YuruiWuFirstEssay 3 - 26 May 2025 - Main.YuruiWu
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstEssay" |
| | -- By YuruiWu - 20 Feb 2025 | |
< < | Sometime in the earlier stages of the first Trump presidency, I would often say to my friends that Donald Trump would love to be president in China. The statement was mostly a bad attempt at humoring myself and my audience in an increasingly depressing world – a world that we have created, or at the very least, let it happen. | > > | In the earlier stages of the first Trump presidency, I would often joke to my friends that Donald Trump would love to be president of China. | | | |
< < | But as ludicrous as the statement was in some way, I believed there was some truth to it. Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, had amended the Constitution to allow himself an unprecedented third five-year term, effectively making himself an emperor for life. Overseas commentators noted that he has amassed more power in China than any previous leaders since the time of Mao by purging adversaries in government and locking up critics in civil society. The front pages of newspapers and websites sang his praises every day, even though it seemed like he did nothing of consequence most days of the year. Trump must be so jealous of the endless power and praises Xi bathes in. If he were running China, he would never have to deal with critical media or an independent judiciary, let alone the celebration his racist and misogynist rhetoric would have received among the Chinese public. But here in the U.S., he could be stopped – or so I thought. | > > | As much as it was an attempt at humor amid a bleak reality, I believed there was some truth to it. Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, had amended the Constitution to allow himself an unprecedented third five-year term, effectively making himself an emperor for life. Overseas commentators noted that he had amassed more power than any Chinese leader since Mao by purging adversaries and locking up critics. The front pages sang his praises every day, even though it seemed like he did little of consequence most days of the year. Trump must be envious of the endless power and praise Xi bathes in. If he were running China, he would never have to deal with critical media or an independent judiciary, let alone the celebration his racist and misogynist rhetoric might receive in such a tightly controlled media environment. But here in the U.S., he could be stopped—or so I thought. | | Anti-Fascist Institutions | |
< < | Trump was first elected a year after I came to the U.S. for school from Beijing. I would tell my host family how depressing it is for me that just as I managed to escape from one authoritarian regime for nine months each year, another authoritarian leader was taking over the U.S., my new adopted home. | > > | Trump was first elected a year after I came to the U.S. for school from Beijing. I would tell my host family how depressing it felt that just as I had managed to escape one authoritarian regime for nine months each year, another authoritarian leader was rising in my adopted home. | | | |
< < | Xi’s power grab in China and Trump’s rise in America coincided with my political awakening, so I was not capable of describing what I was feeling. Today, the more accurate word to describe the leaders of the two largest hegemonies would be “fascist”. In his New Yorker article, Timothy Snyder identified a characteristic of fascism in Stalinist Russia and America under Trump as the disassociation between language and its meaning. The more I learned about what was happening in Chinese society, the more I realized that words and popular slogans in official media were devoid of meaning. | > > | Xi’s power grab in China and Trump’s rise in America coincided with my political awakening. At the time, I didn’t have the vocabulary to describe what I was witnessing. Now I believe the more accurate term to describe the leaders of these two global hegemons is “fascist.” Timothy Snyder identified one characteristic of fascism—shared by Stalinist Russia and Trump’s America—as the dissociation between language and its meaning. The more I learned about Chinese society after I left, the more I saw how official slogans and public discourse were devoid of substance. | | | |
< < | Truth in language is also at the core of two critical pillars of society that set America apart from China. When injustice happens in America, journalists use straightforward language to uncover and explain the truth. When elected officials spread falsehood, reporters fact-check them and attempt to hold them accountable. After Trump was first elected, it appeared that liberal Americans believed in this power as they gave support to newspapers by subscribing and tuning into the evening news. The increasing demand for journalism was an endorsement of truth and passive resistance to fascism. | > > | This disassociation is central to what has long set America apart from China. Here, two institutions have long served to preserve the integrity of meaning: the press and the judiciary. When injustice occurs, journalists uncover the truth. When elected officials lie, reporters fact-check and challenge them. After Trump was first elected, a renewed public interest in journalism—reflected in subscriptions and ratings—signaled a collective belief in the power of truth. | | | |
< < | While journalism is responsible for upholding the truth in public discourse, lawyers fought back in the courtroom by employing the meaning behind the words in the Constitution. Of course, a brand of lawyers and judges have long sought to alter the meaning of those very words, but protecting the rights of the vulnerable in the courts has mostly worked. In Trump’s first term, judicial review successfully stopped him from harming many. | > > | The courts, too, pushed back. Lawyers and judges invoked the meaning of words in the Constitution to defend civil liberties. While some judges worked to reinterpret or dilute those words, judicial review managed to block many of Trump’s most harmful initiatives. For a time, the system worked. | | | |
< < | In China, to the limited extent that language had meaning in journalism and the courts before, Xi has managed to turn those institutions away from the truth. The courts are an extension of his power. The media is part of the propaganda machine. | > > | In China, by contrast, Xi has turned both institutions into instruments of the state. The courts serve his power; the media functions as propaganda. The tools that could have anchored truth have instead become mechanisms for consolidating personal rule.
