It can certainly be argued, that this is not a new phenomenon – the sale of weapons and technologies by private actors, even by former national security figures, is a long-standing and well-known routine.
Nonetheless, the impact of globally distributing cyber surveillance means could be much faster and more far reaching, while at the same time done under much confidentiality. Thus, in a world with no adequate restrictions and regulations on the cyber spyware market, it is now technically possible for an entire population to be easily surveilled over night by its government without (nearly) anyone knowing, while using the services of highly professional private entities.
This situation clearly creates serious concerns of massive infringements of fundamental human and civil rights, such as the rights to privacy; free speech; assemble; movement; and even life and bodily integrity. Various organizations around the world, including Citizen Lab, Privacy International, and others, are constantly trying to raise awareness to the matter and initiate change, without much success.
So What's Next?
In light of the aforesaid, one should ask: what is being done about this? The answer is, shortly, not much.
Thus, following his report on the Surveillance Industry and its Interference with Human Rights, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression has recently called for an immediate moratorium on the sale, transfer and use of surveillance technology until human rights-compliant regulatory frameworks are in place, while expressly indicating that surveillance tools are currently not subject to any effective global or national control.
One possible solution could be to hold the private entities accountable for any abuse of the spyware they provide. However, there are major difficulties in this regard. First, as an inherent feature of the cyber surveillance market, it is highly secretive, thus making it almost impossible to track and enforce. Furthermore, the providers of spyware often present their customers with some kind of a disclaimer, according to which the purchaser guarantees to use the equipment or services provided for legitimate purposes only, thus somewhat "immunizing" the provider's accountability.
Another option is to hold accountable the countries who allow the sale of cyber surveillance means from their territory and jurisdiction. However, it seems that many countries are quite reluctant (to say the least) to legislate and regulate against their own ability to provide and use cyber surveillance means, due to security, as well as commercial, reasons. As reality shows, the cyber surveillance market is a highly profitable and competitive field, as well as an area of mutual development and cooperation between different nations with varying common interests. Thus, the solution should not be expected to come from the international community any time soon.
Conclusion
Many suggest, and I tend to agree, that certain cyber surveillance means should be treated and regulated as weapons, with all that it entails. |