The Siren Triangle

The government, the media, and the defense industry

By Elliott Ash

Abstract

The Pentagon's military analyst program is just the latest and most barefaced example of the poorly understood iron triangle comprising government agencies, defense contractors, and media conglomerates. This note traces the mutualistic coevolution of the defense industry and the mass media. Statutes and decisions on propaganda, fraud, false advertising, defense spending, and state secrets are explicated and applied to the industries; conduct. The reciprocal relationships between defense and media laws and the behavior of the defense and media industries are examined. Possible avenues for breaking the triangle are discussed, including greater transparency in defense matters and preservation of competition in media markets.

Text

Introduction

First shalt thou reach the Sirens; they the hearts
Enchant of all who on their coast arrive.
The wretch, who unforewarn'd approaching, hears
The Sirens' voice, his wife and little- ones
Ne'er fly to gratulate his glad return,
But him the Sirens sitting in the meads
Charm with mellifluous song, while all around
The bones accumulated lie of men
Now putrid, and the skins mould'ring away.

-The Odyssey of Homer

• The corruption linking the government to the media to the defense industry is an intertwined mess of tendrils. Flagitious defense spending is doxa, unquestioned and encouraged by the media.
• Give account of military analyst program.
• How did this happen? Why did it happen? This paper will try to explain.

Decide whether to organize these sections by line, by point, or by time

The Siren Triangle

• Interlocking histories: A chronicle of the autocatalytic coevolution of the modern media and modern military.
• We spend more on the military than the rest of the world combined. We also spend more on the media industry.
• The Siren Triangle is not a conspiracy, with deliberate intent on the part of the actors to conspire against the public interest. Rather, the Siren Triangle is an emergent phenomenon of decentralized social processes, where self-interested activities by separate entities combine into a triangular feedback loop (See Herman and Chomsky 2002 at xi).

The Political-Military Establishment

Media Conglomerates

• http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:S.652.ENR:Telecommunications Act of 1996?

• Jessica Lynch and Pat Tillman.

Government and Defense Contractors

• Evidence indicates quid pro quo between government and more influential contractors. (Fleisher 1993; Karpoff 1999)
• Retroactive immunity given to telecommunications corporations in 2008.
• Break-down of defense spending. Return on expensive programs.
• Important historical events

Defense Contractors and Media

• Defense-industry R&D funding facilitated growth and consolidation of media industry (Cypher 2002)
• General Electric and CBS own defense-industry assets (Kellner 1992)

• A metaphorical nexus and corrupt offspring of the Siren Triangle

The horrible side effects and counterproductivity of weapons technology. (Kolko 2007 at 18-23) Crimes against humanity: mai lai, abu graib, guantanamo.

Discussion

From a legal perspective, the Siren Triangle is a complicated problem. The tangle of corrupt laws that enable and feed the triangle are numerous, and they aren't all in the most obvious places. From a sociological perspective, the problem is infinitely more complicated: Not only do you have to promulgate the regulatory changes just discussed; you have to make fundamental structural changes in how the government and society function in order to get them passed into law and followed correctly.

But perhaps the so-called "sociological" perspective is not meaningful distinct from the "legal" perspective. Instead, figuring out realistic measures that could help cure the Siren Triangle is just taking a broader legal perspective; the difference being that you recognize that all functions of government and society are fair game for reform. In dealing with monstrous, inertial problems like the Siren Triangle, it might serve to contemplate what the endogenous or exogenous variables are. On a short time frame, one might say that "law" is just an exogenous variable. So the problem-solver works around the law. On a longer time frame, law becomes an endogenous variable to the problem because the actor can take deliberate measures to repeal and revise the law. As the problem's time horizon increases, more variables become endogenous and thus instruments toward solving the problem, things like wealth, technology, prejudice, corporate incumbency, etc. In the very long run, even such apparent monoliths as constitutional provisions and even the human genetic code become endogenous.

The lesson of this discussion, I think, is that dealing with the Siren Triangle requires both short-term and long-term strategies. The short-term should deal with more realistic regulations such as closing the revolving door, prosecuting violations of existing propaganda laws.

More long-term solutions would be increasing transparency.

Very long-term solutions might involve reversing supreme court holdings on executive privilege, the commander-in-chief power, government transparency, freedom of the press, and restoring the requirement that Congress declare war before the executive engages in armed conflict against enemy states. Even more long term, we can relieve pedagogical limitations and even genetic limitations on human cognition and morality that curse human democracies to problems like the Siren Triangle.