Trump would love to be Xi. It’s no surprise that during his presidency—and increasingly in his second campaign—he has intensified attacks on journalism and the courts, the two institutions that can still resist his attempts to dissociate language from meaning. At the same time, Trump has incorporated into his machine an army of right-wing new media personalities, oftentimes replacing principled journalism on his loyal base’s screens. They have become the party mouthpieces akin to what Xi relies on in China.
The Party Behind the Throne
Yet Trump still wishes he had one key piece enjoyed by Xi: complete control of the party. Neither Trump nor Xi rules alone. Their cults of personality are dependent on their party’s loyalty to them, and their party’s grip on the public. With a two-party system, despite the fascist trajectory it is heading to, America should be more resilient to cultish leaders than China in principle. However, the Republican party, just like the Chinese Communist Party, has played the role of enablers for Trump. In both cases, the party infrastructure has been hollowed out to serve the ambitions of one man.
While Xi exerts repressive control over the CCP, fortified by direct command of the military, Trump’s power, however expansive, is subject to cracks within a more open political system. In the U.S., a handful of Republican senators could derail any major assault on democratic norms. Trump’s inability to command absolute party loyalty and the decentralized nature of American institutions still leave space for resistance. By contrast, dissent within the CCP remains almost unthinkable without risking immediate reprisal. | | | |
< < | Trump would love to be Xi. It should be no surprise that in his second term, he has increased his attacks on journalism and the courts, the two institutions that could still uphold the meaning behind language. | | Amnesia nation? | |
< < | Last semester, when Professor Benjamin Liebman discussed his decades-long experience observing the Chinese legal system and its further descent into authoritarianism under Xi at a lunch talk, I asked him if there was a way out of the downward spiral. He said he hopes that Xi will eventually die and maybe the next generation of leaders will be more liberal. I responded that I think that is too hopeful. Snyder’s observation on fascism gave me a reason to articulate this pessimism. What Xi, and his predecessors to an extent, have managed to do is to disassociate words with their true meanings. When one generation after another is raised in an environment where language bears no relation to truth, that is all they will ever know. Thanks to modern censorship technology, the Chinese government is more than capable of keeping society that way. Even countless deaths and mass starvation in its most populous and international city during a pandemic were not enough to alter that. There was collective rage and a brief moment of hope, but when language has no meaning, the public loses the collective tool to remember, and they soon forget. If more and more people become comfortable living in a fascist society, why justify the hope the next leaders will be better? | > > | Last semester, during Professor Liebman’s talk on the Chinese legal system and its authoritarian transformation, I asked him if there was a way out of the downward spiral. He replied that perhaps Xi will one day die, and a more liberal generation of leaders might emerge. I responded that this was too hopeful. Snyder’s observations helped me articulate my pessimism: when language is persistently divorced from meaning, the capacity for society to even imagine a different future disappears. One generation raised in this environment may forget; the next may never know.
That’s what happened to Tiananmen Square. It’s what’s happening with the covid lockdown. Rage flickered, hope surfaced, but without a shared language for truth, public memory faded. If society learns to live comfortably under fascism, why expect future leaders to choose anything else?
Unlike China, the U.S. still has meaningful resistance: constitutional norms, institutional autonomy, and an electorate with a real voice. Trump’s defeat in 2020 and the temporary backlash within his party proved that the machinery of fascism here is incomplete.
But his comeback and Xi’s continued popularity show how seductive these movements can be, especially when parties become vehicles of personal domination rather than democratic deliberation. The danger isn’t just in the leaders, but in the parties that carry them, echo their rhetoric, and strip language of its meaning.
