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ArchanHazra1FirstPaper 3 - 17 May 2015 - Main.ArchanHazra1
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| META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstPaper" |
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| | | Introduction | |
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< | The border search doctrine carves out an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of either a warrant or even individualized suspicion prior to search and seizure. The Supreme Court has often articulated the broad authority that the federal government has in searching those that enter the United States: “[s]ince the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the contraband into this country.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 536 (1985). Indeed, Congress has used broad language to grant discretion to customs officers in safeguarding the borders. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), for example, grants officers the ability to “go on board of any vessel or vehicle . . . to search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board.” So while the Fourth Amendment ordinarily offers some protection against search and seizure, the protections it offers at the border are basically nonexistent. And at first blush, there is no reason to think that the protections it offers to one’s data are any less non-existent—even in the aftermath of Riley v. California. | >
> | The border search doctrine carves out an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of either a warrant or even individualized suspicion prior to search and seizure. The Supreme Court has often articulated the broad authority that the federal government has in searching those that enter the United States: “[s]ince the founding of our Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the contraband into this country.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 536 (1985). Indeed, Congress has used broad language to grant discretion to customs officers in safeguarding the borders. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), for example, grants officers the ability to “go on board of any vessel or vehicle . . . to search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board.” So while the Fourth Amendment ordinarily offers some protection against search and seizure, the protections it offers at the border are basically nonexistent. And at first blush, there is no reason to think that the protections it offers to one’s data are any less non-existent—even in the aftermath of Riley v. California. | | |
It is a border, after all. It would be odd to suppose that law with strong identification with place wouldn't be place-sensitive at the border. So? |
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