American Legal History

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DeathPenaltyProject-Revised 4 - 25 Jan 2010 - Main.AngelaChen
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-- AngelaChen - 23 Jan 2010
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  All this is relevant to the present inquiry because it leads to the following possible answer (as suggested above) that some Quakers simply felt it unavoidable to demonstrate a greater acceptance of English laws (thus including English laws on capital punishment), in the narrow purpose in exchange for recognition of the affirmation taken by Quakers as a legitimate alternative to the oath taken by others, and in a wider purpose as an instrument of compromise with those back in England. Certainly, the tone adopted in the Act seemed to be conciliatory with regards to how English law was to be viewed in the colony: see for example the emphasis on the 'birthright' of British subjects to the English common law at the very start of the Act and the implicit concession that offenders were flouting the law due, amongst other things, to the statutes on capital crimes having 'not been hitherto fully extended to this province'.
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One alternative answer to the question of how Quakers 'accepted' the institution of capital punishment which we haven not addressed so far: perhaps it was the case that the law relating to capital crimes became harsher as written 'on the books' but in practice was not carried out to the degree set out by the text of the laws, particularly since we may see from the Pugh and Thomas case that Quakers sat on the juries sentencing those accused of capital crimes (or indeed in this case made up the majority of the jury). If this were in fact the truth, one might see how the Quakers could ostensibly accept the death penalty as a formal institution yet maintain their pacifism in practice. A reading of the cases in Pennsylvania up to the year 1700 shows only one instance of the death penalty actually being inflicted on an offender. However, a quick scan of the Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania(1) shows that juries seemed to show scant hesitation in sentencing people to death for murder in the ensuing years. The fact that the Quakers sitting on the Pugh and Thomas case in 1718 were quite happy to sentence the two convicts to death shows, as suggested earlier, that at least some Quakers were no longer as adherent to pure pacifism as a part of their faith as founder George Fox may have been. Unfortunately I have been unable to locate accessible, comprehensive court records from the period after 1700 onwards (hence my use of the Minutes of the Provincial Council as a substitute) - this may be a profitable line of further exploration if anyone should be interested in pursuing the inquiry vis-a-vis how often and for which crimes the death penalty was used in practice, or how often convicted offenders were pardoned or were able to avail themselves of the benefit of clergy (which was retained in the 1718 Act)(2).

Notes

1 : Available in multiple volumes from Butler Library, Columbia University

2 : see pg 106-107, 1718 Act


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One alternative answer to the question of how Quakers 'accepted' the institution of capital punishment which we haven not addressed so far: perhaps it was the case that the law relating to capital crimes became harsher as written 'on the books' but in practice was not carried out to the degree set out by the text of the laws, particularly since we may see from the Pugh and Thomas case that Quakers sat on the juries sentencing those accused of capital crimes (or indeed in this case made up the majority of the jury). If this were in fact the truth, one might see how the Quakers could ostensibly accept the death penalty as a formal institution yet maintain their pacifism in practice. A reading of the cases in Pennsylvania up to the year 1700 shows only one instance of the death penalty actually being inflicted on an offender. However, a quick scan of the Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania(3) shows that juries seemed to show scant hesitation in sentencing people to death for murder in the ensuing years. The fact that the Quakers sitting on the Pugh and Thomas case in 1718 were quite happy to sentence the two convicts to death shows, as suggested earlier, that at least some Quakers were no longer as adherent to pure pacifism as a part of their faith as founder George Fox may have been. Unfortunately I have been unable to locate accessible, comprehensive court records from the period after 1700 onwards (hence my use of the Minutes of the Provincial Council as a substitute) - this may be a profitable line of further exploration if anyone else should be interested in pursuing the inquiry, vis-a-vis how often and for which crimes the death penalty was used in practice, or how often convicted offenders were pardoned or were able to avail themselves of the benefit of clergy (which was retained in the 1718 Act)(4).
 Finally, although the resignation of many prominent Quakers from the Assembly in 1755 was not in protest against the death penalty but instead in protest against the raising of armed forces to wage war against the Indians as a violation of their pacifist views, the fact that they essentially lost - or gave up - real control of Assembly would have meant that the law on capital punishment (or anything else) would not any longer be predominantly shaped by Quaker pacifist beliefs. Thus, after this period any Quakers opposing the death penalty would no longer be able to challenge or usurp it as directly or easily, at least via legislative means.

Revision 4r4 - 25 Jan 2010 - 04:26:21 - AngelaChen
Revision 3r3 - 24 Jan 2010 - 04:38:50 - AngelaChen
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