China today shows us what happens when fascism wins. If we want a different tomorrow for America, we must not fall into amnesia. | | | |
< < | I am more hopeful that my adopted home will not turn into my birth country under Trump. It was further away from fascism than China ever was, and thus Trump would need to break more norms, and we would have more opportunities to resist. His electoral defeat in 2020 and the brief moment when some Republicans began condemning him demonstrates that. | | | |
< < | But Trump’s comeback and Xi’s popularity show the resilience of fascist leaders and their appeal to many. I am unsure if the Chinese society still has an opportunity to say no to fascism. It has been in amnesia for so long that it would take a miracle. The depressing reality in China shows that a fascist movement must be stopped before it silently destroys the remaining guardrails of truth in language and takes over the entire society. Trump and his followers would love to turn the United States into China. This is not the time to go under amnesia. | | | |
< < |
The draft is clear and effectively written. It makes its points economically. But the absence of the idea of "party," both in the Chinese and US context, limits the weight of your analysis. Xi and Trump are at once determined to be absolute rulers and absolutely dependent on the machinery of party. Both the CCP and the Republic Party in the US appear as entities dominated by their leaders, cults of personality warping asd you show the very language used to communicate about realities of policy and government into formulas of personal authority. But any loss of this apparent completeness of control over the party would bring the illusion of dictatorship to an end. Two or three Republican senators determined to oppose the Administration on any of most important efforts against constitutional rule would be sufficient to destroy the Administration's threat to the republic. Xi might be able to withstand that much dissent in the Central Committee, because his powers of immediate repression are so much stronger; this is why keeping direct personal control of the military has been so important to each of the strongmen since 1949. But if there is another chapter after the disappearance of Winnie the Poo, as Ben so romantically hopes, it can only come from within the party, not outside of it. That, as you say, would take a generation of new education to make possible.
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YuruiWuFirstEssay 2 - 27 Apr 2025 - Main.EbenMoglen
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstEssay" |
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< < | It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted. | | Fascist Superpowers: China Today, America Tomorrow? | | But Trump’s comeback and Xi’s popularity show the resilience of fascist leaders and their appeal to many. I am unsure if the Chinese society still has an opportunity to say no to fascism. It has been in amnesia for so long that it would take a miracle. The depressing reality in China shows that a fascist movement must be stopped before it silently destroys the remaining guardrails of truth in language and takes over the entire society. Trump and his followers would love to turn the United States into China. This is not the time to go under amnesia. | |
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The draft is clear and effectively written. It makes its points economically. But the absence of the idea of "party," both in the Chinese and US context, limits the weight of your analysis. Xi and Trump are at once determined to be absolute rulers and absolutely dependent on the machinery of party. Both the CCP and the Republic Party in the US appear as entities dominated by their leaders, cults of personality warping asd you show the very language used to communicate about realities of policy and government into formulas of personal authority. But any loss of this apparent completeness of control over the party would bring the illusion of dictatorship to an end. Two or three Republican senators determined to oppose the Administration on any of most important efforts against constitutional rule would be sufficient to destroy the Administration's threat to the republic. Xi might be able to withstand that much dissent in the Central Committee, because his powers of immediate repression are so much stronger; this is why keeping direct personal control of the military has been so important to each of the strongmen since 1949. But if there is another chapter after the disappearance of Winnie the Poo, as Ben so romantically hopes, it can only come from within the party, not outside of it. That, as you say, would take a generation of new education to make possible.
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YuruiWuFirstEssay 1 - 21 Feb 2025 - Main.YuruiWu
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META TOPICPARENT | name="FirstEssay" |
It is strongly recommended that you include your outline in the body of your essay by using the outline as section titles. The headings below are there to remind you how section and subsection titles are formatted.
Fascist Superpowers: China Today, America Tomorrow?
-- By YuruiWu - 20 Feb 2025
Sometime in the earlier stages of the first Trump presidency, I would often say to my friends that Donald Trump would love to be president in China. The statement was mostly a bad attempt at humoring myself and my audience in an increasingly depressing world – a world that we have created, or at the very least, let it happen.
