the more Russia weakens.
Zooming out from Nagorno-Karabakh, imperial webs hold together the uneasy status quo in the Caucasus today. The de-facto republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia survive on the patronage of Russia. 20 percent of Georgia’s territory is occupied by Russia through these states. I have no love for Soviet borders, but the impact of this is that hundreds of thousands of Georgians have been displaced from their homes for decades. It also enables Abkhazians and Ossetians to exercise their genuine will for self-determination. It is difficult not to descend into cynical realism and simply conclude that everyone fends for themselves and their own interests as the natural order of things.
One alternative is to reject the idea that these nations are natural units with inherent “interests” (the same logic that justifies the invasion of Ukraine). The Marxists came to this conclusion over a century ago when they decried bourgeois nationalism deployed against the working classes. Indeed, workers’ movements in the Caucasus created transnational solidarities during the Russian Empire, and, despite its horrors, the Soviet Union did build somewhat of a Soviet internationalism. One can see the levers of capital in the Karabakh conflict: British mining companies invest in Karabakh mines, supporting the war, Turkish construction companies tied to Erdogan rebuild Karabakh, Azerbaijani oil attracts international powers, and oligarchs on both sides maintained their mandates based on the conflict. However, to reduce the conflict to the manipulation of ruling classes feels both patronizing and reductionist. In any case, who is interested in taking brave steps to deconstruct their nationalist framework in an international system that does not reward it?
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ArmanAntonyanFirstEssay 5 - 30 May 2023 - Main.ArmanAntonyan
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< | The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh under Azerbaijani blockade | >
> | Nationalism, imperialism, and Nagorno-Karabakh | | | -- By ArmanAntonyan - 16 Feb 2023 | |
<
< | Why Armenians are starving right now in the most polarized conflict in the world | | | | |
<
< | For 2 months now, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh have been under blockade by Azerbaijan, which has stationed government agents along the Lachin Corridor to cut the Armenians off from the rest of the world. What does that sentence mean to you? If you’re Armenian, Azerbaijani, or friends with someone of those two peoples, you might know what I’m referring to. If you have a certain interest in foreign policy or international affairs, you may know what those circles tell you. I question those circles and their unspoken premises, the “international order” they would like to maintain, and the smug view from above. What can an expert on "Eurasia" tell me? I want to try to bring things to basics. | >
> | I have long wondered: if I could be published tomorrow in the New York Times, what would I say about Karabakh, and what would it matter? Recently, I happened to meet the person that did it—Chris Bohjalian, a bestselling author who has published op-eds in the NYT and other big papers about Karabakh. With his pen, he has reached a level of fame higher than most authors ever will. I asked him what did it all matter, and how he kept going seeing that the violence continued. He told me that he asks himself the same question every day, and that you just have to keep trying no matter what. | | | | |
<
< | When we distill the current crisis to its human aspect, it is kind of simple. Right now, the 120,000 Armenians who live in Nagorno-Karabakh are cut off from the rest of the world by Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has blocked Karabakh Armenians' single road to the world—the Lachin Corridor. Food and medical supplies, delivered sparingly by the Red Cross and Russia, have to be rationed in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azerbaijani government, who wants sovereignty over the local Armenians, really wants them to leave. They cut off the gas, fuel, and electricity intermittently. The road is open in only one direction—out of Karabakh. Azerbaijan will let Armenians leave, but does not want them to stay. | >
> | I was happy to find the closure of his answer. It led me to conclude that it doesn’t matter what I write about Karabakh, in the sense that I won’t be saving the lives of Karabakh Armenians. It didn’t even matter when the US called on Azerbaijan to end its blockade of the Lachin Corridor—which has cut the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh off from the world for six months now. These people live at the edge of destruction, and at this point many, if not most are likely to move out of Karabakh once they are allowed to. The Armenian government is ready to give them up, too: its prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, has announced that Armenia is prepared to recognize the region of Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. Yet Armenia is not prepared for the likely consequences of this decision—120,000 refugees in a country of 3 million, for one thing. | | | | |
<
