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| | | Public Service: Private Support | |
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< | The ADDHAR project is the brain child of Nandan Nilekani, former CEO of billion dollar company Infosys Technologies. Despite his corporate ties, Nilekani insists that the AADHAR project is only intended for use by the Indian government, however, the system is in fact intricately tied to the private sector. For example, AADHAR receives biometric support from C-1 Identity Solutions, an American-run intelligence and surveillance company. While it is unclear precisely under what terms of use the privately run supporting companies operate, and what access they have to the biometric data, the potential consequences are unsettling. For example, though the Government of India hopes that the AADHAR project will be a success, there are concerns that the project is too large an undertaking and will have to be abandoned. To date, however, biometric information has been gathered from over 200-million citizens. If this data is not in use by the government, the potential exploitations in the commercial world are endless for marketing by understanding age and occupational demographics. Further, even if the information is not used by any of the private partners, concerns exist that the government may not invest the resources needed to adequately secure the data that has already been gathered, and this mass of bio metric information could lead to identity fraud or other large scale surveillance concerns. For example, if this is compared with the United State's own current version of consolidated identifying information - the Social Security Number the risks if the AADHAR numbers are left unsecured is all too apparent. While Social Security numbers are meant to be kept confidential by the government, due to the frequency with which citizens must provide the number to various other companies and administrative services makes them incredibly easy to steal. If a Social Security number is stolen, the unfortunate holder of the card may have credit cards or loans falsely taken out in his name, but the implications for a stolen AADHAR number which contains even more sensitive information and is tied to essential services could be even more severe. | >
> | The ADDHAR project is the brain child of Nandan Nilekani, former CEO of billion dollar company Infosys Technologies. Despite his corporate ties, Nilekani insists that the AADHAR project is only intended for use by the Indian government, however, the system is in fact intricately tied to the private sector. For example, AADHAR receives biometric support from C-1 Identity Solutions, an American-run intelligence and surveillance company. While it is unclear precisely under what terms of use the privately run supporting companies operate, and what access they have to the biometric data, the potential consequences are unsettling. For example, though the Government of India hopes that the AADHAR project will be a success, there are concerns that the project is too large an undertaking and will have to be abandoned. To date, however, biometric information has been gathered from over 200-million citizens. If this data is not in use by the government, the potential exploitations in the commercial world are endless for marketing by understanding age and occupational demographics. Further, even if the information is not used by any of the private partners, concerns exist that the government may not invest the resources needed to adequately secure the data that has already been gathered, and this mass of bio-metric information could lead to identity fraud or other large scale surveillance concerns. For example, if this is compared with the United State's own current version of consolidated identifying information - the Social Security Number-the risks if the AADHAR numbers are left unsecured are all too apparent. While Social Security numbers are meant to be kept confidential by the government, due to the frequency with which citizens must provide the number to various other companies and administrative services, makes them incredibly vulnerable to theft. If a Social Security number is stolen, the unfortunate holder of the number may have credit cards or loans falsely taken out in his name, but the implications for a stolen AADHAR number which contains even more sensitive information and is tied to essential services could be even more severe. | | | | |
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< | Building Our Own AADHAR | >
> | What does AADHAR Really Stand For?
Despite the privacy concerns, and worries that the project is simply too big of an undertaking given the population of India, it certainly appears that, at the very least, the AADHAR project will gather at least twice the number of registrations as it currently has. At best, the AADHAR program will finally put 1/3rd of India's population on the "map," and allow them to be counted in the state census and gather welfare benefits. At worst, the program may put the personal information of millions of people at risk, including, for the first time in history, vast data bases of bio-metric data. Further, while it is likely a boon to most of the population to finally be accounted for by the state, the AADHAR project reduces the option to be invisible to the state if one should choose. This raises interesting questions about the implications of loosing the option in modern societies to be "off the radar" or simply unaccounted for by the state. Further, it raises the interesting question of if people should have the right to simply disappear, and what "disappearing" can even mean in the digital and surveillance era. As AADHAR continues to grow, it will be fascinating to witness the implications for both the self-identity of the poor in India as well as the data mining implications for all citizens. Finally, once it is an option for everyone to be accounted, will the desire and belief in the goodness of accountability remain the same? | | | | |
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< | These concerns raised by the Indian AADHAR system lead to questions about the potential creation of such a program in the United States expanded beyond the Social Security Number. Collecting biometric data on all 300-million Americans would certainly assist in government security and surveillance efforts, and replacing passports, drivers licenses, social security cards, with one sleek identification card may reduce a certain amount of bureaucracy. It has been suggested, however, that in the U.S., the government need not create such a database, because we are creating of our own volition. With over 100 Million monthly American users, Facebook is a prime example of data that we've gathered about ourselves. Eventually, Facebook may have just as much, if not more identifying information than AADHAR. Users eagerly input their full names and birthday dates, and upload over 300-million photos of each other each day which they dutifully tag. Need a mug shot of suspect? How about 1,000 photos of the suspect in various outfits and locations instead? This concern is further compounded by the fact that Facebook recently got rid of its "Privacy Policy," and has replaced it with a simple "Data Use Policy," suggesting that what we once conceived of as "private information," has been re-construed in the public psyche as simply "data." | | | |
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