Law in the Internet Society

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SkyeLeeSecondEssay 3 - 10 Jan 2022 - Main.SkyeLee
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From the Iron-Fist’s Crushing Grip to the Invisible Panopticon - The tug-of-war between surveillance strategies and political dissidents

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From the Iron-Fist’s Crushing Grip to its Invisible Panopticon - Understanding the Impact on Hong Kong’s Political Culture through the Net’s Dynamics

 
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-- By SkyeLee - 16 Dec 2021
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-- By SkyeLee - 09 Jan 2022
 
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Hong Kong’s Culture War: Moving the Battle Online

 
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The first tug: Using Encrypted Communications

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On 8th December 2021, four individuals from Hong Kong were arrested. They were accused of inciting unlawful assembly and criminal damage using messenger app Telegram. This is the latest in a string of police crackdowns on anti-establishment online communication which form a part of a wider tug-of-war for control over Hong Kong’s cyberspace.
 
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A week ago, on 8th December 2021, four individuals from Hong Kong were arrested. They were accused of inciting unlawful assembly and criminal damage, to protest against the government’s COVID measures, using messenger app Telegram. Days before that, a Telegram channel administrator was sentenced to prison for almost five years for inciting violence and arson via his server during the 2019 protests. The recent incidents are the latest in a string of police efforts to crack down on anti-establishment communication on Telegram.
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A culture war is underway in Hong Kong. As the government pushes Hong Kong’s cultural integration with the Chinese mainland, a systematic attack on anything inconsistent or discordant is executed. Physical monuments - such as the Pillar of Shame commemorating the June 4th Tragedy, have been stealthily deconstructed. Groups like the Hong Kong University Student Union and Chinese University Student Union have been disbanded and disavowed for their stance on recent political incidents. Non-centralized media outlets such as Apple Daily, Stand News, Citizen News have either been raided and shut down or pressured to dissolve. As anti-establishment monuments, groups, and media fall away, the movement is forced increasingly into Hong Kong’s cyberspace.
 
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The significance of this Telegram-related suppression has to be contextualised within the unique dynamics of Hong Kong’s current anti-establishment movement. The movement in Hong Kong that started in 2019 is uniquely ‘diffused’, participation in the movement is ‘open’ and, unlike previous protests such as the 2014 ‘Umbrella Movement, there is no particular organization or leadership predominating its coordination. With no identifiable leaders determining the overall direction and agenda, strategising within a ‘flat structure’ has influenced the manner of information transmission within the movement. Absent top-down dissemination from a leading organisation, decentralised access to knowledge, communication and coordination has been conducted through social media messaging apps.
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The establishment’s hubs of online activity are concentrated on social media messaging groups via apps like Telegram. The current movement is uniquely ‘diffused’, participation in the movement is ‘open’ and, unlike the 2014 ‘Umbrella Movement’, there is no particular leadership. With no central leadership determining the overall direction, strategising within a ‘flat structure’ has influenced information transmission within the movement. Decentralised access to knowledge and communication has been conducted mainly through social media messaging apps.
 
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The second tug: Government suppression and infiltration

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The Government’s Attack Strategy: Covert Infiltration over Overt Suppression