< | Nagorno-Karabakh is a region that was part of Soviet Azerbaijan and declared its independence during the fall of the Soviet Union. Its Armenians never wanted to be a part of Azerbaijan; they were violently forced to join it in 1921. During Soviet liberalization, when the region’s Armenians saw a chance, they rallied to be joined to Soviet Armenia, and then fought for their independence. Soviet Azerbaijan pursued pogroms and other repressions against them, sometimes with the help of Moscow. But the Armenians persisted, fighting to create a country they call the Artsakh Republic, establishing self-governance even if the world wouldn’t recognize it. The world does not like when borders are changed. Except when the US wants to create the Republic of Kosovo. The Armenians of the Artsakh Republic are now paying the price for resistance 30 years later. A renewed invasion in 2020 saw Azerbaijan conquer and ethnically cleanse much of the land. The land where Armenians still stand is being protected halfheartedly by Russia, which is allied to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and which is busy invading Ukraine. | >
> | Bigger issues are at play, beyond the capacity of national rhetoric. The issue is not just that the world’s eyes are on Ukraine, to the exclusion of other conflicts. The fate of Armenians in Karabakh is tied cruelly to the success of the Russian imperial project in Ukraine. Russia was bombing my great uncle’s city of Kharkiv last year. The fact that Russia did not successfully conquer his city and many others in Ukraine opened the door for Azerbaijan to conquer a village in Karabakh last year—one that was in the zone of responsibility of Russian peacekeepers since 2020—and to kill hundreds of Armenian soldiers in border incursions. The EU’s decision to wean off of Russian oil forever has lead it to deepen its strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, another petro-state. Russia, meanwhile, is also more dependent on Azerbaijan and its close ally Turkey than ever. Despite its security alliance with Armenia, Russia cannot currently afford to prevent Azerbaijan’s aggression. All these factors have made the uneasy peace made between Armenia and Azerbaijan after the 2020 war only more lopsided. The factors that lead to my great uncle’s safety also mean that my cousin, who will be conscripted to the Armenian army soon, is more likely to be killed in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. | | | | |
<
< | I am convinced that this is the most polarized conflict in the world. Today, no ethnic Armenian can enter Azerbaijan—I, a US citizen with an Armenian name, would be refused access to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis can visit Armenia on paper, but they wouldn’t. Today, no Armenian would accept Azerbaijani sovereignty. No Azerbaijani would accept Armenian sovereignty. In the ‘90s, every time Armenians seized a village, Azerbaijanis were forced out, and vice versa. In 2020, only Armenians were kicked out of their homes. The few who stayed behind were mostly killed. One or two were used for Azerbaijani propaganda. Even for violent conflict, this is not normal. Palestinians work in Israel. Ukrainians can still live under Russian occupation. | >
> | In this patchwork, the Armenian Prime Minister believes that by recognizing Karabakh as Azerbaijan, and by alienating Russia, he is cutting Armenia’s Gordian Knot and paving the way to the Western panacea. But the collapse of Russian power would create a vacuum that would lead to the rise of Turkish power in the Caucasus. A century ago, during World War I, when imperial Russia was collapsing to the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian troops’ withdrawal from the Caucasus and Western Armenia spelled the continuation of the Armenian Genocide by Ottoman and then Turkish Republican troops. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was the final straw that spelled war between Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijan. Today, the pain of a weakening Russia can be felt in Nagorno-Karabakh the most. It is a cause for excitement in Azerbaijan, and elsewhere too. The Ukrainian government sporadically speaks in support of Azerbaijani conquests in Karabakh, and hopes to open “second fronts” in places like Georgia. It makes sense—their very existence is threatened too. Former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, whose party is the main opposition in Georgia, recently stated that “Ukraine will break through the front, Russia will disintegrate, and we will have a chance to regain Abkhazia … Georgia should prepare for a common border with Ukraine.” This is an extreme view, but it becomes increasingly reasonable the more Russia weakens. | | | | |
<
< | Trying and failing to understand the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict | >
> | Zooming out from Nagorno-Karabakh, imperial webs hold together the uneasy status quo in the Caucasus today. The de-facto republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia survive on the patronage of Russia. 20 percent of Georgia’s territory is occupied by Russia through these states. I have no love for Soviet borders, but the impact of this is that hundreds of thousands of Georgians have been displaced from their homes for decades. It also enables Abkhazians and Ossetians to exercise their genuine will for self-determination. It is difficult not to descend into cynical realism and simply conclude that everyone fends for themselves and their own interests as the natural order of things. | | | | |
