Again, I apologize for the delay. I will get the revision for this minor writing credit paper done as soon as possible.
From the Screens to the Streets in Hong Kong
-- By
AliAbid - 20 May 2025
The 2019 Hong Kong protests started as a reaction to a proposed extradition law but it became something much bigger. What began as opposition to a single policy transformed into a mass movement against rising despotic control. Protesters demanded more than just the termination of the bill. They sought to facilitate police reform, democratic reform and protection of the freedoms promised to the city at the time of its annexation by China. While the demonstrations unfolded in the streets, much of the movement lived online. Protesters used digital platforms to organize, communicate, and protect each other. The thing is, the same digital tools that gave the movement life also left it exposed. The government watched and adapted to use the internet into a tool of repression. The Hong Kong protests showed both the potential and the limits of digital resistance.
There were no central leaders directing the protests. Organizers and participants knew that if anyone emerged as the face of the movement they would be arrested. Instead, everything was handled digitally. Telegram became the main app to use for communication. Its encrypted chats and large group capacity made it ideal for coordinating. Massive group chats shared updates and protest routes. The anonymity allowed protesters to act collectively without putting individual people at risk.
LIHKG was a local message board that became the space where protest ideas were discussed and decisions were made. It was sort of like their version of Reddit. Protesters used LIHKG to make decisions in real time. They could adjust their plans based on what everyone determined was feasible. There was no leader barking orders. It was a decentralized movement that let the resistance decide together.
Even without internet access, information still moved. Protesters used
AirDrop? to send information to each other. HKmap.live was a crowdsourced digital map that protesters used to track police activity in protest areas. Protestors updated it live. This gave the crowd a real time view of where was safe and where wasn’t. For a while the streets of Hong Kong were a living grid of online communication.
Protesters knew they were being watched. They wore masks to protector them from tear gas as well as to block facial recognition methods. They often switched off their phones or left them at home. They used burner devices or prepaid SIM cards brought in cash. The city’s digital infrastructure had become part of the threat.
Activists took privacy seriously. Telegram chats were wiped after each action. The Signal app became common for communication. They warned others to avoid linking any personal information to their accounts. They understood that a digital footprint could be traced. Even a like or a forwarded message might be used later as evidence.
These weren’t just unsubstantiated fears. People were arrested based on messages found on their phones. Police demanded device access at checkpoints. Some protesters were pulled aside for what they had posted on their apps and not even for the protests themselves. The digital tools helped the movement grow also became an attack vector from the government.
As the protests intensified so did the government’s response. Online platforms were pressured. Apple removed HKmap.live from its app store because of political pressure from the Chinese government. Pro government lackeys flooded Telegram groups with spam or misinformation. Accounts on LIHKG were reportedly hacked. The online spaces for protestors began to feel compromised.
The Chinese government was already experienced in digital control. They began pushing their methods into Hong Kong. State media and fake social accounts posted disinformation accusing protesters of being violent, treasonous and criminal. Police used footage and digital trails to identify individuals involved in the protests. Some protesters were arrested much time later after being out in the streets. The government used their phone data, surveillance footage and online activity to pinpoint them.
The state didn’t just shut down apps and websites. They changed the meaning of being online. The internet was no longer a space of organizing and speech. It became a space of surveillance where the protestors in Hong Kong had no freedom to act in a free capacity.
In June 2020, the National Security Law was passed. It criminalized acts of subversion, secession, and foreign collusion. The definitions were vague enough to cover nearly anything. Even slogans were enough for arrest. Online posts were grounds for interrogation. Posts posted years ago could now be scrutinized under this law. Protest related websites were shut down. Activists deleted entire accounts and wiped years of online presence for their own safety.
The digital movement collapsed under the weight of fear. People didn’t stop believing in the cause but now even liking a tweet the government didn’t like could mean prison. Some left Hong Kong and others went off the grid. The tools that had allowed mass mobilization were now tools of risk. The lack of true digital privacy had closed the door on resistance and without secure digital space the protest lost its reach.
Though the streets went quiet, that didn’t mean people stopped caring though about the cause.. The protests didn’t fail because the tools stopped working. They failed because those tools were never as safe as they seemed. The government didn’t need to block the internet or shut down networks. All it had to do was watch. Once the data was collected and the laws were in place the same messages that once connected people became evidence against them.
The Hong Kong protests showed the possibilities of digital resistance but also showed its fragility. The internet allowed fast and flexible organizing while also carrying the seeds of exposure. Protesters did everything they could to protect themselves, The problem was that the tools they relied on were never completely safe. The government didn’t need to fight the crowd, they just needed to takeaway their methods of mobilization.
Works Cited:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/09/hong-kong-protests-explained/
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49565587
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-democracy-protests-china-crackdown
https://www.cnet.com/tech/mobile/apple-pulls-hkmap-live-app-used-in-hong-kong-protests/
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/01/china/hong-kong-national-security-law-july-1-intl-hnk
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/10/1102882
https://qz.com/1660460/hong-kong-protesters-use-airdrop-to-breach-chinas-firewall
https://www.reuters.com/article/world/exclusive-messaging-app-telegram-moves-to-protect-identity-of-hong-kong-protest-idUSKCN1VK2NC/
https://www.reuters.com/article/world/timeline-key-dates-in-hong-kongs-anti-government-protests-idUSKBN23608O/
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/society/article/3021224/hong-kong-protests-how-citys-reddit-forum-lihkg-has-become
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