 
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The nature of the movement’s reliance on decentralised communication is compounded by its ‘open’ nature, rendering it particularly vulnerable to infiltration by the opposition. Within this context, the Hong Kong government’s approach is similarly calculated to reap the benefits of the mainland Chinese government’s response to its citizens using VPN technology to climb over the Great Firewall. Two response phrases have been observed in China, a first attempt to continue adapting the firewall and crush all VPNs, and a second, more insidious attempt at infiltrating the VPNs. Infiltrating channels of communication makes for more effective listening; one who wishes to listen, can listen without making one’s presence known. And when the listener’s presence is unknown; the talkers continue their unfiltered talking, very much unaware of invisible ears. The introverted nature of a government listener allows it to be more omnipresent, increasingly omniscient and eventually omnipotent. The invisible panopticon disciplines the anti-establishment, as did the iron fist before it.
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In seeking to dismantle anti-establishment structures in cyberspace, the Hong Kong government’s plan of attack has been one of infiltration. Hacking attempts have been made originating from the mainland on both a systemic and individual level. State-actor sized DDos technology networks attacked Telegram concurrently during demonstrations in Hong Kong. Direct seizure of personal devices allow for a surveillance network to be constructed through piecemeal infiltration from individual and separate ‘nodes’. And in the spirit of infiltration, there begins the covert creation of fake accounts to join channels in decentralised communication networks like Telegram. Their approach is similar to the mainland Government’s infiltration of VPNs. Infiltrating channels of communication makes for more effective listening; one who wishes to listen, can listen without making one’s presence known. And when the listener’s presence is unknown; the talkers continue their unfiltered talking, unaware of invisible ears. The introverted nature of a government listener allows it to be more omnipresent, increasingly omniscient and eventually omnipotent. The invisible panopticon disciplines the anti-establishment, as did the iron fist before it.
 
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In Hong Kong, the government has responded by mirroring the Chinese government’s second approach of infiltration. In the spirit of crackdown, hacking attempts have been made by national network founders on both a systemic and individual level. State-actor sized DDos technology networks attacked Telegram concurrently during demonstrations in Hong Kong. Direct seizure of personal devices allows for a surveillance network to be constructed through piecemeal infiltration from individual and separate ‘nodes’. And in the spirit of infiltration, there begins the covert creation of fake accounts to join channels in decentralised communication networks like Telegram.
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However, the government’s attack is custom-made for Hong Kong. The decentralized and open nature of current movements renders them particularly vulnerable to infiltration by the opposition. Yet more importantly, and much like the city itself, Hong Kong’s cyberspace is already globally integrated. Western-owned big technology companies such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter have rooted their presence in Hong Kong with large data servers and years of service in the region. Foreign telecommunications businesses have also adopted Hong Kong as a telecommunications hub in Asia. Not only are the telecommunication and technology corporations economic powerhouses themselves, but their services are an entrenched part of Hong Kong’s financial and economic landscape. Hong Kong is unlike the mainland, where the Government has controlled and shaped the development of its cyberspace. If the Hong Kong government were to engage in overt controls of the internet, it would be ambushing a hitherto unrestricted, global cyberspace.
 
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However, there are additional reasons for Hong Kong’s preference for infiltration beyond effectiveness, mainly the government’s continued interest in maintaining a veneer of democracy in the nation. Unlike mainland China, there are political and (more importantly) economic interests in retaining Hong Kong’s appearance as a democratic hub that is not fully integrated into the Chinese monolith. Therefore, Hong Kong is unlikely to enact a similar ‘Great firewall’ that China has established for many years. For evidence that the Hong Kong government is entirely committed to keeping up appearances of democracy, one need turn no further than the latest political battle over the upcoming legislative council election. Given that the majority of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy candidates have been arrested or chased into exile, the line taken by the anti-establishment is now one of boycott - hoping that the low turnout numbers will make evident the lack of democratic legitimacy vested in the establishment. But in the desire to keep up Hong Kong’s global reputation, the government has churned out advertisements and messaging urging citizens to vote in the upcoming election. The government’s vested interest in this veneer of democracy makes infiltration all the more explicable as its weapon against the anti-establishment movement.
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Such a move would entirely undermine the government’s continued interest in maintaining a veneer of democracy in the nation. There are political and economic interests in retaining Hong Kong’s appearance as a democratic hub not fully integrated into the Chinese monolith. Therefore, Hong Kong is unlikely to enact a similar ‘Great firewall’ that China has. The government’s vested interest in this veneer of democracy makes infiltration all the more explicable as its weapon against the anti-establishment movement.
 
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In light of police actions, the Anti-establishment has also made its own adjustments. For instance, communication has become more diffused than ever such that information is passed through connections of trust and only into small, contained groups. A notable practice that has developed is a ‘scorched-earth’ deletion of data upon arrest. Arrestees sever and delete all online traces, accounts, and connections. The intention is not only to protect themselves from incriminating evidence, but to prevent their device from being used as a ‘node’ for incriminating one’s friends and allies.
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The bruised Cyberspace, post-erosion of Hong Kong’s Free Internet

But regardless of the relatively covert nature of the government’s cyberspace infiltration, the government’s assault on Hong Kong’s cyberspace has clearly begun and the net has, like a body suffering trauma, reacted defensively and protectively.
 