<
< | Distilling this conflict for the onlooker is a ritual I and many Armenians have engaged in for years. It is the least an Armenian living safely in diaspora can do. Unlike the Armenians back home, we don’t have to get shelled or conscript our children, so we have to say something. I don’t mind. Lately I question the value of awareness, though. If I could get published by the New York Times, Le Monde, or the State Department tomorrow, what could I say, and what would it matter? | >
> | One alternative is to reject the idea that these nations are natural units with inherent “interests” (the same logic that justifies the invasion of Ukraine). The Marxists came to this conclusion over a century ago when they decried bourgeois nationalism deployed against the working classes. Indeed, workers’ movements in the Caucasus created transnational solidarities during the Russian Empire, and, despite its horrors, the Soviet Union did build somewhat of a Soviet internationalism. One can see the levers of capital in the Karabakh conflict: British mining companies invest in Karabakh mines, supporting the war, Turkish construction companies tied to Erdogan rebuild Karabakh, Azerbaijani oil attracts international powers, and oligarchs on both sides maintained their mandates based on the conflict. However, to reduce the conflict to the manipulation of ruling classes feels both patronizing and reductionist. In any case, who is interested in taking brave steps to deconstruct their nationalist framework in an international system that does not reward it? | | | | |
<
< | Trying to read the news about Karabakh will leave you more confused. Right now, Azerbaijan claims that the agents it has stationed to starve Armenians are “eco-activists” protesting illegal mining activities—they’ve changed the narrative a few times. Now that Azerbaijan said it, the news media has to report it. Azerbaijan benefits from obfuscating the news because it is more powerful than Armenia. And what does the news media really know, anyway? Most of them do not have a presence on the ground. Not in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Russia and Azerbaijan prevent foreign journalists’ access. Especially not where 18 year-old conscripts are getting killed. The media can tell you that the United States condemns the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh. That's it. The epistemological problem here runs deep. But more fundamentally, for most people—through no fault of their own—this entire conflict is an abstraction. Too many syllables and too far away.
There is excellent material on the Armenian resistance in the local languages of the region—Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Russian—and a ton of garbage. To date, nobody who speaks all three languages fluently has written a comprehensive history of the conflict. The premier book, littering syllabi across the world, is written by a British journalist who speaks Russian. It is not terrible—the man knows things, he spoke to real people on the ground—but it shouldn’t even be twentieth on our lists. There is one by an Armenian journalist who speaks at least two and a half of the languages fluently. He is excellent, but when was the last time he was allowed to be in Azerbaijan, how good of a historian is he, and when is he going to stop denying the Khojaly massacre?
Why are you describing sources of value without references? What is the point of complaining about the writers?
The epistemological problem here runs deep. It would be a massive undertaking to get all the important sources from all the sides. Kind of impossible, actually: who is going to get access to the archives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia?
The key to improvement here, I think, is to articulate the reason you are writing the essay. The idea expressed by this draft is that this small conflict is intense, and that it is little covered and indeed hard to investigate. Also, the Armenians are good and the Azeris are bad.
But if the point is to bring context to readers only peripherally aware of the situation, then the hyperlocality of the conflict should not result in hyperlocal analysis. The real point is that Armenian interests have been under the protection of Russian imperial power since the fall of the Soviet Union, and Russian power is destroying itself in Ukraine. Millions of Ukrainians are displaced, cities are destroyed, thousands of innocent civilians have been murdered, tortured, and maimed. In Ankara and Baku, Russia's self-destructive war of aggression offers an opportunity to harm Armenian interests and Armenian people. It will be taken. Thousands of people will be displaced. Villages and towns will be destroyed. Hundreds of innocent civilians will be burned out, raped, and murdered. In Nakhchivan, on the other hand...
You can condense the factual recitation substantially, linking to standard reference works and the more useful coverage. That will give room for showing the larger surrounding context, as well as telling the reader what—beyond our continuing savagery to people we think are other than ourselves—this story means.