But as ludicrous as the statement was in some way, I believed there was some truth to it. Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, had amended the Constitution to allow himself an unprecedented third five-year term, effectively making himself an emperor for life. Overseas commentators noted that he has amassed more power in China than any previous leaders since the time of Mao by purging adversaries in government and locking up critics in civil society. The front pages of newspapers and websites sang his praises every day, even though it seemed like he did nothing of consequence most days of the year. Trump must be so jealous of the endless power and praises Xi bathes in. If he were running China, he would never have to deal with critical media or an independent judiciary, let alone the celebration his racist and misogynist rhetoric would have received among the Chinese public. But here in the U.S., he could be stopped – or so I thought.
Anti-Fascist Institutions
Trump was first elected a year after I came to the U.S. for school from Beijing. I would tell my host family how depressing it is for me that just as I managed to escape from one authoritarian regime for nine months each year, another authoritarian leader was taking over the U.S., my new adopted home.
Xi’s power grab in China and Trump’s rise in America coincided with my political awakening, so I was not capable of describing what I was feeling. Today, the more accurate word to describe the leaders of the two largest hegemonies would be “fascist”. In his New Yorker article, Timothy Snyder identified a characteristic of fascism in Stalinist Russia and America under Trump as the disassociation between language and its meaning. The more I learned about what was happening in Chinese society, the more I realized that words and popular slogans in official media were devoid of meaning.
Truth in language is also at the core of two critical pillars of society that set America apart from China. When injustice happens in America, journalists use straightforward language to uncover and explain the truth. When elected officials spread falsehood, reporters fact-check them and attempt to hold them accountable. After Trump was first elected, it appeared that liberal Americans believed in this power as they gave support to newspapers by subscribing and tuning into the evening news. The increasing demand for journalism was an endorsement of truth and passive resistance to fascism.
While journalism is responsible for upholding the truth in public discourse, lawyers fought back in the courtroom by employing the meaning behind the words in the Constitution. Of course, a brand of lawyers and judges have long sought to alter the meaning of those very words, but protecting the rights of the vulnerable in the courts has mostly worked. In Trump’s first term, judicial review successfully stopped him from harming many.
In China, to the limited extent that language had meaning in journalism and the courts before, Xi has managed to turn those institutions away from the truth. The courts are an extension of his power. The media is part of the propaganda machine.
Trump would love to be Xi. It should be no surprise that in his second term, he has increased his attacks on journalism and the courts, the two institutions that could still uphold the meaning behind language.
Amnesia nation?
Last semester, when Professor Benjamin Liebman discussed his decades-long experience observing the Chinese legal system and its further descent into authoritarianism under Xi at a lunch talk, I asked him if there was a way out of the downward spiral. He said he hopes that Xi will eventually die and maybe the next generation of leaders will be more liberal. I responded that I think that is too hopeful. Snyder’s observation on fascism gave me a reason to articulate this pessimism. What Xi, and his predecessors to an extent, have managed to do is to disassociate words with their true meanings. When one generation after another is raised in an environment where language bears no relation to truth, that is all they will ever know. Thanks to modern censorship technology, the Chinese government is more than capable of keeping society that way. Even countless deaths and mass starvation in its most populous and international city during a pandemic were not enough to alter that. There was collective rage and a brief moment of hope, but when language has no meaning, the public loses the collective tool to remember, and they soon forget. If more and more people become comfortable living in a fascist society, why justify the hope the next leaders will be better?
I am more hopeful that my adopted home will not turn into my birth country under Trump. It was further away from fascism than China ever was, and thus Trump would need to break more norms, and we would have more opportunities to resist. His electoral defeat in 2020 and the brief moment when some Republicans began condemning him demonstrates that.
But Trump’s comeback and Xi’s popularity show the resilience of fascist leaders and their appeal to many. I am unsure if the Chinese society still has an opportunity to say no to fascism. It has been in amnesia for so long that it would take a miracle. The depressing reality in China shows that a fascist movement must be stopped before it silently destroys the remaining guardrails of truth in language and takes over the entire society. Trump and his followers would love to turn the United States into China. This is not the time to go under amnesia.
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Revision 3 | r3 - 26 May 2025 - 01:02:01 - YuruiWu |
Revision 2 | r2 - 27 Apr 2025 - 13:54:50 - EbenMoglen |
Revision 1 | r1 - 21 Feb 2025 - 03:57:36 - YuruiWu |
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