Open-Source E-Voting Heads West 

The Australian system cost $125,000 to develop and implement the software, and about $75,000 for the 80 machines running it in polling places distributed around the Australian Capital Territory. The machines, which were standard off-the-shelf PCs, cost the government the equivalent of about $750 each.

Matt Quinn, lead engineer for Software Improvement's voting system, was pleased to hear about Ritchie's plan.

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never settle.

"The market's big enough for Diebold, Sequoia and ES&S (the three top voting machine makers); and it's certainly big enough for more than one free-software offering," he said. "Obviously I'd like our system to be successful, but there's certainly no reason why no other systems couldn't be successful, too. I think it's about time."

Some voting activists say all voting code should be open source so the public can ensure that the code is doing what it's supposed to do and doesn't contain security flaws.

But Rebecca Mercuri, a computing expert on e-voting machines and a research fellow at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, said that open source alone is not a panacea for the fundamental security problem with computers -- which is that there is no way to confirm that the software is doing only what it's designed to do and not something else.

"A crappy open-source system that can be modified readily is no better than a closed-source system. In fact it could be worse," she said. "When you have open-source software, people can modify it and change it however they want."

Mercuri said open-source systems give people a false sense of security because malicious code that could alter an election still can be installed in the operating system on which the voting program is running or in the compiling programs that turn source code into an operational program.

What's more, election officials have to make sure the system is implemented correctly, and have to find some way to ensure that all of the code they review is actually the code that runs on the system.

Pointing to recent events in California where Diebold Election Systems placed uncertified software in 17 counties without the state knowing it, Mercuri said that "open source provides no additional protection from people who are intent on putting uncertified software in machines used in an election."

But even with extra precautions, she said, there still is no way to catch all types of sophisticated Trojan horses that might be slipped into code.

This is why Mercuri was one of the first computing experts to stress the need for a voter-verified paper audit trail to provide a backup for votes.

"Open source provides some layer of protection, but that doesn't mean you can remove other security mechanisms, such as the ability to do an independent recount with the system," Mercuri said.

Software Improvement's Quinn agreed. The company initially built its system to offer a VVPAT, but the Australian Capital Territory opted not to use the option, due to increased cost.

To read Wired News' complete coverage of e-voting, visit the Machine Politics section.

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More stories written by Kim Zetter