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You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. |
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ArmanAntonyanFirstEssay 4 - 25 Feb 2023 - Main.EbenMoglen
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstEssay" |
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| | | Trying to read the news about Karabakh will leave you more confused. Right now, Azerbaijan claims that the agents it has stationed to starve Armenians are “eco-activists” protesting illegal mining activities—they’ve changed the narrative a few times. Now that Azerbaijan said it, the news media has to report it. Azerbaijan benefits from obfuscating the news because it is more powerful than Armenia. And what does the news media really know, anyway? Most of them do not have a presence on the ground. Not in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Russia and Azerbaijan prevent foreign journalists’ access. Especially not where 18 year-old conscripts are getting killed. The media can tell you that the United States condemns the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh. That's it. The epistemological problem here runs deep. But more fundamentally, for most people—through no fault of their own—this entire conflict is an abstraction. Too many syllables and too far away. | |
<
< | There is excellent material on the Armenian resistance in the local languages of the region—Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Russian—and a ton of garbage. To date, nobody who speaks all three languages fluently has written a comprehensive history of the conflict. The premier book, littering syllabi across the world, is written by a British journalist who speaks Russian. It is not terrible—the man knows things, he spoke to real people on the ground—but it shouldn’t even be twentieth on our lists. There is one by an Armenian journalist who speaks at least two and a half of the languages fluently. He is excellent, but when was the last time he was allowed to be in Azerbaijan, how good of a historian is he, and when is he going to stop denying the Khojaly massacre? The epistemological problem here runs deep. It would be a massive undertaking to get all the important sources from all the sides. Kind of impossible, actually: who is going to get access to the archives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia? | >
> | There is excellent material on the Armenian resistance in the local languages of the region—Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Russian—and a ton of garbage. To date, nobody who speaks all three languages fluently has written a comprehensive history of the conflict. The premier book, littering syllabi across the world, is written by a British journalist who speaks Russian. It is not terrible—the man knows things, he spoke to real people on the ground—but it shouldn’t even be twentieth on our lists. There is one by an Armenian journalist who speaks at least two and a half of the languages fluently. He is excellent, but when was the last time he was allowed to be in Azerbaijan, how good of a historian is he, and when is he going to stop denying the Khojaly massacre? | | | | |
>
> |
Why are you describing sources of value without references? What is the point of complaining about the writers?
| | | | |
>
> | The epistemological problem here runs deep. It would be a massive undertaking to get all the important sources from all the sides. Kind of impossible, actually: who is going to get access to the archives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia?
The key to improvement here, I think, is to articulate the reason you are writing the essay. The idea expressed by this draft is that this small conflict is intense, and that it is little covered and indeed hard to investigate. Also, the Armenians are good and the Azeris are bad.
But if the point is to bring context to readers only peripherally aware of the situation, then the hyperlocality of the conflict should not result in hyperlocal analysis. The real point is that Armenian interests have been under the protection of Russian imperial power since the fall of the Soviet Union, and Russian power is destroying itself in Ukraine. Millions of Ukrainians are displaced, cities are destroyed, thousands of innocent civilians have been murdered, tortured, and maimed. In Ankara and Baku, Russia's self-destructive war of aggression offers an opportunity to harm Armenian interests and Armenian people. It will be taken. Thousands of people will be displaced. Villages and towns will be destroyed. Hundreds of innocent civilians will be burned out, raped, and murdered. In Nakhchivan, on the other hand...
You can condense the factual recitation substantially, linking to standard reference works and the more useful coverage. That will give room for showing the larger surrounding context, as well as telling the reader what—beyond our continuing savagery to people we think are other than ourselves—this story means.
| | |
You are entitled to restrict access to your paper if you want to. But we all derive immense benefit from reading one another's work, and I hope you won't feel the need unless the subject matter is personal and its disclosure would be harmful or undesirable. |
|
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ArmanAntonyanFirstEssay 3 - 17 Feb 2023 - Main.ArmanAntonyan
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< | It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | >
> | | | | The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh under Azerbaijani blockade |
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ArmanAntonyanFirstEssay 2 - 16 Feb 2023 - Main.ArmanAntonyan
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | | | Why Armenians are starving right now in the most polarized conflict in the world | |
<