Information Transmission

Lieberson (2002) demonstrates that transmission of aesthetic preferences has its own internal logic. The transmission of knowledge has its own internal logic. Some of that is based on human psychology: Some messages are more salient than others as a result of our brain structure (Boyer 2001). Humans appear to prefer truth to falsity, and also the appearance of truth over the appearance of falsity. What other neural mechanisms guide capture and transfer of information? Whatever they are, these evolved mechanisms for information processing are manipulable. Individuals can manipulate others to do their bidding (Dawkins 1982). This process will inevitably result if an entity 1) would benefit from such manipulation, and 2) it has the communicative tools to successfully undertake the manipulation. Humans do this to each other on a daily basis, with varying results. But the entity in this model doesn't have to be a human being. Collective organizations have their own emergent self-interest, and if they have the tools to manipulate humans to their benefit, they will do so. Governments and corporations are prime examples of this phenomenon. Congress will benefit if Americans think that there are no agency costs between citizen and representative--thus, "We are the party of the people." Media corporations will benefit via higher ratings if viewers think they are in danger and that that corporation's media product will give good information about avoiding that danger. This analysis puts the lie to the standard establishmentarian refrain that advertisements provide "information" about products. That is self-evidently false. Advertisements are disinformation--they are manipulation of the brains of the viewer. The upshot is that the actors in the Siren Triangle--the government, the media, and defense contractors--are actively and deliberately manipulating the public sphere to facilitate the production and reproduction of messages that strengthen the Siren Triangle.

The other problem is that while the benefits of the Siren Triangle are fully internalized by the three entities, the costs are distributed over the whole American electorate and, more crucially, citizens the world over. As far as the American citizenry goes, the coordination costs required to organize an effective populist campaign against the components of the Siren Triangle are preventative. But while Americans at least can vote with their ballots and their eyeballs, the rest of the world is out of luck. The costs that are imposed upon other countries are irremediable; neither the US government, the media, nor the defense contractors have to answer to the complaints of foreign citizens.

Scholars who complain of quid pro quo between politicians and defense contractors frame the relationship as that between buyer and seller: The defense contractor buys the vote. Empirical evidence shows that this is the wrong explanation. Instead, defense contractors support those candidates with preexisting ideological predispositions in favor of defense spending. The funding and support helps those candidates ascend to political power, and primaries and elections are just the final processes. Once defense-contractor-friendly individuals are in office, those predispositions are reproduced through path-dependent processes--specifically, those politicians hire and support new politicians with similar views on the defense industry. This process might explain why defense contractors donate to both democrats and republicans in electoral races. A better empirical test would involve examination of defense-contractor donations during primary season; the hypothesis being that the primary candidate that most supports defense spending will be more likely to gain the nomination.

An analogue is the broken promotion process in the intelligence community elucidated by Kolko (2007). Blindly optimistic interpreters of intelligence were promoted by politicians who refused to see failure in Vietnam. Also, Neocons did not cause America to be militaristic; Neocons were hired because they were militaristic (Kolko 2007 at 97-98).

Military Technology and Intellectual Property

Military technology is a peculiar category of intellectual property. When embodied in a weapon, it does not produce net utility. Military technology schemes:

• Free sharing of military technology.
• Preservation of technology, sale of weapons
• Preserving technology and weapons.
• Agreement not to weaponize technology.
• Agreement not to pursue military technology (article on dual use: Guichard 03)

• Eli Whitney's replaceable parts. (Lehman 1996 at 8)
• Military technology was repeatedly monetized throughout the last century (Cypher 2002).

Arms races

• Between politicans. Candidates spend more. Offices grow (Kolko 07?).
• Between media companies. Media companies compete for viewers. Result: huge expenses for worthless technology (ex. doppler radar)
• Between military agencies. US builds astronomically expensive weapons that are practically worthless (Kolko 07 at 91, 93).
• Between institutions and public: Public develops safeguards against abuse; institutions develop work-arounds; repeat.

The Agency Problem

A fundamental problem in American governance that the Siren Triangle is founded upon is that the agents in charge of the country do not share the goals or incentive structure of the public. What the public wants the government to do is miles away from what the governors want the government to do. Media companies and defense contractors are quasi-public entities, and their incentive structures are not aligned with the public's.

SourceQuotes?

Bibliography

Subject Legend:

• G = Government/Military
• C = Defense contractors
• M = Media
• MAP = Military Analyst Program