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Computers, Privacy & the Constitution
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PaulLie's JournalJournal Entry 2 5 April 2020 I realized that I had accidentally created my first journal entry under a Guest Login, so here goes attempt No. 2. The New York Times article posted on the radar has highlighted the privacy concerns that have arisen as a result of governmental policies taken to combat the spread of the Covid 19 virus (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/technology/coronavirus-surveillance-tracking-privacy.html). In Singapore, I had mentioned the development of a voluntary contact tracing app called “TraceTogether” which uses short range Bluetooth to maintain a log of other users with the same app. The idea behind the app is that the data logs would allow authorities to identify persons who were previously in close contact with the user, in the event the user is subsequently diagnosed with the virus (https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/25/coronavirus-singapore-to-make-contact-tracing-tech-open-source.html). To address privacy considerations, the app anonymizes and encrypts data collected. Concerns however have been raised that the coding in the app collects other information (e.g. IP Addresses, device type, carrier) which may eventually be used to identify users, thus rendering anonymization attempts redundant (https://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2020/04/03/sporean-coder-highlights-data-privacy-concern-in-contact-tracing-app-for-sending-user-data-to-government-data-collection-service/). In my view the “TraceTogether” app attempts to strike a balance between privacy and societal benefit by allowing users to voluntary choose whether to download the app or not. As the Covid 19 situation worsens though, pressure will only grow on government agencies to leverage on any form of advantage they have to combat the spread of the virus. Each country will then have to make a choice on balancing individual privacy with collective public need, including the possibility of mandatory or invasive forms of location tracing. As highlighted in the earlier class, the key is in ensuring that any constraints on privacy must be limited to only what is strictly necessary, and any such policies implemented must be quickly rolled back once the need for them has passed.
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