< | For 2 months now, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh have been under blockade by Azerbaijan, which has stationed government agents along the Lachin Corridor to cut the Armenians off from the rest of the world. What does that sentence mean to you? If you’re Armenian, Azerbaijani, or friends with someone of those two peoples, you might know what I’m referring to. If you have a certain interest in foreign policy or international affairs, you may know what those circles tell you. I question those circles and their unspoken premises, the “international order” they would like to maintain, and the smug view from above. What can an expert on “Eurasia,” the “post-Soviet space,”or the “Caucasus” tell me? I want to try to bring things to basics. | >
> | For 2 months now, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh have been under blockade by Azerbaijan, which has stationed government agents along the Lachin Corridor to cut the Armenians off from the rest of the world. What does that sentence mean to you? If you’re Armenian, Azerbaijani, or friends with someone of those two peoples, you might know what I’m referring to. If you have a certain interest in foreign policy or international affairs, you may know what those circles tell you. I question those circles and their unspoken premises, the “international order” they would like to maintain, and the smug view from above. What can an expert on "Eurasia" tell me? I want to try to bring things to basics. | | | | |
<
< | When we distill the current crisis to its human aspect, it is kind of simple. Right now, the 120,000 Armenians who live in Nagorno-Karabakh are cut off from the rest of the world by Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has blocked its single road to the world—the Lachin Corridor. Food and medical supplies, delivered sparingly by the Red Cross and Russia, have to be rationed in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azerbaijani government, who wants sovereignty over the local Armenians, really wants them to leave. They cut off the gas, fuel, and electricity intermittently. I’m not being fully honest about the blockade. The road is open in one direction—out of Karabakh. Azerbaijan will let Armenians leave, but does not want them to stay. | >
> | When we distill the current crisis to its human aspect, it is kind of simple. Right now, the 120,000 Armenians who live in Nagorno-Karabakh are cut off from the rest of the world by Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has blocked Karabakh Armenians' single road to the world—the Lachin Corridor. Food and medical supplies, delivered sparingly by the Red Cross and Russia, have to be rationed in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azerbaijani government, who wants sovereignty over the local Armenians, really wants them to leave. They cut off the gas, fuel, and electricity intermittently. The road is open in only one direction—out of Karabakh. Azerbaijan will let Armenians leave, but does not want them to stay. | | | Nagorno-Karabakh is a region that was part of Soviet Azerbaijan and declared its independence during the fall of the Soviet Union. Its Armenians never wanted to be a part of Azerbaijan; they were violently forced to join it in 1921. During Soviet liberalization, when the region’s Armenians saw a chance, they rallied to be joined to Soviet Armenia, and then fought for their independence. Soviet Azerbaijan pursued pogroms and other repressions against them, sometimes with the help of Moscow. But the Armenians persisted, fighting to create a country they call the Artsakh Republic, establishing self-governance even if the world wouldn’t recognize it. The world does not like when borders are changed. Except when the US wants to create the Republic of Kosovo. The Armenians of the Artsakh Republic are now paying the price for resistance 30 years later. A renewed invasion in 2020 saw Azerbaijan conquer and ethnically cleanse much of the land. The land where Armenians still stand is being protected halfheartedly by Russia, which is allied to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and which is busy invading Ukraine. | |
<
< | I am convinced this is the most polarized conflict in the world. Today, no ethnic Armenian can enter Azerbaijan—I, a US citizen with an Armenian name, would be refused access to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis can visit Armenia on paper, but they wouldn’t. Today, no Armenian would accept Azerbaijani sovereignty. No Azerbaijani would accept Armenian sovereignty. In the ‘90s, every time Armenians seized a village, Azerbaijanis were forced out, and vice versa. In 2020, only Armenians were kicked out of their homes. The few who stayed behind were mostly killed. One or two were used for Azerbaijani propaganda. Even for violent conflict, this is not normal. Palestinians work in Israel. Ukrainians can still live under Russian occupation. Serbians
have communities in Kosovo. After 2020, Azerbaijan created a war trophy park in its capital, featuring helmets of dead Armenian soldiers and racist wax mannequins of Armenian troops. | >
> | I am convinced that this is the most polarized conflict in the world. Today, no ethnic Armenian can enter Azerbaijan—I, a US citizen with an Armenian name, would be refused access to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis can visit Armenia on paper, but they wouldn’t. Today, no Armenian would accept Azerbaijani sovereignty. No Azerbaijani would accept Armenian sovereignty. In the ‘90s, every time Armenians seized a village, Azerbaijanis were forced out, and vice versa. In 2020, only Armenians were kicked out of their homes. The few who stayed behind were mostly killed. One or two were used for Azerbaijani propaganda. Even for violent conflict, this is not normal. Palestinians work in Israel. Ukrainians can still live under Russian occupation. | | | Trying and failing to understand the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict | |
<
< | Distilling this conflict for the onlooker is a ritual I and many Armenians have engaged in for years. It is the least an Armenian living safely in diaspora can do. Unlike the Armenians back home, we don’t have to get shelled or conscript our children, so we have to say something. I don’t mind. Lately I question the value of awareness, though. If I could get published by the New York Times, Le Monde, or the State Department tomorrow, what would I say, and what would it matter?
