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< | Law school grades are commonly understood to be one of the most important factors in law firm associate hiring. Common wisdom ascribes the value of the grade as a hiring metric to its capacity to measure the production of excellent legal work. A cursory examination of the basis of law school grades, however, shows that the law school examination system measures little to nothing to do with a students skill at turning out the work of an associate lawyer. Looking harder at the purpose of grades in associate hiring, we find that, to the degree that they play a substantive role, they likely measure adaptability and the ability to conform to a set of externally imposed institutional motivations. Indeed, the firms’ use of the grade system as a hiring metric conveniently creates the very external goal structure that the student is being tested on conforming to. Grades are primarily given not to separate students on the basis of skill, but rather on the basis of their ability to be motivated by an external institutional set of values; grades show which students can be motivated by grades, and at the same time give the law firms a tool to | >
> | Law school grades are commonly understood to be one of the most important factors in law firm associate hiring. Common wisdom ascribes the value of the grade as a hiring metric to its capacity to measure the production of excellent legal work. A cursory examination of the basis of law school grades, however, shows that the law school examination system measures little to nothing to do with a students skill at turning out the work of an associate lawyer. Looking harder at the purpose of grades in associate hiring, we find that, to the degree that they play a substantive role, they likely measure adaptability and the ability to conform to a set of externally imposed institutional motivations. Indeed, the firms’ use of the grade system as a hiring metric conveniently creates the very external goal structure that the student is being tested on conforming to. Grades are primarily used not to separate students on the basis of skill, but rather on the basis of their ability to be motivated by an external institutional set of values; grades show which students can be motivated by grades, and at the same time give the law firms a tool to | | | Quality of work is the characteristic most popularly linked to grade performance; however, it is difficult to make a case for law school grades reflecting facility with the type of work that associate work requires. First year grades, and the majority of second and third year grades, are based on a short exam at the end of a semester of reading and lectures. Although this exam doubtless tests some degree of aptitude at writing and legal thinking, it is hard to see how a four hour snapshot of writing under severe time constraints measures a students ability to write legal documents, research, and otherwise perform the duties of an associate lawyer.
It is not possible to show for certain that the timed exam does not somehow provide a heuristic for measuring quality of associate work; however, the difficulty of showing how this metric would function leads us to the proposition that the law firms are not actually looking at grades for a substantive measure of future work quality. | |
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< | If the firm is not looking at grades as a measure of possible work quality, it is possible that they are looking at the grades as a measure of motivational capacity. To the degree that grades are (to some extent) based on the effort put into learning and preparing for the exam, the law school exam is measuring effort output. In general, the motivation for this effort is generally going to come either from the student herself, or from external social and institutional pressures. As the exam becomes more and more stilted and less indicative of actual learning and useful skills (i.e. approaches the four hour in-class exam), the internally motivated students interested in actual learning are likely to perform more and more poorly. The students influenced by external motivations – the students most likely to adapt to and be motivated by the institutional goals of the law firm – are separated from students who are unaffected by the pressures of the institution to conform. This substantive explanation of grades matches well with the limited data that exists on the topic. A Michigan Law School study has shown a strong correlation between high grades in law school and law firm retention, but a very small correlation between grades and future earning capacity. Grades are selecting for students that are insecure, or lack strong internal drive: students that can be easily absorbed, motivated, and held by an institution. | >
> | If the firm is not looking at grades as a measure of possible work quality, it is possible that they are looking at the grades as a measure of motivational capacity. To the degree that grades are (to some extent) based on the effort put into learning and preparing for the exam, the law school exam is measuring effort output. In general, the motivation for this effort is going to come either from the student herself, or from external social and institutional pressures. As the exam becomes more and more stilted and less indicative of actual learning and useful skills (i.e. approaches the four hour in-class exam), the internally motivated students interested in actual learning are likely to perform more and more poorly. The students influenced by external motivations – the students most likely to adapt to and be motivated by the institutional goals of the law firm – are thereby separated from students who are unaffected by the institutional pressures to conform. This substantive explanation of grades matches well with the limited data that exists on the topic. A Michigan Law School study has shown a strong correlation between high grades in law school and law firm retention, but a very small correlation between grades and future earning capacity. Law firms are selecting for students that are insecure or lack strong internal drive: students that can be easily absorbed, motivated, and held by an institution.
Although this explanation provides some substantive basis for the use of grades by law firms, it does not explain the existence of the system, or address any additional non-substantive explanations for the law school grading system. In addition to providing a way to identify externally motivated students, an emphasis on grades provides a way for law firms to use a preexisting external structure to capture and hold these students as associates. By emphasizing grades as a vital piece of the hiring process, the firm is using the anxiety and insecurity that the school has created through the grading process as a tool to play on the same weaknesses that the grades are testing. A student who has accepted the law school’s grading system as an indicator of value is likely to jump at an offer by a law firm that purports to only hire top GPA students. Students that have “barely made the cut” and who have been turned down and later accepted are even more likely to take the job – allowing the firm to hire associates both insecure about their own worth and overly grateful for the chance to produce work.
Not only does the law firm’s ability to use the grading system to prey on the insecurities of students provides an addition explanation for the use of grades in hiring, but this feature of the system additionally allows us to explain the existence of the system in the first place. A strong emphasis on grades in law school is essential to create the artificial value metric and conditions of insecurity and self-doubt that the firm uses to capture and hold new associates. Law firms use the reliance on grades to | | | |
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