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For the movement, activity has become more diffused than ever. Communication has retreated such that information is passed through connections of trust, limited to small, contained groups. Insecurity over data and digital footprints on the internet is brewing. A notable practice that has developed is a ‘scorched-earth’ deletion of data upon arrest. Arrestees sever and delete all online traces, accounts, and connections. The intention is not limited to self-protection from incriminating evidence, but to prevent their device from being used as a ‘node’ for incriminating one’s friends and allies.
 
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The third tug: Heightened user demands from encryption to deletion

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Technology giants active in Hong Kong’s cyberspace have sought to insulate themselves from political controversy and reassure users of their trustworthiness. Facebook and Google have hurried to reiterate their commitment to data privacy and have released all records of government data requests. Regardless, a further shift towards privacy in compromise of consumer comforts is explicable among Hong Kong’s digital population. When WhatsApp? announced new privacy policies allowing Facebook to access private user data in January 2021, usage dropped sharply in Hong Kong, coinciding with the rise of Telegram as media sites touted its stricter policies on stored user data.
 
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This practice of deletion belies the growth of a wider, general digital insecurity in Hong Kong, which has generated an even further shift towards privacy in compromise of consumer comforts. When WhatsApp? announced its new privacy policies allowing Facebook to gain access to private user data in January 2021, usage of the app dropped sharply in Hong Kong, coinciding with the rise of Telegram as the primary app for communications. Media sites touted Telegram’s stricter policies on stored user data as compared to Whatsapp. Now, there has been a second migration from Telegram to Signal, a messaging app based on free software principles with open source code. This time, the paradigm of consumer demand is no longer soft reassurance about the security of data but the guarantee of outright deletion. Strict data policies are no longer sufficient to quell privacy concerns. Encryption is no longer the talk of the town, rather, local media sites in Hong Kong flaunt the primary attraction of Signal - with its star feature being self-deleting messages. This is not new technology. Snapchat, Telegram’s technological predecessor, automatically deletes all messages once they are read unless the user intentionally saves them. However, it is the political climate that has stimulated user hyperawareness and heightened concern about the governing power structures and locus of data control, causing them to focus on the technology’s foundational principles, beyond its substantive technical functions.

This is a fine first draft, Skye. The best route to improvement is the one you recommend yourself: larger context.

The real subject here is the dynamics of the Net as the Chinese state tries to seize full control of political culture in Hong Kong. But the CCP and the now-decapitated and perforce "decentralized" resistance are by no means the only parties and people shaping history. The official Beijing narrative demands the existence of foreign influence, and Hong Kong is in fact integrated into global society. Berlin could be divided by a wall, taking on many pathological elements from the result of that amputation, but it became the more intricately international for that very reason before it was unified again. As its free press collapses, student unions are disavowed by universities, intellectuals and political activists flee the city, Hong Kong's Net is responding like the nervous system of a body undergoing trauma. Trying to understand all the people and parties involved in that process—other governments and their spies, the platforms and the finance powerhouses, the foreign telecomms, and so on—is too much for 1,000 words, of course. But the essay can only gain strength from taking more of them into account.

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As netizens react to recent Telegram arrests, there has been a second migration from Telegram to Signal, based on free software principles with open source code. The paradigm of consumer demand is no longer about securing data, but outright deletion. Local media sites flaunt the primary attraction of Signal being its feature of self-deleting messages. The political climate has stimulated user hyperawareness and heightened concern about the governing power structures and locus of data control, focussing users on the technology’s foundational protections, beyond its convenient technical functions.
 

Revision 3r3 - 10 Jan 2022 - 05:43:24 - SkyeLee
Revision 2r2 - 03 Jan 2022 - 13:39:33 - EbenMoglen
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