It is extremely difficult to research the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Trying to read the news will leave you more confused. Right now, Azerbaijan claims that the agents it has stationed to starve Armenians are “eco-activists” protesting illegal mining activities or something—they’ve changed the narrative a few times. Now that Azerbaijan said it, the news media has to report it. Azerbaijan benefits from obfuscating the news because it is more powerful than Armenia. And what does the news media really know, anyway? Most of them do not have a presence on the ground. Not in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Russia and Azerbaijan prevent foreign journalists’ access. Especially not where 18 year-old conscripts are getting killed. The media can tell you that the United States condemns the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh. Not that much more. The epistemological problem here runs deep. But more fundamentally, for most people—through no fault of their own—this entire conflict is an abstraction. Too many syllables and too far away. I can’t say I’m any better about the rest of the world. | >
> | Distilling this conflict for the onlooker is a ritual I and many Armenians have engaged in for years. It is the least an Armenian living safely in diaspora can do. Unlike the Armenians back home, we don’t have to get shelled or conscript our children, so we have to say something. I don’t mind. Lately I question the value of awareness, though. If I could get published by the New York Times, Le Monde, or the State Department tomorrow, what could I say, and what would it matter? | | | | |
<
< | There is excellent material on the Armenian resistance in the native languages of the region—Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Russian (the lingua franca)—and a ton of garbage. To date, nobody who speaks all three languages fluently has written a comprehensive history of the conflict. The premier book, littering syllabi across the world, is written by a British journalist who speaks Russian. It is not terrible—the man knows things, he spoke to real people on the ground—but it shouldn’t even be twentieth on our lists. There is one by an Armenian journalist who speaks at least two and a half of the languages fluently. He is excellent, but when was the last time he was allowed to be in Azerbaijan, how good of a historian is he, and when is he going to stop denying the Khojaly massacre? The epistemological problem here runs deep. It would be a massive undertaking to get all the important sources from all the sides. Kind of impossible, actually: who is going to get access to the archives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia? | >
> | Trying to read the news about Karabakh will leave you more confused. Right now, Azerbaijan claims that the agents it has stationed to starve Armenians are “eco-activists” protesting illegal mining activities—they’ve changed the narrative a few times. Now that Azerbaijan said it, the news media has to report it. Azerbaijan benefits from obfuscating the news because it is more powerful than Armenia. And what does the news media really know, anyway? Most of them do not have a presence on the ground. Not in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Russia and Azerbaijan prevent foreign journalists’ access. Especially not where 18 year-old conscripts are getting killed. The media can tell you that the United States condemns the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh. That's it. The epistemological problem here runs deep. But more fundamentally, for most people—through no fault of their own—this entire conflict is an abstraction. Too many syllables and too far away.
There is excellent material on the Armenian resistance in the local languages of the region—Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Russian—and a ton of garbage. To date, nobody who speaks all three languages fluently has written a comprehensive history of the conflict. The premier book, littering syllabi across the world, is written by a British journalist who speaks Russian. It is not terrible—the man knows things, he spoke to real people on the ground—but it shouldn’t even be twentieth on our lists. There is one by an Armenian journalist who speaks at least two and a half of the languages fluently. He is excellent, but when was the last time he was allowed to be in Azerbaijan, how good of a historian is he, and when is he going to stop denying the Khojaly massacre? The epistemological problem here runs deep. It would be a massive undertaking to get all the important sources from all the sides. Kind of impossible, actually: who is going to get access to the archives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia? | | | |
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ArmanAntonyanFirstEssay 1 - 16 Feb 2023 - Main.ArmanAntonyan
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It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.
The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh under Azerbaijani blockade
-- By ArmanAntonyan - 16 Feb 2023
Why Armenians are starving right now in the most polarized conflict in the world
For 2 months now, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh have been under blockade by Azerbaijan, which has stationed government agents along the Lachin Corridor to cut the Armenians off from the rest of the world. What does that sentence mean to you? If you’re Armenian, Azerbaijani, or friends with someone of those two peoples, you might know what I’m referring to. If you have a certain interest in foreign policy or international affairs, you may know what those circles tell you. I question those circles and their unspoken premises, the “international order” they would like to maintain, and the smug view from above. What can an expert on “Eurasia,” the “post-Soviet space,”or the “Caucasus” tell me? I want to try to bring things to basics.
When we distill the current crisis to its human aspect, it is kind of simple. Right now, the 120,000 Armenians who live in Nagorno-Karabakh are cut off from the rest of the world by Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has blocked its single road to the world—the Lachin Corridor. Food and medical supplies, delivered sparingly by the Red Cross and Russia, have to be rationed in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azerbaijani government, who wants sovereignty over the local Armenians, really wants them to leave. They cut off the gas, fuel, and electricity intermittently. I’m not being fully honest about the blockade. The road is open in one direction—out of Karabakh. Azerbaijan will let Armenians leave, but does not want them to stay.
Nagorno-Karabakh is a region that was part of Soviet Azerbaijan and declared its independence during the fall of the Soviet Union. Its Armenians never wanted to be a part of Azerbaijan; they were violently forced to join it in 1921. During Soviet liberalization, when the region’s Armenians saw a chance, they rallied to be joined to Soviet Armenia, and then fought for their independence. Soviet Azerbaijan pursued pogroms and other repressions against them, sometimes with the help of Moscow. But the Armenians persisted, fighting to create a country they call the Artsakh Republic, establishing self-governance even if the world wouldn’t recognize it. The world does not like when borders are changed. Except when the US wants to create the Republic of Kosovo. The Armenians of the Artsakh Republic are now paying the price for resistance 30 years later. A renewed invasion in 2020 saw Azerbaijan conquer and ethnically cleanse much of the land. The land where Armenians still stand is being protected halfheartedly by Russia, which is allied to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and which is busy invading Ukraine.
I am convinced this is the most polarized conflict in the world. Today, no ethnic Armenian can enter Azerbaijan—I, a US citizen with an Armenian name, would be refused access to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijanis can visit Armenia on paper, but they wouldn’t. Today, no Armenian would accept Azerbaijani sovereignty. No Azerbaijani would accept Armenian sovereignty. In the ‘90s, every time Armenians seized a village, Azerbaijanis were forced out, and vice versa. In 2020, only Armenians were kicked out of their homes. The few who stayed behind were mostly killed. One or two were used for Azerbaijani propaganda. Even for violent conflict, this is not normal. Palestinians work in Israel. Ukrainians can still live under Russian occupation. Serbians
have communities in Kosovo. After 2020, Azerbaijan created a war trophy park in its capital, featuring helmets of dead Armenian soldiers and racist wax mannequins of Armenian troops.
Trying and failing to understand the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
Distilling this conflict for the onlooker is a ritual I and many Armenians have engaged in for years. It is the least an Armenian living safely in diaspora can do. Unlike the Armenians back home, we don’t have to get shelled or conscript our children, so we have to say something. I don’t mind. Lately I question the value of awareness, though. If I could get published by the New York Times, Le Monde, or the State Department tomorrow, what would I say, and what would it matter?
It is extremely difficult to research the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Trying to read the news will leave you more confused. Right now, Azerbaijan claims that the agents it has stationed to starve Armenians are “eco-activists” protesting illegal mining activities or something—they’ve changed the narrative a few times. Now that Azerbaijan said it, the news media has to report it. Azerbaijan benefits from obfuscating the news because it is more powerful than Armenia. And what does the news media really know, anyway? Most of them do not have a presence on the ground. Not in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Russia and Azerbaijan prevent foreign journalists’ access. Especially not where 18 year-old conscripts are getting killed. The media can tell you that the United States condemns the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh. Not that much more. The epistemological problem here runs deep. But more fundamentally, for most people—through no fault of their own—this entire conflict is an abstraction. Too many syllables and too far away. I can’t say I’m any better about the rest of the world.
There is excellent material on the Armenian resistance in the native languages of the region—Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Russian (the lingua franca)—and a ton of garbage. To date, nobody who speaks all three languages fluently has written a comprehensive history of the conflict. The premier book, littering syllabi across the world, is written by a British journalist who speaks Russian. It is not terrible—the man knows things, he spoke to real people on the ground—but it shouldn’t even be twentieth on our lists. There is one by an Armenian journalist who speaks at least two and a half of the languages fluently. He is excellent, but when was the last time he was allowed to be in Azerbaijan, how good of a historian is he, and when is he going to stop denying the Khojaly massacre? The epistemological problem here runs deep. It would be a massive undertaking to get all the important sources from all the sides. Kind of impossible, actually: who is going to get access to the archives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia?
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